Movements and Political Parties in the 21st Century: Exploring the Role of ICTs, Human Development, and Political-Activism Culture in East Asia and Latin America by Negron, Wilneida
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone 
Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 
2-2018 
Movements and Political Parties in the 21st Century: Exploring the 
Role of ICTs, Human Development, and Political-Activism Culture 
in East Asia and Latin America 
Wilneida Negron 
The Graduate Center, City University of New York 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2472 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 





Movements and Political Parties in the 21st Century: 
 
 
Exploring the Role of ICTs, Human Development, and Political 










A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City 















































Movements and Political Parties in the 21st Century: 
Exploring the Role of ICTs, Human Development, and Political-Activism Culture in East Asia and 
Latin America 
 
By Wilneida Negrón 
 
This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in 




________________________             Stephanie Golob 
Date      Chair of Examining Committee  
 
 
________________________            Allyson Cole 




Supervisory Committee  
Kenneth Erickson  












Movements and Political Parties in the 21st Century: 
Exploring the Role of ICTs, Human Development, and Political-Activism Culture in East Asia and 
Latin America 
 
By Wilneida Negrón 
 
The dynamics between social movements and political parties are shifting in the 21st 
century.  Due to the emergence of information communication technologies (ICTs), political 
parties are facing increased pressure to use ICTs to co-exist, complement, and nurture social 
movements and empowered civic communities (Nahon, 2015).  However, this shift is not 
ahistorical and technologically deterministic.  Rather, the shifting relationship between social 
movements and political parties is one that can be shaped by a variety of demographic and socio-
economic factors as well as preexisting cultures of resistance, activism, and electoral 
campaigning.  This research examines potential patterns and casual mechanisms which can help 
explain how ICTs enable new political opportunities which can shift relations between 
movements and political parties in emerging democracies.  Specifically, the case studies reveal 
that history matters and that contextual factors such as successive student movements and a 
country’s human development, particularly education, can help us understand the changing 
relationship between social movements and political parties.   
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The past years have exposed democracy’s structural flaws.  Although more than half the 
world’s people are living under democratic systems, freedom around the world has declined, and 
authoritarian governments have become more repressive (Freedom House 2016).   Across the 
world, democratic representative institutions are experiencing varying symptoms of political 
disaffection and cynicism as seen by low voter turnout in elections and weakening levels of party 
loyalty and membership (Mair2007; Webb and White 2009).  Consequently, the crisis in 
democratic representation and governance has increased the scrutiny of political parties around 
the world.  Studies have found that legislative branches and political parties are the most salient 
targets of public cynicism (Diamond 2014).  Therefore, while low voter turnout and decreasing 
levels of party membership have been observed in advanced Western democracies since the 
1960s (Barnes et al. 1979; Lipset and Schneider 1983; Dalton 1988; Nye 1997; Pharr and 
Putnam 2000), changes in citizens’ attachments to political parties continue to be a concerning 




Within this context, the emergence of information communication technologies (ICTs) 
are believed to be undermining democratic institutions, particularly political parties (Putnam 
2000) while they are also empowering the masses.  ICTs refer to a range of technologies 
available to facilitate communication, community building, and information sharing. They 
provide convenient, cheap, and innovative methods of communication such as the Internet, 
social networks, email, and mobile/SMS technologies (Hafkin & Huyer 2006). Although ICTs’ 
influence over politics is constantly evolving and its future developments are not easy to predict 
(Vaccari 2008; Bimber 1998, 1999; Budge 1996; Hacker and van Dijk 2000; Weare 2002), ICTs 
possess several dynamic characteristics which differentiate them from previous 
telecommunication advancements such as newspapers, radio, and television.   
 
Most notably, a significant political outcome of the increased pace and 
interconnectedness of ICTs has been their ability to facilitate the development of horizontal 
political networks (Bimber and Jorba2012) and to provide opportunities for citizens to increase 
and deepen political participation (Lusoli et al 2003; Jordan and Taylor 2004).  Therefore, 
although political participation via traditional channels such as political parties has waned, 
political participation around the world has increased due to the diversification of political 
participation enabled by ICTs (Ayres 1999; Bimber 2003; Dalton 2006; Micheletti and 
McFarland 2011).   Because of these features, ICTs have been found to have a “transformative 
potential” which can restructure political power towards a populist direction (Weitzner 2007: 
20) and change opportunity structures for political change and the range of possible outcomes 
(Howard 2010, Pattie et al. 2003; Negroponte 1995: 229; Dahlberg 2001; Di Maggio 2001; Scott 
and Street 2000; Gurak and Logie 2003; Boncheck 1995; Garrett 2006; Schudson 2004; 




Yet, despite these virtues, scholars have warned against the technological determinism of 
ICTs.  First, scholars have argued that ICTs’ highly fragmented structure, increasing 
commercialization, and inequalities in access and formation of groups (i.e. “digital divide,” see 
Norris 2001), prevent them from facilitating dense networks that cross-cut various issues and 
identities (Healy 1997; Sunstein 2007; Castells 1999; Norris 2003: 9; Bimber 1998; Corrado 
2000; Davis 1999; Davis and Owen 1998; Hill and Hughes 1998; Kamarck and Nye 1999).  
Therefore, ICTs have been found to not effectively and equitably provide additional spaces for 
political deliberation and participation (Wellman et al 2001; Dahlberg 2001; Papacharissi 2002; 
Wilhelm 2000; Feick 2007).  This is also often referred to as the “democracy divide,” or people’s 
differential usage of ICTs for political purposes, which creates an unequal distribution of power 
and influence in political systems (Norris 2001).  The emergence of democracy divides raises 
critical questions for democracies around the world, as it suggests that there will be an 
increasing number of politically marginalized citizens in the digital age.  
 
Putnam (2000) also argues that ICTs will have a detrimental impact on engagement 
because they are primarily used for entertainment.  Rather, ICTs distract us from civic duties 
(Putnam 2000) and make us less thoughtful, less connected (Turkle, 2011; Kavanaugh et al 
2005; Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010; Diani 2000; Clark and Themudo 2004; Tilly 2004b).   
Consequently, some studies have found that new ICT-enabled forms of political participation 
have little substantive impact on real-life political goals (Bimber 2001; Scheufele and Nisbet 
2002), contributing only to ‘slacktivism’.  Slacktivism refers to political activities that only serve 
to increase the feel–good factor of the participants (Morozov 2009).   Therefore, citizens may be 
lured away from more effective forms of participation whether within political parties or 
through other more traditional activist repertoires (Putnam 2000).   Finally, scholars argue that 
ICTs tend to undermine social cohesion and instead contribute to a “society made up of the 
juxtaposition of flows and tribes which cease to be a society and bears the seeds of a new, 
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fundamental barbarianism” (Castells 1999: 60).  Thus, ICTs, and the “networked individualism” 
they produce, intensify this sense of dislocation. Likewise, the multiple channels and outlets 
now available for “niche” audiences, fragments voter information and contributes to 
“accelerated pluralism” (Bimber 1998; Kriesi 2008; Castells 2009) which makes it harder for the 
public to agree on the salience of issues and for political parties to mediate among the differing 
opinions (Bennett & Manheim 2006; Bimber 2005, Farrell & Webb 2000; Norris 2000; Prior 
2007).   
 
ICTs and People Power from Below 
 
Central to this study is the changing relationship between new forms of activism and 
social movements and political parties (Rohlinger 2015).  Despite the contradictory claims about 
the utility of ICTs in the political sphere, there is ample evidence that ICTs are helping to 
increase activism and protest around the world (Carothers and Youngs 2015).  The 
consequences of this increased activism are twofold.  First, the resurgence of “new” electronic, 
digital or networked action repertoires, have been found to support the politicization of existing 
struggles and issue areas as well as introduce new political players and social issues to 
established advocacy spaces (Costanza-Chock 2003; Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010; Della Porta 
and Diani 2006; McAdam et al 2001; Taylor & Van Dyke 2004).  Second, these new tech-
supported repertoires of contention are also enabling new opportunity structures.  Opportunity 
structures are best understood as the contextual factors outside of a social movement which 
impact and shape the success and sustainability of movements (McAdam, 1996).  Per McAdam 
(1996: 42), political opportunities typically are: (1) accessibility of the political system, (2) the 
stability or fragmentation of alignments among elites, (3) the presence of elite allies, and (4) the 
state’s capacity and propensity for repression.  ICTs help to enable new opportunity structures 
by helping to accelerate and geographically extend the diffusion of social movements, activism, 
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and protest (Myers1994; Ayres1999; Vegh 2003). Therefore, news coverage of protest activity in 
one location can increase issue salience across a much broader region, potentially motivating 
future actions elsewhere. Finally, ICTs offer modes of communication and organizing that allow 
activists to communicate directly with their audience and challenge top-down hierarchical forms 
of communications (Scott and Street2000; Kidd2003; Rucht 2004)1.This levels the playing field 
for new emerging groups and political actors.  
ICTs and Party Decline or Renewal?  
Since ICTs offer new means for citizens to engage in politics and social life, scholars have 
tried to understand how citizens and political parties use these technologies.  This branch of 
research has raised empirical and theoretical questions about how ICTs may promote or 
undermine people-party linkages (Stockton 2001; Norris 2003) as well as whether they decrease 
citizens’ reliance on elected officials or party organizations (Corrado and Firestone 1999; Budge 
1996; Whitley 2010; Gibson and Ward2000; Oates et al. 2006; Lusoli 2005).   Two seminal 
studies -- Political Parties and Democratic Linkages (Dalton et al 2013) and Political Parties 
and the Internet: Net Gain?(Gibson et al 2003)-- provide a comprehensive assessment of how 
political parties are adapting to the emergence of ICTs.  Both studies find that overall, political 
parties will not be undermined by ICTs because political parties are adapting to changes brought 
on by ICTs and incorporating these technologies into their practice (Dalton et al 2011; Gibson et 
al 2003).  Specifically, ICTs have been found to help political parties in several ways.   
 
                                                 
1 The Internet potentially allows activists to increasingly circumvent government-imposed barriers to organization 
and mobilization. This ability is illustrated in recent failed attempts by authoritarian regimes to censor or block access 
to the Internet. Increasing reliance on ICTs in contentious activity also poses a risk for social movements because it 
creates new opportunities for demobilization efforts. In many cases, elites and their allies own and/or control the 
infrastructure on which new ICTs depend. If a use becomes too threatening, challengers may be denied access to 




First, ICTs have been found to provide new avenues of communication which allow 
parties to bypass traditional media and communicate directly with the public (Kamarck 1999; 
Norris 2003: 26; Römmele 2003, 9–11).  This can result in new forms of interactivity and 
deliberation that would contribute to more direct forms of democracy (Grossman 1995; Budge 
1996).  Second, they bring several benefits for minor parties, such as the ability to accurately 
portray what a party stands for, recruit new members, engage in fund raising, provide timely 
information, and mobilize grassroots activists in a timely and cost-effective manner.  
Consequently, ICTs have been found to “equalize” the electoral playing field by reducing the cost 
of campaigning as well as reducing regulatory and financial barriers (Gibson & Ward 1998; 
Rheingold 2000).  This can increase the ability for fringe and minor opposition parties to get 
their message out and mobilize supporters like major parties (Margolis & Resnick 2000; 
Margolis et al. 2003: 57–8; Barber 2001; Corrado and Firestone 1999; Hagen and Mayer 2000; 
Norris 2001).  Finally, the emergence of political party Web sites and various social media 
accounts used by political parties are believed to have a direct impact in terms of engaging 
voters on policy issues and encouraging people to go out and vote.   
 
However, while political parties around the world appear to be adapting to these 
technologies, questions have surfaced regarding their ability to transform and deepen people-
party linkages, and hence, representation. Norris (2009) argues that, on a global basis, the 
penetration of Internet usage is a greater predictor than democratization of whether political 
parties of a nation will maintain a Web presence. Therefore, she argues that “the strongest and 
most significant indicator of the presence of all parties online is technological diffusion, 
measured by the proportion of the population online, followed by levels of socioeconomic 
development” (9).  At the same time, evidence shows that the interactivity often attributed to 
ICTs does not always result in effective forms of deliberation and communication between 
voters and political parties (Gibson et al 2003).  Rather, party’s use of ICTs has become an 
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additional tool in their repertoire of politicking and marketing, thereby existing right alongside 
more traditional forms of communication.   Most notably, scholars have found that in mature 
western democracies such as the US, UK, and Norway (Jackson and Lilleker 2009; Kalnes 2009; 
Foot and Schneider 2006), political parties’ use of ICTs resembles more ill-defined attempts to 
join a marketing bandwagon than a conscious and well-planned strategic effort to connect with 
voters (Bimber and Davis 2003).   
 
These findings have led to the conclusion that political parties are not necessarily using 
ICTs to create an “informational democracy” (Castells 1996), facilitate a new civic arena (Stoker 
2006; White 1997; Bimber 1999, 2001; Comfield 2000; Dahlgren 2000), or enhance or broaden 
participation among disengaged groups (Tedesco 2007; Jackson and Lilleker 2009; Norris 
2003).  Rather, political parties are primarily using ICTs to improve the speed of organizational 
communication (Bentivegna 2006: 336) and mostly communicate with current supporters or 
what Bimber and Davis call “preaching to the converted" (2003: 54).  Consequently, ICTs have 
also been found to increase the costs of campaigning and the day-to-day party operations for 
political parties, because they do not replace existing traditional communication methods.  So, 
parties now must allocate funding for additional technology-savvy staff or consultants which can 
be a large expense (Norris 2004; Bimber and Davis 2003).  Thus, politicians now face pressure 
to modernize, as they increasingly must maintain official blogs and social media accounts.  
 
The political use of ICTs’ by political parties is often explained by the demographic 
hypothesis.  This hypothesis states that the use of ICTs’ for political purposes depends on the 
demographic profile of the individuals using them as well as the overall demographic profile of 
the country (Della Porta 2006).  Specifically, studies have found that citizen resources and 
motivation, socioeconomic development, the character of civil society (Norris 2002); the digital 
divide, the media system, and the institutional setting (Anduiza et al 2012: 8) are some of the 
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key individual and country factors which shape the democratic utility of ICTs.  Studies have also 
found that the existence of low broadband Internet, prevailing political apathy, and distrust of 
political parties are factors which could discourage political parties from using these 
technologies to transform party-citizen linkages (Loulis 2003; Schmitter 2003).    
 
Finally, as noted earlier, the ability of social movements to leverage ICTs has been 
changing the dynamics between movements and political parties. Internet-savvy movements 
can help fill in gaps in party structures.  Thus, ICTs are crucial to the proliferation of non-
traditional third-party actors (Farrell and Schmitt-Beck, 2008), including new issue-centered or 
identity-based movements (Castells, 2010) and new movement parties (NMPs) (Gunther and 
Diamond 2001; Schmitter 2001).  Therefore, many argue that ICTs have the potential to alter 
the cultural context in which politics happens, thereby altering politics itself (Howard 2003).   
Scholars argue that if traditional political institutions are perceived as unresponsive, 
nonhierarchical communication and organizing channels such as these will continue to increase 
in popularity (Little 2008; Bang 2005).  Take the case of the newly-created “Podemos” (We Can) 
party in Spain, which originated from an electoral program that brought together the main 
demands made by the various social movements that arose during the wave of opposition to 
austerity policies (Chadwick and Strommer-Galley2016; Casero-Ripollés et al 2016).  Supported 
through various crowdfunding campaigns, the Podemos party has the most followers on social 
networks, compared with the two main parties2.  Likewise, in Italy we have seen the rise of the 
Five Star Movement (M5S), a hybrid fusion of political party, celebrity culture, populism, online 
mobilization, and street protest (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2015; Natale and Ballatore 2014). 
 
                                                 
2 In the December 20, 2015, National Elections in Spain, the Podemos Party received 20.65% of the vote and won 69 
out of 350 seats in the parliament.  As a result, many have concluded that they have officially ended the two-party 
system in Spain.  
9 
 
These parties-as-movements efforts in Spain and Italy, show the growing potential for 
new more grassroots-driven party forms which may rely on peer-to-peer models of organizing 
and fundraising.  They highlight the ways that parties are being renewed from the outside in, as 
digitally enabled citizens breathe new life into an old form by partly remaking it in their own 
participatory image (Chadwick and Strommer-Galley 2016).   Therefore, the party 
organizational form is highly uncertain in the 21st century and it will be critical to continue 
studying the changing relationship between social movements and political parties (Coleman 
2017; Chadwick and Strommer-Galley 2016). 
 
Finally, there is a need to explore the changing nature of electoral politics in non-
Western contexts.  In less established democratic countries ICTs have often been found to be 
dynamic and “liberating technologies” (Diamond 2010).  From Turkey, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Thailand, and Indonesia’s recent 2014 Presidential elections, empirical evidence shows how 
ICTs can maximize voter volatility during elections (Howard 2010: 3).  Likewise, in South Korea, 
Philippines, and Indonesia, mobile phones were also successfully used for mobilization, leading 
to the rise of what some call "networked politics" (Castells 1997; Webster 2001; Juris 2004).  
Consequently, some of the case studies that follow show how ICTs can help promote important 
power shifts in societies (Tan 2010; March 2006) which can have electoral impact.  These cases 
also highlight how ICTs role and impact in societies are often shaped by a variety of factors such 
as existing cultures of activism, resistance, institutional context, levels of technological 
development, and existing political practices and orientations (Jorba et al 2012: 241).   
People Power and the Transformation of Political Parties in the 
Digital Age: Research Design  
This study explores the shifting relationships between political parties and social 
movements in emerging democracies.  Specifically, it seeks to understand how intermediary 
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factors such as demographic, socio-economic, and cultural factors (e.g. resistance, activism, and 
electoral campaign culture) interact with ICTs to shape relations between social movements and 
political parties in the 21st century.  To do this, I incorporate four sets of scholarly literature that 
rarely interact with each other - literatures on social movements, digital media, technology, and 
democracy (Porta 2011).  For example, the need to incorporate the growing literature on the role 
of digital media into democratization studies is becoming relevant.  Scholars have begun 
introducing new theories on how political communication now works and how politics is 
increasingly defined by organizations, groups, and individuals who are best able to blend older 
and newer media logics, in what has been coined a hybrid system (Chadwick 2016).  Therefore, 
the study of how digital media is created and consumed by activists and how this changes 
activism and political parties will be a growing area of research (Coleman 2017; Chadwick and 
Strommer-Galley 2016). 
 
This study uses a “nested analysis”, combining a large-N quantitative analyses of 80 
countries with small-N studies to identify broad trends related to level of Internet usage and 
socio-economic factors which could impede or promote it.  This is followed by four case studies 
or small-N comparisons that will help me identify how contextual factors such as party politics 
and history of mobilizations can help explain how ICTs are being used to shape politics and 
democracies in these countries today.  The case studies will also allow me to highlight the more 
subtle, contingent, and unpredictable ways that ICTs are bringing new negotiated relationships 
between political parties, civil society, and citizens.  To lay the groundwork for exploring the role 
of ICTs, digital media, and social movements in shaping political parties, I begin the study with 
a quantitative analysis in Chapter 2.  This chapter seeks to identify which country-level and 
demographic factors can best explain differences between the countries in how ICTs and digital 




The two main case studies that follow in chapters 3 and 4, Taiwan and Chile, highlight 
the ways that social movements are utilizing ICTs to create new political opportunity structures 
which may shift relations between social movements and political parties in countries with high 
levels of human development, ICT usage and education, and strong movement legacies. 
Findings from surveys with student activists and political parties in Taiwan and Chile illustrate 
the divergent views that exist among activists and mainstream political parties.  As noted earlier, 
political parties in Taiwan and Chile maybe renewed from the outside in, due to established 
parties’ reluctance to use ICTs to enable more participatory engagement.  Meanwhile, “non-
establishment” politicians that opt for less bureaucratic and dynamic forms of ICT-enabled 
engagement are winning notable elections, such as with the election of Dr. Ko Wen-je to become 
the new Mayor of Taipei and election of several Chilean student movement leaders such as 
Camila Vallejoin the 2013 Congressional elections.  Whether citizens will be able to breathe new 
life into established political parties (Chadwick and Strommer-Galley 2016), remains to be seen 
and makes studying the changing relationship between social movements and political parties’ 
essential for the 21st century (Coleman, 2017; Chadwick and Strommer-Galley 2016). 
 
The comparative case studies of Indonesia and Peru in Chapter 5 allow me to test 
whether the same patterns can be found in two countries with lower levels of human 
development, education and ICT penetration, and weaker movement legacies, and to identify 
other enabling or disenabling factors which may shape how ICTs abilities to create new political 
opportunity structures.  I find that in all the case studies, ICTs are facilitating at least one kind of 
political opportunity, such as: (1)  elevating domestic issues to the international arena, (2) 
supporting the election of “third party” non-establishment candidates, (3) facilitating peer-to-
peer communications which strengthen alternative and common/shared views and perspectives 
and challenge elite discourse, (4) creating new civic accountability and transparency 
communities, and (5) diversifying and complementing organizing, mobilizing, and movement 
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building strategies.  Taiwan, with a high level of education and Internet usage, is the only one of 
the four in which all five of these political opportunities are being created.  However, since the 
emergence of ICTs, Indonesia, a country with less wealth, human development, educational 
outcomes, and Internet usage, has experienced at least four of the political opportunities 
outlined above.  This suggests the role of other preexisting factors such as culture of resistance, 
activism, and electoral campaigns which can help us to understand why ICTs have been so 
influential there and not in other countries such as Peru. 
 
Finally, the four case studies draw upon results from a content analysis of 82 websites 
and social media profiles for established parties in Chile, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Peru 
performed by myself and the research assistants.  The content analysis sought to understand: (a) 
which parties are currently online ;(b) how they are using their websites and social media 
profiles to engage with citizens; and (c) how active and vibrant are the online communities they 
are supporting. The conclusion suggests that many major parties have been relatively 
conservative in adapting to the Internet, but one of the most important impacts of ICTs may be 
to empower challenger and insurgent parties lacking traditional resources.   








HDI Literacy3 Tertiary 
Education4 











Very High 98.5% High Very High 80% 
                                                 
3 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. September 2015. 











Medium 94.5% High Medium-low 39.2% 
 
 
Ultimately, this dissertation shows that history matters for understanding both how 
political parties incorporate technology into their practices and the relationship between new 
social movements and political parties.  Specifically, I find that this relationship is shaped by a 
variety of demographic and socio-economic factors as well as preexisting cultures of resistance, 
activism, and electoral campaigning.  In Taiwan and Chile, we learn of the ways that traditional 
political parties are adapting to changing demands and expectations brought on by ICTs (Dalton 
et al 2013).  However, preexisting cultures of resistance and activism and the socioeconomic 
context in those countries may determine if political parties will be able to shift to become more 
inclusive and participatory and learn to coexist, complement and nurture social movements and 
empowered civic communities (Nahon 2015). Meanwhile, the secondary case studies of Peru 
and Indonesia emphasize the way that socioeconomic context interacts with preexisting cultures 
to create different outcomes in these more similar countries.  In Indonesia, the preexisting 
culture of resistance and activism among youth has contributed to a vibrant and active student 
movements and activism enabled by ICTs that can overcome Indonesia’s socioeconomic 
challenges.  In Peru, however, despite being wealthier, more educated, and technology-
connected population, a preexisting culture of political apathy and lack of trust for political 











Contextualizing the Political Uses of ICTs  
Around the World 
 
 
This chapter explores socioeconomic and demographic factors which can shape Internet 
usage in countries.  This study argues that these factors alone cannot explain why and how 
citizens and groups use and leverage technologies in different contexts.  However, they can help 
us isolate and identify other intermediary factors such as preexisting political culture, activism, 
and resistance which may help to explain how political actors and citizens use and leverage 
ICTs.  To explore this, I grouped socioeconomic factors by two main categories: (a) country-level 
and (b) demographic factors.  I then developed a sample of 77 countries with populations 
greater than 500,000 in 2004, plus Taiwan.  Taiwan is included in the data set because it is one 
of the four cases analyzed in subsequent chapters and because its government makes policy as a 
national government would.  This is the largest sample I could put together which would have 
complete data for all the variables I am interested in.  In addition, the analyses reported are 
cross-sectional in that I compare countries at a single point in time, instead of over time (good 




Extensive comparative work has found that Internet use is contingent on institutional 
arrangements, political circumstances, levels of socioeconomic development, and demographic 
factors (Jorba and Bimber 2012; Rosenstone & Hansen 1993; Thomas, 1982; Verba & Nie 1972; 
Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995).  Figure 1outlines some plausible associations between 
Internet usage and additional contextual factors.  This figure is not meant to present a complete 
picture, but rather an attempt to highlight additional key variables which can affect Internet use 
and hence, ICT-enabled political participation.  In the figure, country-level factors refer to those 
specific structural aspects of a country such as geography, economy, and politics.  Specifically, I 
have chosen to focus on population density, income inequality, democracy/democracy 
experience, human development, and political freedom.   















Education - EDU 
Gender – FEM 
Youth pop. – Youth 
Literacy - Literacy 
 
Population density - PD 
Income inequality - GINI 
Democracy experience- Polity 
Human Development - HDI 











Demographic factors are those factors which represent socioeconomic characteristics of citizens.  
The four demographic factors I have chosen to focus on are education level, gender, age as 
reflected by the percentage of youth population, and the literacy rates of citizens (Kum 2008; 
Van Dijk 2005; Norris 2001; Castells 2001; Wilson 2006; DiMaggio et al 2007) are factors 
found to influence Internet use.  Finally, I expect these factors to not only function 
independently, but also have interrelated effects.  Thus, it is unlikely that they would exhibit the 
same outcomes across nations.   
 
The Diffusion of the Internet in International Context 
 
Nearly half of the world’s people have Internet access.  Forty-five percent of Internet 
users are in Asia and 10.4% are in Latin American and Caribbean (Internet World Stats, 2012).  
Together these regions account for over half of the Internet users in the world - and this number 
is growing.   For the past twenty years, Internet use around the world has been increasing 
(Archibugi and Coco 2004, Leiner et al. 2009, Odlyzko 2001).  Although there is no reliable data 
on the size of the world’s online population, estimates suggest that the number of Internet users 
in the world has increased from 40 million in 1995, to over 3 billion in 2014 (ITU, 2014)5. This 
means that the global penetration rate of the Internet has increased from less than 0.1% in 1991 
to 42.3% in 20146.  However, despite rapid worldwide diffusion of the Internet, a 
disproportionate number of users are concentrated in more developed countries, especially in 
North America, Australia, and Europe.   Table 2 shows the disparities that exist among the 




                                                 
 
6Internet Usage and World Population Statistics are for June 30, 2014.  
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Table 2: World Internet Usage and Population Statistics 
Regions Internet Users % of Population 
North America 310,322,257 87.7% 
Australia/Oceania 26,789,942 72.9% 
Europe 582,441,059 70.5% 
Latin America 320,312,562 52.3% 
Middle East 111,809,510 48.3% 
Asia 1,386,188,112 34.7% 
Africa 297,885,898 26.5% 
 
World Total 3,035,749,340 42.3% 
Source: Internet Usage and World Population Statistics are for June 30, 2014. Demographic (Population) numbers 
are based on data from the US Census Bureau and local census agencies. Internet usage information comes from data 
published by Nielsen Online, by the International Telecommunications Union, by GfK, local ICT Regulators and other 
reliable sources. Internet World Stats 2014. 
 
Over the years, the diffusion of the Internet (and accompanying technologies) has 
occurred regardless of significant within-country differences in socioeconomic, political, 
cultural, social, and technological factors. The term “digital divide” is often used to describe the 
gap that occurs when country demographic factors don’t align with the expansion of Internet 
and technology use.   Specifically, this term was introduced in the early 21st century (Dewan et 
al., 2004; Norris, 2001; Sidorenko and Findlay, 2001; Castells 2001; Kirkman et al. 2002; 
Mosaic Group 1998; Norris 2001; Rogers, 2001) to study and measure the gap and causes that 
were emerging between individuals and countries that have the resources to access and use the 
Internet with those that do not (Wilson, 2006; Milner, 2006).  Therefore, even in countries with 
high levels of Internet use, there could still be considerable inequities in access between and 









The population density of a country can promote or impede Internet access for citizens.  
Studies have shown that rural areas with low population density have less technology 
infrastructure than more densely populated urban areas.  Rural low-population areas are 
generally characterized as having lower access to basic infrastructure such as electricity, clean 
water, schools, medical clinics, roads, etc., – let alone infrastructure for Internet and other 
information technologies (Bazar and Boalch, 1997).  On the other hand, there are several 
reasons why heavily populated urban areas are often associated with abundant communication 
and information technology infrastructure.  First, densely populated urban areas tend to enjoy 
higher incomes, thereby making Internet access more affordable to more citizens (Xiaoming and 
Kay, 2004; Kim, 2007; Horrigan et. al., 2005; United Nations Publications, 2003; Prieger, 
2003; Moss, et al., 2000; Morrill, et al, 1988).  Consequently, it is no surprise that when you 
map out Internet usage by area, scholars have found that Internet has mainly diffused in urban 
areas among the comparatively wealthy and educated (Rogers, 2000; Rogers, 1995; Lim, 2005; 
Horrigan et. al., 2005; Birba and Diagne, 2012).  Second, greater proximity to fiber lines reduces 
the cost of the Internet while also increasing the quality of Internet connections.  This means 
that for approximately 70% of the world’s poor who reside in rural areas (McKinsely & 
Company, 2014), Internet access will be very limited.  This has led scholars to conclude that 
when studying the global digital divide, existing telecommunication infrastructure between high 
and low-density population areas is crucial to understand the variation in the spread of the 
Internet (Kelly and Petrazzini, 1997).  Finally, studies have found that key causes of the Arab 
Spring were a combination of disaffected citizens and high rate of youth unemployment all 
coexisting in densely packed urban settlements (Hussain and Howard, 2013).  Therefore, based 
on these studies I can formulate the following hypothesis: 




Studies have shown how economic factors, especially income level (Kum, 2008), can 
significantly impact Internet diffusion at the national levels (Distaso, et al., 2004; Garcia-
Murillo & Gabel, 2003; Kim, et al 2003; Ismail & Wu; 2003).  As a result, it is often a strong 
predictor for Internet use (Viswanath and Finnegan, 1996; Hargittai, 1999; Guillen and Suarez, 
2001; Maitland and Bauer, 2001; Chinn and Fairlie, 2004; Norris, 2001:58-64; Chen et al, 
2002).  Additionally, studies looking at how income inequality (measured by the Gini 
coefficient) influences the digital divide have determined that it is an important influencing 
factor on Internet use (Fuchs, 2009).  According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 
2008) and OECD (2011), while income can help to predict Internet use, Internet use is also 
increasing the wage gap between the very highly skilled and everyone else.  Thus, technological 
progress is often referred to as the single biggest factor driving income inequality in both 
advanced and developing countries (IMF, 2008; OECD, 2011). Therefore, while some countries 
experience a decline in their socioeconomic divide, the digital divide in other countries 
continues to increase along the lines of income and education (Chen, 2004).  Finally, lower 
levels of inequality — as measured by Gini coefficient — have been found to be related to higher 
levels of access (Web Index Report, 2014). I can expect: 







Even though the relationship between democratic governments and Internet use is 
highly contested (Best and Wade, 2009), a study looking at 190 countries from 1991 to 2001, 
Milner (2006) found that a country's regime type can influence citizens’ use of the Internet, even 
when controlling for other economic, technological, political, and sociological factors.  Other 
studies have found that democracies have historically been the prevalent regime during the early 
stages of the worldwide diffusion of the Internet (Guillen and Suarez, 2005; Norris 2001:58-64; 
van Disk, 1999).  Likewise, when controlling for economic development and income, democratic 
political regimes have been shown to enable faster growth of the Internet than authoritarian or 
totalitarian regimes (Guillen and Suarez, 2005; Borrow, 1973-1974; Norris 2001:60-61, 100-101; 
Milner, 2006).  While Internet use still does take place in more authoritarian countries, the 
belief is that users in democracies still have much more autonomy over the information they can 
access and over the various information technologies they can use than those in authoritarian 
settings (Guillen and Suarez, 2005; Havick, 2000).  In authoritarian states, there is usually 
rampant state surveillance and restrictions are often put on Internet and other personal 
freedoms.  For example, in countries such as North Korea, Vietnam, China, and Cuba 
governments directly control all the physical access to the Internet (Boas 2000; Drake, Kelathil 
and Boas, 2000).  For example, in China and Vietnam, democracy advocates or cyber-dissidents 
have been arrested and received harsh sentences for their pro-democracy activities online 
(Abbott 2001; Cooper 2000; Taubman, 1998).  As a result, Norris (2001) argues that the greater 
civil liberties of democracy are consistent with greater access to and use of the Internet and 
democratic governments find it more difficult to censor free expression on the Internet than on 
television. Therefore, we would expect Internet usage to thrive in these conditions.  Therefore, I 
can formulate the following hypothesis: 




The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) periodically releases a Human 
Development Report to measure human development levels.  The key metric used in their 
reports is the Human Development Index (HDI) which measures progress in health, education, 
and income over the past 40 years (UNDP Human Development Report, 2010). This index is 
then used to distinguish between developed and developing countries. Since the emergence of 
the Internet and ICTs, policy and program priority has been placed on the relationship between 
ICTs, globalization, and human development by the United Nations (Birdsall, 2005). For 
example, the importance of ICTs to human development is a recurring theme in the annual 
UNDP Human Development Reports (HDR). The 1999 HDR report, Globalization with a 
Human Face, includes an entire chapter on "New Technologies and the Global Race for 
Knowledge" (UNDP, 1999).  At the same time, a 2003 report links technology and human 
development as a means of providing access to global knowledge and helping to pull people out 
of poverty (UNDP, 2003, pp. 157–160; Birdsall, 2005). Consequently, although the relationship 
between ICTs and human development continues to be contested, the widespread benefits 
credited to ICTs have led key national and international actors to see them as central to all facets 
of development — including globalization, human development, human rights and democracy, 
poverty and economic development, and culture (Birdsall, 2005).  
 
Studies have also found an increasingly positive correlation between human 
development level and Internet penetration rate (Pratama and Al-Shaikh, 2012; J.K., 2011). Not 
surprisingly, this also means that developed countries often have a significantly higher Internet 
penetration rate compared with the developing countries. This positive correlation results 
suggests that an improvement in health, literacy and income levels can result in positive effects 
on Internet usage. It is important to point out that Internet use appears to be growing at a faster 
rate in developing countries than in developed countries (Pratama and Al-Shaikh, 2012).   So, 
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the next ten years will be telling whether developed countries will be able to catch up with 
developed countries with regards to Internet usage.  Therefore, I can make the following 
hypothesis: 




A country’s laws regarding freedom of speech can provide key insights regarding Internet 
use among citizens.  However, this relationship is complex and studies have produced mixed 
results. First, as noted in the previous section on democracy/democratic experience, in 
nondemocratic systems, which lack protection for personal freedoms, governments may survey 
or censor online speech and prosecute the expression of opposing online opinions (Du, 1999; 
Euromonitor International, 2003; Goonasekera, 2001; Wunnava and Leiter, 2009; Rotberg, 
2008). The UNDP have also found that major factors limiting the Internet access are (1) 
government opposition to the Internet and (2) lack of communication freedom (UNDP, 2003). 
Therefore, we would not expect Internet use to thrive under these conditions.  
 
Second, other studies have found that although there is an assumed link between 
political freedom and the deployment and use of the Internet in a country, this relationship is 
not always significant (Xiaoming and Kay, 2004).  A study of 28 Asian countries failed to show a 
significant relationship between political freedom and Internet development (Xiaoming and 
Kay, 2004). Instead, these scholars have noted the existence of a big range in terms of political 
freedom among those countries that have low Internet penetration. For example, countries like 
India, Indonesia, Thailand (at the time of the study) and the Philippines may enjoy greater 
political freedom in Asia; their Internet use is relatively low.  Meanwhile, countries like 
Singapore may score poorly in terms of political freedom but its Internet penetration is higher 




Finally, a disturbing trend has been emerging wherein Internet freedom around the 
world has declined for the fourth year in a row, as more countries introduce aggressive online 
censorship measures (Freedom House, 2016).  Freedom on the Net 2016, the fifth-annual report 
released by Freedom House, found that of the 65 countries assessed, 36 experienced a negative 
trajectory in online freedom between May 2013 and May 2014 (Freedom House, 2016). This was 
due to factors such as blocked social networks, aggressive online surveillance and cyberattacks, 
and the intimidation and arrests of journalists and digital activists. Therefore, although one 
could conclude that countries that are politically less free are more likely to have lower Internet 
usage and penetration rates, this is a trend that could change in the coming years. Therefore, to 
test if there is really a relationship between political freedom and Internet use, I hypothesize:  
H5: Political freedom will not show a strong influence on Internet usage 
Demographic Factors  
Gender  
 
As noted earlier, studies have found that the offline population around the world are 
disproportionately rural, poor, illiterate, elderly, and female (Mendoza & Alvarez de Toledo, 
1997; Atkin et. al, 1998; Lin, 1988; Liu & San, 2006; Dutta & Roy, 2004; Dholakia et al., 2003).  
Therefore, gender is a common theme as studies have found that men are more likely than 
women both to access and to use the Internet (Chen and Wellman, 2003).  The gender digital 
divide is often considered one of the most prominent instances of digital divide around the 
world (Liff and Shepherd, 2004).  Scholars have found two statistically significant gender gaps 
that exist regarding the Internet: (1) in access and (2) in use (Bimber, 2000). The access-gap is 
not the product of gender-specific factors, but is explained by socioeconomic and other 
differences between men and women. The use-gap is the result of both socioeconomics and 
some combination of underlying gender-specific phenomena (Bimber, 2000).  Specifically, these 
gender disparities are often due to male–female cultural differences; differences in 
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specialization, preferences for jobs, and education and literacy; complex interactions among the 
features of the Internet and gender; and external variables such as sociocultural and economic 
factors (Dholakia et al, 2004; Li and Kirkup, 2007). Thus, I can hypothesize: 
H6: Gender will have a strong influence on Internet use. 
 
Age 
When looking closer at the users within a country, it is no surprise that youth tend to be 
the highest users of ICTs.  In return, this has caused an increasingly dominant role of younger 
generations in political actions, especially in the so-called third-wave democracies (Valenzuela 
et al, 2012).  Youth bulges are large young cohorts ages 15-25 related to either the total or the 
adult population (Geinges, 2005; Urdal, 2004; Groshek and Ingrid, 2014).  There are about 1.8 
billion young people between the ages of 10 and 24 – the largest youth population ever (UNFPA, 
2013). Many of them are concentrated in developing countries. While these young cohorts have 
been historically associated with political crises and social disorder (Goldstone 2001), their 
willingness to participate in political transformation stems from their need to compensate and 
fix economic and or social inequalities (Hart et al, 204).  So, youth bulges within countries can 
herald monumental political transformations (Gienges, 2005; Urdal, 2006).  This was the case 
in Arab Spring were other factors such as large groups of young disaffected citizens in densely 
packed urban settlements helped to explain social unrest and protest that emerged.  
 
Young people are the most enthusiastic adopters and users of ICTs.  Thus, they have 
become especially technology-savvy in using the Internet and accompanying ICTs to mobilize, 
collaborate, and formulate a political voice and identity where perhaps there was none.  Mobile 
phones have also connected youth from all around the world across vast geo-political barriers. 
In 2013, the International Communication Union estimated that young people under the age of 
25 accounted for 45% of total global Internet users (ITU, 2013). Although there are great 
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disparities in Internet use among the global youth population (25 years and younger) (ITU, 
2013; Measuring the Information Society, 2013), the total number of Internet users that are 
below the age of 25 in developing countries is already three times as high as that in the 
developed world (UN Youth Reports, 2013).  Therefore, the level of a country’s socioeconomic 
development is not always a barrier to Internet usage among youth.   
 
Other reasons which help explain the high Internet usage among youth are related to 
their ability to access it from different places and their level of comfort with technology in 
general.  For one, students (particularly in developing countries) can access the Internet via 
their schools and universities or are more likely to visit local Internet cafes in their area.  By 
contrast, their parents are less likely to do these things.  Second, youth are considered “digital 
natives” in that they were born around the time the personal computer was introduced and 
have therefore spent their lives connected with technology (Measuring the Information 
Society, 2013). Out of a total of 145 million young Internet users in the developed countries, 
86.3% are estimated to be digital natives (ITU, 2013); and this figure is expected to double 
within the next five years.  Therefore, I can expect that: 






Education and Literacy 
Finally, the education gap is among the most important explanatory factors regarding 
Internet use and the range of activities performed on the Internet (OECD, 2014).  Many scholars 
have argued that since the use of new technologies requires some level of knowledge and 
literacy, low levels of education and literacy hamper both accessibility and dissemination of 
information technologies (Kiiski and Pohjola, 2002; Cassiolato and Baptisa, 1996; Gatignon and 
Robertson, 1985, Cohen, 1963).  This has also been proven empirically true with few exceptions 
(Norris, 2001; Hargiattai, 1999). Moreover, people with higher levels of education are likely to 
have had more exposure to computer technology (Hargittai, 2002).  Therefore, scholars have 
found that Internet usage rates are among the highest in people that have earned tertiary 
education (Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002; Volken, 2002; Lee, et al., 2001).     However, while most 
studies agree with the positive influence of the education and literacy on the adoption and 
diffusion of the Internet, Hargittai (1999) and Kiiski and Pohjola (2002) found that education 
has no significant influence on the diffusion of the Internet in the case of industrialized 
countries (Kum, 2008).  Nevertheless, I can formulate the following hypothesis regarding 
Internet use and education and literacy: 
H8: The higher the education level, the higher the Internet usage.  




Emergence of Mobile Phones 
I want to end this section by discussing the emergence of mobile phones. All around the 
world, mobile phones are increasingly bridging many of the digital divides discussed in this 
section (rural/urban, developed/developing, gender, educational/literacy, etc.) as well as acting 
as agents of social mobilization through improved communication (Aminuzzaman et al, 2003).  
According to ITU estimates, by the end 2013 there will be 6.8 billion mobile-cellular 
subscriptions – almost as many as there are people on the planet; and there will be an estimated 
2.7 billion people using the Internet worldwide (ITU, 2013). As global mobile-cellular 
penetration approaches 100% and market saturation is reached, growth rates have fallen to their 
lowest levels in both developed and developing countries.  Mobile-cellular penetration rates 
stand at 96% globally; 128% in developed countries; and 89% in developing countries. 2.7 billion 
people – almost 40% of the world’s population – are online (ITU, 2013).  Therefore, mobile 
technology and services continue to be the key driver of the information society as they are not 
hampered by slow broadband speeds and lack of electricity, and they can be used by individuals 
with low or no literacy.   
 
There are several ways that mobile-enabled technologies are increasingly helping to 
bridge the digital divide in developing countries by the use of: (1) SMS applications through 
which people can send requests by text-messages to a specific phone number, and get the result 
with a new text-message they receive (e.g. popular SMS platforms such as Ushandi, Text to 
Change, or Rapid SMS), (2) voice applications through which people can call a specific phone 
number which is connected to a voice platform and with either voice or keypad inputs, they can 
have the information they are looking for, or (3) web applications where people have a Web 
browser on their phone and a data-service plan which connect them to the Internet and allow 
them to browse the Web (Boyera, 2012).  Thus, these mobile phone-based technologies are 
providing simple and powerful ways for citizens to obtain and share information, search the 
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web, communicate, and mobilize.  The ITU estimates the number of mobile phone subscriptions 
worldwide, at the end of 2010, to be around 5.28 billion, equivalent to 76.2% of world 
population and to more than one subscription for every adult worldwide (ITU, 2015).  In many 
developing countries, mobiles represent well over 90% of all available telephones (ITU, 2015).  
Furthermore, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) estimates that 90% of world 
population now lives in areas with coverage, though the figure for rural areas in Africa is only a 
little over half of this. This means that most rural areas around the world now have mobile 
phone coverage. Therefore, I can speculate that soon people will increasingly be able to access 
the Internet regardless of location, sex, education level, etc.  This is a factor that will need to be 
observed in the coming years and which could greatly change the relationships between country-
level and demographic factors, Internet use, and political participation and activism.    
 
Data and Methods 
 
I have compiled a cross-national dataset on economic, political, and sociological 
determinants of Internet use. My dependent variable, Internet usage, is measured each year 
between 2004 and 2013.  Internet usage is measured as the percentage of Internet users in a 
population is represented by the number of Internet users per 100 inhabitants, as provided by 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU 2004: A89-A90; 2014). In this case, “Internet 
user” refers to any person who has access to the Internet no matter what the type of access 
(private/shared), connection (wired/wireless) or location (household/school/office/café).    I 
have chosen to use the ITU data because this specialized agency within the United Nation is 
considered the official compiler of international statistics on telecommunications. The ITU 
dataset covers more than 200 countries and territories and over a longer period than any other 
available dataset. Moreover, the ITU sets standards for both telecommunications services and 
statistics, organizes meetings to harmonize data collection and reporting procedures.  Therefore, 
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ITU is the best available source of information on the Internet around the world (Abramson 




My nine independent variables are: (1) population density, (2) income inequality, (3) 
democracy experience, (4) human development, (5) freedom, (6) education, (7) gender, (8), age, 
and (9) literacy.  GNI and ICT development are my control variables.    For population density, I 
have chosen to focus on this statistic rather than urban/rural data available through the World 
Bank Development Indicators database.  The reason for this is due to national differences in the 
characteristics that distinguish urban from rural areas. There is also no definitive definition for 
urban vs rural populations that is applicable to all countries.  Therefore, the distinction between 
the two is often blurred and scholars often resort to measuring the degree of concentration of 
population.  For my population density data, I have relied on World Bank population data for 
years 2010-2014.  For certain countries such as Taiwan that are not always recognized by the 
World Bank, I have obtained the population density data from the United Nations World 
Prospects Report (2004 and 2010 revision).  
 
As noted earlier, I am focusing on income inequality as measured by Gini coefficient.  I 
have obtained Gini coefficient information from the World Bank Development Indicators 
database for years 2010-2014 — a widely-used statistical measure of income inequality in 
countries.   For countries or years not available at the World Bank, I have used OECD and 
United Nations Gini coefficient data to supplement and fill in missing gaps in the data.  To 
measure democratic experience, I took the average polity scores for years 1960-2013 calculated 
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from the Polity IV dataset7. Long term democratic experience is a country’s mean Polity 
(democracy minus autocracy) score overall years from 1960 to 2013 for which data are available.  
The Polity IV dataset is among the largest and most reliable large cross-national democracy 
databases for several reasons.  First, it captures democratic experience for a long-time frame 
(data go back to 1800 or to a country’s date of independence, whichever is later).  Second, its 
transparency and detailed coding rules are available for anyone to review.  Finally, they use 
multiple coders and inter-coder reliability tests (Marshalls & Jagger, 2006) to eliminate biases.    
  
To measure human development, I employ the United Nations Development Program’s 
(UNDP) HDI data.  The HDI is a composite index that has been developed by the United 
Nations (UN) and has been monitored by the UN on an annual basis since 1990.  However, for 
the purposes of my study I have only focused on the years 2005-2013 as this is the period that 
the fieldwork research focused on.  To represent levels of freedom, I employ the Freedom House 
scores for political rights and civil liberties for years 2005-2013. Freedom House measures 
national political rights and civil liberties by tabulating ordinal sets of survey questions. The 
resulting political rights and civil liberties scores range from 1 to 7, 1 being the highest score. 
 
For education, I have chosen to gather data on gross tertiary school enrollment for the 
years 2010-2014 from the World Bank and the UNESCO Institute for Statistics.  Gross tertiary 
school enrollment is the total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of 
age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group following on 
from secondary school leaving (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2014).  I have chosen to focus 
on tertiary rather than secondary education because studies have found that people with higher 
levels of education are likely to have had more exposure to computer technology in general, 
                                                 
7 Polity IV’s DataSets User’s Manual (2016): Annual scores are based on three criteria: (1) openness and 
competiveness of chief executive; (2) constraints on the authority of the chief executive; and (3) level of 
factionalism and personalism in political participationand competitiveness of participation. 
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familiarity, and expertise and confidence which is an important first step in gaining access to the 
Internet (Hargittai, 2002).  Specifically, Internet usage rates are among the highest in people 
that have earned tertiary education (Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002; Volken, 2002; Lee, et al., 2001).  To 
measure the literacy rate, I have collected data on percentage of adults (age 15 and older) who 
can read or write.  This analytic is available at the CIA World Factbook (2010) and the World 
Bank Development Indicators database (2004) which has an indicator that is available for the 
largest number of countries and years is literacy as a percentage of the adult population (World 
Bank 2004). For literacy, I consider the percentage of adults (age 15 and older) who are literate.  
 
For my independent variable of gender, I was unable to access micro data for all my 
countries; therefore, I chose to use female population (% of total) from the World Bank and the 
United Nations Population Division's World Population Prospects. This indicator captures the 
percentage of the population that is female within a country or territory.  My contention is that 
due to the gender digital divide discussed earlier, countries with high percentage of female 
population may experience lower Internet use.  For this indicator, I have collected data for the 
years 2010-2014.  I experienced the same challenges getting reliable age information for my 
sample; therefore, I had to settle for obtaining data on the percentage of youth population 
within a country.  The belief is that countries with a high youth population as defined by 25 or 
younger years of age, may experience more Internet use than countries with low youth 
population.  I obtained this data from the United Nations Population Division, World 
Population Prospects (2012 and 2013).   
 
For my analysis, I wanted to control for two of the factors that are most traditionally 
associated with Internet usage: wealth and ICT infrastructure.  Therefore, by controlling for 
them I can explore the role of other explanatory factors.  For my control variable, wealth, I use 
GNI per capita for the years 2010-2014 from the World Bank Development Indicators database 
32 
 
(World Bank 2014).  To measure ICT infrastructure, I use the ICT development index from for 
the years 2011 and 2012 from the ITU (2014) as a measure of the development of the 
telecommunications infrastructure within a country.   
Findings 
 
The research design involved three analytical steps.  First, I conducted correlation 
analysis using the Pearson correlation coefficient to test the relationship between Internet use 
and the various factors that may affect it.  During this step, I also created a baseline model with 
my independent variables and used multiple regression to explore associations between them 
across the 77 cases.  Second, I developed and tested two models to determine whether country-
level or demographic factors are more likely to explain Internet use, using GNI and ICT 
development as control variables.  Model 1 tests the country-level factors against my 
independent variables and Model 2 tests the demographic explanatory variables, while 
controlling for wealth and ICT infrastructure.  Finally, I tested these models a second time with 
a stratified sample of 76 countries broken up by generic regions, so that I could identify any 
regional differences.  SPSS was used for all the analyses.   
 
Bivariate Correlation Findings 
 
Bivariate analysis investigates the relationship between two paired data sets. Therefore, 
it can be used to examine the strength of any correlation. Pearson correlation analysis was 
performed between the independent variables: GNI: Gross National Income, ICT: ICT 
Development Index, Polity: Democratic Experience, PD: Population Density, HDI: Human 
Development Index, Literacy: Literacy Rate, Freedom: Freedom, EDU: Tertiary School 
Enrolment, FEM: Gender Population Female, Youth: % Youth Population & GINI: Income 
Inequality, and the Dependent Variable - IU: Internet Usage.  Table 3 outlines the findings of 




As discussed in the previous chapter, there is a strong positive and significant 
relationship between GNI and IU (r = .894, p < .01). This shows that a higher GNI would result 
in a higher IU. Similarly, the relationship between ICT and IU was also found to be strongly 
positive and significant (r = .955, p < .01). Thus, a higher level of ICT would result in a higher 
level of IU. Regarding the other explanatory factors, there was a weak positive but significant 
relationship (r = .252, p < .05) between Democratic Experience and IU. This shows that with an 
increase in Internet usage within a country, their democratic experience score also increases.  As 
a result, the variables have a high-high relationship. It also means that this particular analysis 
may benefit from testing with a larger sample size.  Furthermore, no significant relationship was 
established between PD and IU (r = .146, P > .05). A very strong and significant relationship was 
observed between HDI and IU (r = .892, p < .01), it is thus noted that an increase in the level of 
HDI could result in an increased level of IU. A moderate and significant relationship was found 
between literacy and IU (r = .553, P < .01). The relationship between Freedom and IU was 
moderate negative and significant (r = -.677, p < .01).  This inverse relationship between 
Freedom and IU shows that a higher level of freedom results in a lower IU. EDU was found to be 
moderately positive and significantly related to IU (r = .675, p < .01). An insignificant 
relationship was found between FEM and IU (r = .173, p > .05). Percentage of youth population 
was found to be negatively associated with IU, the results show a strong negative and 
significantly negative relationship between youth population and IU (r = -.762, p < .01). Finally, 
the relationship between GINI and IU was very weak and negative but insignificant (r = -.223, p 




Table 3: Correlation Analysis 
 GNI ICT Polity PD HDI Literacy Freedom EDU FEM Youth GINI IU 
GNI 1            
ICT .882** 1           
Polity .231* .259* 1          
PD .358** .173 -.055 1         
HDI .843** .954** .284* .148 1        











-.483** 1      
EDU .532** .754** .248* -.009 .774** .556** -.566** 1     














1   
GINI -.183 -.284* .131 -.022 -.247* -.134 .096 -.213 .034 .323** 1  




**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Multivariate Regression Findings 
 
Multivariate analysis looks at several variables to see if one or more of them are 
predictive of a certain outcome. Multiple regression is the most common method used in 
multivariate analysis to find correlations between data sets, but many others, such as logistic 
regression and multivariate analysis of variance, are also used.  For my analysis, I carried out 
ordinary least squares multiple regressions and tested all the independent variables together to 
predict the dependent variable. Table 4 outlines the findings.  The dependent variable (IU) was 
regressed on predicting variables of GNI, ICT, Polity, PD, HDI, Literacy, Freedom, EDU, FEM, 
Youth, and GINI. The results show that the independent variables significantly predict IU, F (12, 
63) = 89.606, p < 0.0001, which indicates that the eleven factors under study have a heavy 





= .945 depicts that the model explains 94.5% of the variance in IU. Finally, the 
coefficients show the significant influence of each of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable. The results show that only GNI, ICT, PD and Literacy had a significant influence on IU, 
other predictor variable had no significant influence on IU. The results of hypotheses testing are 
summarized in Table 5. 
Table 4: Model Summary 
R R Square F Sig 
.972a .945 89.606 .000 
 





B SE t p-value 
Hypotheses 
Supported 
H1 GNI→IU -17.825 53.423 2.971 .004 Supported 
H2 ICT→IU .000 .000 7.664 .000 Supported 
H3 Polity→IU 12.872 1.680 -.550 .584 Not Supported 
H4 PD→IU -.010 .067 -2.161 .034 Supported 
H6 HDI→IU -.003 .001 -.894 .375 Not Supported 
H7 Literacy→IU -22.967 25.693 -2.000 .050 Supported 
H8 Freedom→IU -28.076 14.040 -1.185 .240 Not Supported 
H9 EDU→IU -.853 .719 -.171 .865 Not Supported 
H10 FEM→IU -.010 .057 .356 .723 Not Supported 
H11 Youth→IU .340 .956 1.456 .150 Not Supported 








Hierarchical multiple regression, a variant of the basic multiple regression procedure is 
often utilized to evaluate the two models. The regression method allows the researcher to specify 
a fixed order of entry for variables to control for the effects of covariates or to test the effects of 
certain predictors independent of the influence of others. Therefore, I used hierarchical multiple 
regression in which the independent variables were entered into the model in blocks, to test the 
hypotheses. I ran two models for each of the independent variables and used GNI and ICT 
development as control variables. The first model was for the total sample and used five 
country-level factors as the independent variables of interest. The second model used the same 
total sample but only examined the demographic explanatory variables.  Below are the findings 




A two-stage hierarchical regression analysis was performed. ICT and GNI were entered 
at stage one as control variables. At stage two Population Density (PD), Income Inequality 
(GINI), Democracy (Polity), Human Development Index (HDI) and Freedom variables were 
entered. The hierarchical multiple regression revealed that at stage one, ICT and GNI 
contributed significantly to the regression model, F (2,73) = 448.460, p<.001) and accounted for 
92.5% of the variation in Internet Usage (IU). In the next stage, the next set of variables were 
entered into the analysis. At stage two, the variables explained 93.8% change in IU. The change 
in R2 was .013, the R2 was also found to be significant, F (7, 68) = 147.132. At stage two PD and 
HDI were found to be significant while GINI, Polity, and Freedom were found to be 




Table 6: Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Model 1 
Variable   t R  R2  R2 Sig. 
Step 1   .962 .925  .000 
ICT 9.684 11.018    .000 
GNI .000 3.415    .001 
Step 2   .969 .938 .013 .019 
GNI .001 4.161    .000 
ICT 12.035 7.875    .000 
PD -.003 -2.174    .033 
GINI .103 1.141    .258 
Polity -.075 -.466    .642 
HDI -54.877 -2.570    .012 




A two-stage hierarchical regression analysis was performed. ICT and GNI were entered at stage 
one as control variable. At stage two, the variables Education, Gender, Youth Population and 
Literacy were entered. Table 7 outlines the results of this analysis.  The hierarchical multiple 
regression revealed that at Stage one, ICT and GNI contributed significantly to the regression 
model, F (2,73) = 448.460, p<.001) and accounted for 92.5% of the variation in Internet Usage 
(IU). In the next stage, the next set of variables were entered into the analysis. At stage two, the 
variables explained 93.6% change in IU. The change in R2 was .011, the R2 was also found to be 
significant, F (6, 69) = 167.628. At stage two FEM and Youth were found to be insignificant 









Table 7: Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Model 2 
 
Variable   t R  R2  R2 Sig. 
Step 1   .962 .925  .000 
ICT 9.684 11.018    .000 
GNI .000 3.415    .001 
Step 2   .967 .936 .011 .025 
GNI .000 17.129    .000 
ICT 12.722 2.260    .027 
Literacy -31.280 9.102    .000 
EDU -.017 -2.426    .018 
FEM .259 -.314    .754 
Youth .515 .286    .776 
 
Therefore, Model 1 explains 93.8% variable in IU, while Model 2 explained 93.6% change 
in IU which is marginally lower than Model 2. However, it is important to note that two out of 
four variables in Model 2 were found to be insignificant while the greatest contribution can be 
accounted to ICT in both the models.  
 
Regional Stratified Sampling 
 
The countries were grouped by generic regions as identified by the 2013 United Nations 
Statistics Division.8 A total of 76 countries were selected for the analysis. Table 8 shows the 
representation from each region. Hierarchical multiple regression was once again used to 
evaluate the two models. This regression method allowed me to specify a fixed order of entry for 
variables to control for the effects of covariates or to test the effects of certain predictors 





                                                 
8Composition of macro geographical (continental) regions, geographical sub-regions, and selected economic and 
other groupings, United Nations Statistics Division. 
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Table 8: Regional Distribution 
 Frequency Percent 
Africa 9 11.8 
Asia 19 25.0 
Europe 28 36.8 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
16 21.1 
Northern America 2 2.6 
Oceania 2 2.6 




A two-stage hierarchical regression analysis was performed. ICT and GNI were entered 
at stage one as the control variables. At stage two, Population Density (PD), Income Inequality 
(GINI), Democracy (Polity), Human Development Index (HDI) and Freedom variables were 
entered. Regression analysis was run separately for each region. The results reveal that in all the 
models the predictor variables explain over 90% of the variance in IU. In all the regression 
analysis, in Step 1, ICT was found significant while GNI was found in significant, however in 
Step 2, only for Europe, ICT was found significant, while all variables were found insignificant. 
It is important to note that North America and Oceania/Australia had to be left out of the 











Table 9: Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Model 1 
Variable   t R  R2  R2 F Sig. 
Africa        
Step 1   .948 .899  26.652 .001 
ICT 18.701 6.566 
    
.001 
GNI -.003 -3.893 
    
.008 
Step 2   .998 .997 .098 46.876 .112 
ICT 7.760 1.888 
   
 .061 
GNI .002 1.766 
   
 .119 
Polity -.060 -.145 
   
 .154 
PD -.008 -1.601 
   
 .517 
HDI -58.383 -1.090 
   
 .277 
Freedom .440 .262 
   
 .180 
GINI -.153 -.487 
   
 .310 
Asia        
Step 1   .950 .902  73.421 .000 
ICT 9.999 5.962 
    
.000 
GNI .000 1.013 
    
.326 
Step 2   .961 .924 .022 19.033 .000 
ICT 11.584 6.648 
   
 .086 
GNI .001 4.124 
   
 .105 
Polity -.131 -.725 
   
 .887 
PD -.003 -2.296 
   
 .138 
HDI -58.216 -2.353 
   
 .299 
Freedom -1.032 -1.302 
   
 .798 
GINI .105 1.073 
   
 .636 
Europe        
Step 1   .943 .890  101.095 .000 
ICT 14.903 6.404 
    
.000 
GNI .000 .948 
    
.352 
Step 2   .954 .910 .020 28.804 .000 
ICT 14.051 3.966 
   
 .001 
GNI .000 .599 
   
 .556 
Polity -.066 -.225 
   
 .824 
PD .011 .694 
   
 .496 
HDI -5.864 -.083 
   
 .935 
Freedom -2.422 -1.666 
   
 .111 
GINI -.212 -.832 
   
 .415 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
       
Step 1   .951 .904  61.311 .000 
ICT 8.055 6.306 
    
.000 
GNI .001 1.887 
    
.082 
Step 2   .968 .938 .034 17.220 .000 
ICT 7.150 2.116 




GNI .000 .997 
   
 .348 
Polity -.241 -.791 
   
 .452 
PD .015 .962 
   
 .364 
HDI 33.289 .637 
   
 .542 
Freedom .001 .001 
   
 .999 
GINI .126 1.020 





A two-stage hierarchical regression analysis was performed. ICT and GNI were entered 
at stage one as control variable. At stage two, the variables education, gender, youth population 
and literacy were entered. Regression analysis was run separately for each region. The results 
reveal that in all the models the predictor variables explain almost 90% of the variance in IU. In 
all the regression analysis, in Step 1, ICT was found significant while GNI was found 
insignificant. For Africa, in Step 2, only ICT was found significant, all other variables were found 
insignificant. For Asia, in Step 2, only ICT was found significant, all other variables were found 
insignificant. For Europe, in Step 2, ICT and Youth were found to significantly influence IU, all 
other variables were found insignificant. For Latin America and Caribbean, in Step 2, only ICT 














Table 10: Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Model 2 
 
Variable   t R  R2  R2 F Sig. 
Africa        
Step 1   .948 .899  26.652 .001 
ICT 18.701 6.566 
    
.001 
GNI -.003 -3.893 
    
.008 
Step 2   .998 .997 .098 18.796 .051 
ICT 16.178 6.621 
   
 .022 
GNI -.002 -3.532 
   
 .072 
Literacy -12.114 -.665 
   
 .574 
EDU -.020 -.234 
   
 .836 
FEM -.282 -.110 
   
 .923 
Youth -.980 -1.049 
   
 .404 
Asia        
Step 1   .950 .902  73.421 .000 
ICT 9.999 5.962 
    
.000 
GNI .000 1.013 
    
.326 
Step 2   .952 .907 .005 19.439 .000 
ICT 11.508 3.316 
   
 .006 
GNI .000 .627 
   
 .543 
Literacy -20.064 -.509 
   
 .620 
EDU -.023 -.128 
   
 .900 
FEM .134 .046 
   
 .964 
Youth .336 .484 
   
 .637 
Europe        
Step 1   .943 .890  101.095 .000 
ICT 14.903 6.404 
    
.000 
GNI .000 .948 
    
.352 
Step 2   .960 .921 .031 41.060 .000 
ICT 17.163 6.828 






   
 
.815 
Literacy 57.676 .440 
   
 .664 
EDU -.068 -.693 
   
 .496 
FEM .798 .546 
   
 .591 
Youth 1.556 2.404 
   
 .026 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
       
Step 1   .951 .904  61.311 .000 
ICT 8.055 6.306 
    
.000 
GNI .001 1.887 
    
.082 
Step 2   .970 .941 .037 24.116 .000 
ICT -.323 -.074 
   
 .942 
GNI .000 -.381 




Literacy 18.636 1.116 
   
 .293 
EDU .058 .787 
   
 .451 
FEM -.249 -.229 
   
 .824 
Youth -3.338 -1.800 





Several validation tests were run to determine the reliability of my data.  First, normality 
tests for the variables were conducted using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The results reveal 
that almost all variables were normally distributed. Hence normality of variables was attained. 
The results for normality test are tabulated below.  
Table 11: Normality Test Results 
 
 Region Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
 Statistic df Sig. 
GNI 
Africa .289 9 .029 
Asia .181 19 .102 
Europe .108 28 .200* 
Latin America and the Caribbean .139 16 .200* 
ICT 
Africa .212 9 .200* 
Asia .144 19 .200* 
Europe .082 28 .200* 
Latin America and the Caribbean .128 16 .200* 
Polity 
Africa .216 9 .200* 
Asia .120 19 .200* 
Europe .177 28 .025 
Latin America and the Caribbean .167 16 .200* 
PD 
Africa .239 9 .145 
Asia .430 19 .000 
Europe .221 28 .001 
Latin America and the Caribbean .313 16 .000 
HDI 
Africa .231 9 .183 
Asia .125 19 .200* 
Europe .154 28 .088 
Latin America and the Caribbean .125 16 .200* 
Literacy 
Africa .191 9 .200* 
Asia .344 19 .000 
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Europe .263 28 .000 
Latin America and the Caribbean .261 16 .005 
Freedom 
Africa .147 9 .200* 
Asia .162 19 .200* 
Europe .379 28 .000 
Latin America and the Caribbean .141 16 .200* 
EDU 
Africa .323 9 .007 
Asia .151 19 .200* 
Europe .116 28 .200* 
Latin America and the Caribbean .231 16 .022 
FEM 
Africa .195 9 .200* 
Asia .157 19 .200* 
Europe .222 28 .001 
Latin America and the Caribbean .139 16 .200* 
Youth 
Africa .174 9 .200* 
Asia .154 19 .200* 
Europe .190 28 .011 
Latin America and the Caribbean .189 16 .130 
GINI 
Africa .169 9 .200* 
Asia .223 19 .014 
Europe .119 28 .200* 
Latin America and the Caribbean .123 16 .200* 
IU 
Africa .136 9 .200* 
Asia .178 19 .115 
Europe .098 28 .200* 
Latin America and the Caribbean .103 16 .200* 
Literacy is constant when Region = Northern America has been omitted. 
Freedom is constant when Region = Northern America has been omitted. 
Freedom is constant when Region = Oceania has been omitted. 
 
Outliers analysis was also conducted to determine the existence of outliers in the data.  
To achieve this, boxplots were analyzed for each of the variables in the study. GNI, ICT, Polity, 
HDI, Freedom, EDU, Youth, GNI and IU did not show any significant outliers (refer to 
Appendix A for boxplot charts).  However, outliers were found in PD, Literacy, FEM. The reason 
for this could be attributed to the disparity in statistics of these variables across different 
continents. Finally, one way ANOV Analysis was conducted to evaluate if there are significant 
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differences in the variables. No significant difference was found in population density across the 
different regions, while all other variables had significant difference across the different regions.  
This further strengthens the disparity in different variables across the different continents.  
Table 12: ANOVA Results 
Variables df F Sig. 
GNI 5 11.588 .000 
ICT 5 18.298 .000 
Polity 5 2.353 .049 
DU 5 7.692 .000 
PD 5 1.089 .374 
HDI 5 23.687 .000 
Literacy 5 13.503 .000 
Freedom 5 9.843 .000 
EDU 5 13.434 .000 
FEM 5 3.148 .013 
Youth 5 34.890 .000 
GINI 5 4.474 .001 




In this chapter I examined various social, economic and political explanatory variables 
which may promote or impede Internet use around the world.  The analysis consisted of a three-
step process: (1) correlation and regression analysis of the explanatory variables, (2) 
development and testing of two models to measure the explanatory strength of country-level vs 
demographic variables, and (3) model testing using a stratified regional sample.  The 
explanatory variables under investigation were: wealth/GNI, ICT development, democratic 
experience, population density, human development, literacy, freedom, education, gender, age, 
and income inequality.  In the first phase, correlation and regression analysis wasperformed. 
The results indicated significant relationship between all the variables.  Regression analysis 
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revealed significant influence of GNI, ICT development, population density, and literacy on 
Internet users.  
 
During step two, hierarchical regression analysis was performed and two different 
models were tested using ICT and GNI as control variables. Model 1 revealed that this set of 
country-level independent variables explained 93.8% variance in Internet use.  In comparison to 
model 1, model 2 explained 93.6% change in IU. Therefore, the variance explained by model 1 
was slightly higher than model 2. It is important to note that three out of five variables in model 
1 were significant while two out of four variables in Model 2 were found to be significant while 
the greatest contribution can be accounted to ICT in both the models. Finally, in step three the 
two models were tested with ICT and GNI as control variables and separate hierarchical 
regression analysis was performed for each region. Findings show that only in Europe is ICT and 
youth population still significant after introducing the other explanatory variables while all other 
variables were found insignificant.  After the additional explanatory variables were introduced 
only ICT development was found significant for Asia and Latin America & Caribbean.    
 
These findings reinforce that context matters when understanding if and how citizens 
use the Internet.  The findings also confirm some of the basic theoretical arguments in the social 
sciences regarding Internet access and use. As the findings show, the Internet is a medium 
whose growth and diffusion are not only driven by technological and economic constraints, but 
also by demographic and sociological ones. Therefore, although several studies support the 
assumption that a country's level of economic development is usually closely related to the level 
of Internet penetration in that country (Hargittai, 1999; Bazar & Boalch, 1997; Kelly & 
Petranzzini, 1997; Maherzi, 1997; Baliamounce-Lutz, 2002, 2003; Arnum & Conti, 1998; Elie, 
1998; Maherzi, 1997), scholars and activists should not ignore the role of other contextual 
explanatory powers.  As I can conclude, there are a collection of possible structural and 
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demographic factors that can help us to understand this, and not just one factor alone.  The 
multiple regressions confirmed that country wealth and the ICT infrastructure within a country 
alone are not sufficient to understand Internet use.  Rather, when I added additional 
explanatory factors using the models, those additional factors along with wealth and ICT 
infrastructure could explain to a slightly greater degree Internet usage.  At the same time, the 
results show that their relationship is still hard to interpret and decipher due to lack of 
consistent data across countries.  In the meantime, case studies can help us to decipher the 
complex relationships that exist between an array of factors when trying to understand how 
social and political actors’ ICTs use may be shaped by their context.   
 
In my analyses, when controlling for ICT and wealth, the country-level model had a 
slightly stronger predictive power than the demographic model, but it is a small difference. The 
model testing also revealed that the variables that warrant more in-depth exploration were: 
population density, human development, literacy, and education.  The five variables that were 
not found to be a significant factor in Internet use was income inequality, democracy experience, 
political freedom, gender, and youth populations.  Initially, political freedom may appear to be a 
surprise.  However, the non–significant relationship can be explained by the fact that many 
authoritarian societies also see the advantages of the Internet. Regarding country differences, 
the analysis failed to show whether there is a statistical relationship within the regional clusters 
which demonstrate that location does matter when understanding Internet use.  As we know, 
location does matter regarding the quality and your ability to access the Internet, but perhaps 
these differences are best explained by population density or urban/rural distinctions rather 
than regional or country differences.  Finally, the lack of significance of youth population 
regarding Internet usage is surprising, but not deterring as far as the significance of this 
variable.  Although mobile phones are helping to close the digital divide among youth in 
developed and developing countries, there are still a variety of factors which influence the level 
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of Internet usage within a country and specifically within a subset of a population.  Trying to 
understand the contextual factors that shape this is a reason for this analysis.  
 
Even so, the explanatory variables chosen for the research design could explain over 90% 
of the variance in Internet use for all the regions. At the minimum, this helps to confirm that the 
explanatory variables I chose to explore are fruitful and potentially insightful ones.  There are 
several conclusions I can draw from the regional testing.  For one, Europe was the only region 
which showed that the youth population may also explain variance in Internet use.  Second, it is 
notable that although literacy and Internet use appears to have a correlation, it did not come up 
as a barrier to Internet users in non-English speaking regions.  This can probably be explained 
partly because many of these regions (especially Asia) have developed their own national and 
regional networks and websites.  Therefore, one must still be cognizant of the effects of literacy 
in poorer regions such as Africa or poor small non-English countries such as Cambodia, Nepal, 
Pakistan, etc., which lack the ability to create their own national or regional networks.  
Consequently, if basic computer skills require basic education, we are unlikely to see widespread 
Internet use in those countries with high illiteracy (Xiaoming, 2004).  With that in mind, we still 
need better data on youth usage of the Internet to fully examine the interplay of factors at the 
state and country level which shape Internet usage.  
 
Several caveats about these findings should be noted.  First, my sample size was not big 
enough to carry out more sophisticated statistical analyses that may have allowed me to test my 
assumptions better.  Therefore, a larger sample size, particularly when doing the regional 
testing, may be able to more clearly distinguish the relationships between the explanatory 
factors and Internet use.  Second, my reliance on secondary publicly available information 
imposed great constraints on the depth of the analysis.  More and better international 
comparative data at the micro level will be needed to understand the impact of these political 
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and social variables on the Internet.  In addition, micro-level data will allow scholars and 
activists to explore the two-way causation that may be operating between Internet use and some 
of these variables.  Finally, data that covers a longer period of observation may provide the 
opportunity to explore endogeneity problems more carefully.  Ultimately, there is great hope in 
this respect as global data collection efforts regarding Internet use have been garnering great 
support the past five years.  So, in 10-15 years, scholars will have more and better data upon 
which to study this phenomenon.  
 
Finally, the findings lay the groundwork for my two main case studies of Chile, Taiwan, 
and supplementary case analysis looking at Indonesia and Peru.  Focusing on these countries, 
we will see variation in the variables highlighted in this analysis: wealth, ICT development, 
population density, human development (HDI), literacy, and education.  Table 13 outlines the 
key country-level and demographic factors for each country.  For one, we have two high income 
and two middle income countries with various levels of ICT infrastructure, with Indonesia and 
Peru having the least developed ICT infrastructure of the four countries.  The countries also 
include varying levels of population density according to the World Bank Indicators Database 
and the 2005 CIA World Factbook.  Taiwan has the highest population density of all the 
countries.  In fact, it is the 16th most densely populated country in the world with a population 
density of 646 people per km.9 Therefore; it provides a good first case study to explore deeper 
the relationship between the variables of population density, ICT infrastructure, and education 





                                                 
9Population density calculated using surface area and population figures from CIA World Factbook. Republic of 
China (Taiwan) as of 2005 
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Below is a breakdown of all the countries: 
Table 13: Case Study Countries 








Users % of 
Population 
Chile High income Medium Low High High High 66.5% 
















Together these factors will help us understand the country and demographic level factors 
which shape Internet usage.  From this point and understanding that ICTs are neutral, I can 
explore if these factors can also help us to unravel the ways that ICTs interact with socio-
economic and political context in which they are employed for political purposes.  For example, 
as we will see in the case analysis, although Indonesia and Peru both have low levels of ICT 
development, medium level of HDI, and high literacy, online political participation among 
citizens and political parties in Indonesia is vibrant and dynamic when compared to Peru.  
During the 2014 Indonesian Presidential election, the Internet was used for the first time ever as 
a powerful campaign strategy.  This highlights the ways that the Internet opens opportunities, 
not usually available via mass media, for politicians who know how to use technology in 
innovative ways.  Meanwhile, in Peru where Internet use is not high and population density is 
low, online political participation and political parties’ use of Internet has been inconsistent and 
lackluster with most parties struggling to engage constituents online.  The lack of time and 
resource investment by political parties in Peru can probably be explained by the fact that 
political parties know that most of their constituent base is not accessible online.  Therefore, 
traditional politicking strategies in Peru are still vibrant and live alongside with the emergence 
of the Internet.  In the Peru and Indonesia, I explore how the interaction of population density 
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and education factors shaped how the Internet was used for political purposes.  Finally, as we 
will see, the Internet-political parties-democracy relationship is not absolute and there will be 


















Ethnonationalism, Social Movements, and ICTs, in a Highly-






Taiwan has undergone dramatic transformation in the past 70 years: from part of the 
Japanese empire, to an authoritarian state governed under martial law, to electing a president 
by popular vote for the first time in 1996. Additionally, its impressive economic gains place 
Taiwan alongside Japan and Korea as one of the members of the East Asian miracle – countries 
which have achieved high growth with equity due to a combination of fundamentally sound 
development policies, tailored interventions, and unusually rapid accumulation of physical and 
human capital (Boyd et al, 2006; Ngo, 2006; Kay, 2006; Wang and Kurzman 2007; Yi, 2015; Pei 
1995; Lim, 2008).   Despite the economic achievements, most of Taiwan’s history, political 
development has taken a backseat to economic development (Wong, 2002).  Most recently, 
political polarization and renewed ethno-nationalism tensions have emerged – threatening 
Taiwan’s democratic gains. The election of Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2012 has ushered in 
an era in which China is seeking increasing nationalistic ties to the country’s special regions, 
including Taiwan.  At the same time, the election of pro-independence leaders in Taiwan, 
including President Tsai in 2016, have elevated the potential for territorial disputes across the 
Taiwan Strait to the top of China’s geo-political concerns (Council on Foreign Relations, 2016). 
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As these political struggles take shape, China and Taiwan also continue to deepen economic ties, 
making it increasingly harder for Taiwan to maintain its autonomy. 
 
During this time, there has been a renewal in activism in Taiwan.  The current political 
and economic climate have has given way to an increase in domestic political activity—largely 
referred to as Taiwan’s “third force” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2016). The “third force” is 
used to describe the emergence of new political actors and youth activism in the aftermath of the 
Sunflower Movement(太陽花學運) ).  These activists used ICTs to communicate and spread 
counter narratives in support of a Taiwanese identity, support the election of non-traditional 
political actors, hold elected officials accountable, and call for greater transparency in 
government.  The “third force” has led to electoral gains such as the 2016 local elections and 
followed by the election of pro-Independence President Tsai later that year.  Meanwhile, per a 
2015 survey by the National Chengchi University, and increasing number of residents regard 
themselves as exclusively Taiwanese (60%), while 33.7 % identify as both Taiwanese and 
Chinese, and 4.1% consider themselves only Chinese (down from 26.2% in 1994) (National 
Chengchi University, 2015).   
 
The rise of new ICT-enabled activism must be understood within the broader historical 
context of how ethnonationalism has coincided with activism and democratic development in 
Taiwan.  Scholars have found that while recent social movements, ICTs, and emergence of non-
traditional political actors is complicating cross-strait relations (Lee, 2014), they may also be 
changing the look and feel of politics in Taiwan for the years to come (Chen, 2014).  This chapter 
examines how ICTs are creating new political opportunity structures in Taiwan and reshaping 
how politics is done by activists and political parties alike.  Through survey data collected with 
college students and members of political parties during the Sunflower Movement from March 
18 until April 10th, 2014, this chapter will explore the bottom-up grassroots appropriations of 
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ICTs, and how they may be helping to bring about new political opportunities which may change 
the way political parties function. This case study highlights how uniting a case of media, social 
movement theory, and democratization we can gain greater insights.  
 
Wealth, Development, and Free Society 
 
Taiwan is generally a stable, wealthy, and free society.  Despite, its small size, it is among 
the most densely populated(16th world), urbanized, and richest countries in the world (World 
Population Review, 2014).  Much of this urbanization can be traced to the Republic of China-US 
framework and the Kuomintang’s economic, social, and educational policies brought about 
several societal changes, such as rising labor problems, urbanization, environmental 
degradation and growing a more politically active middle class (Howe, 2014).  The World Bank 
ranks Taiwan as a High-Income Country with a GNI that fluctuates between $14,000 and 
$21,000 (World Bank, 2015)10.  Its dynamic capitalist economy continues to be well supported 
by its extensive exports of such products such as electronics, technology, machinery, and 
petrochemicals. Some reports note that only less than 1% of the population are characterized as 
poor (Ferrante, 2012: 238).  Overall income distribution across the general population as 
measured by the Gini coefficient, is relatively equal and remained stable, resulting in Taiwan 
having one of the world’s lowest levels of income inequality outside Europe (Bloom et al, 2000; 
Kinugasa and Mason, 2007).  Its Gini coefficient was .342 for 2010 and 2011 (World Fact Book, 
2011).  In return, low income inequality may also have encouraged fast GDP growth by reducing 
pressure for market distorting income-redistributive politics; by diminishing political 
instability; by raising the supply of and demand for education; and by expanding the internal 
market (Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Alesin and Rodrik, 1994; Birdsall, Ross, and Sabot, 1995; 
Murphy, Schleifer, and Vishny, 1989). Citizens also enjoy a high level of press, media, and 
political freedom.  Taiwan has been ranked a free country by Freedom House continuously over 
                                                 
10 However, it is generally difficult to get statistics on Taiwan’s gross domestic product (GDP) or gross national 
income (GNI) because their economic figures are often combined with China’s.   
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the five years, with 1 out of 7 for political rights in 2014, and 2 out of 7 for civil liberties in 2015 
(Freedom House, Taiwan, 2015).  
 
Taiwan also has one of the highest levels of human development in the world.  Although, 
the United Nation’s does not capture human development data for Taiwan because it includes it 
as part of the People's Republic of China, the government of Taiwan conducts their own 
calculations using the same methodology the United Nations uses for their human development 
index (HDI).  PerTaiwan's government calculation, their HDI is believing to be 0.882 (Taiwan 
Directorante General of Budget 2011)11. This means that the country ranks 22nd globally, among 
such countries like Norway and Australia with HDI of (0.91) respectively and places Taiwan 
third in Asia behind Japan (12th) and South Korea (15th) (United Nations Human Development 
Index, 2014).The high level of human development has also resulted in citizens enjoying a high 
level of education when compared to global standards.  Ninety-nine percent of Taiwan’s 
population has completed secondary school (Clark, 2010) and the country has one of the highest 
literacy rates in the world with 98% (Taiwan Ministry of Interior, 2014). Although, Taiwan lacks 
rural poverty, the estimated 1% of the populations characterized as poor come from the rural 
areas, especially those of original Taiwanese descent (Lin, Bishop, & Chiou, 2007). However, the 
most socially excluded group is made up of Taiwan’s 440,000 foreign workers, who suffer from 
low salaries and social discrimination.   
  
                                                 
11"2011中華民國人類發展指數 (HDI)" (PDF) (in Chinese). Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
Executive Yuan, R.O.C. 2011. Retrieved 2011-11-21. 
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Taiwan Under Martial Law 
 
Taiwan’s early politics has been shaped by the period of Japanese colonization from 1895 
to 1945 (Morris and Gerteis, 2015) and the Chinese Civil War that was taking place between 
China’s Nationalist Party, Kuomintang (KMT) and Communist Party of China (CPC) until 1949.  
Following the defeat of Japan after World War II, Japan returned Taiwan to China’s ruling 
Nationalist Party, Kuomintang (KMT) in 1945.  Around this time, the CPC defeated the KMT, 
and more than 2 million KMT supporters were forced to flee the homeland and relocate to 
Taiwan (Morris and Gerteis, 2015).  The rush of migration of KMT supporters to Taiwan led to a 
high level of tension between Taiwanese citizens and the newly arrived mainlanders from China.  
These tensions escalated on Feb. 27, 1947, after Nationalist Party had a confrontation with a 
Taiwanese woman selling black-market cigarettes, which then led to the death of an innocent 
bystander (US Department of State, 1949).  This event sparked a massive anti-government 
rally the following day, which would be labeled as the 228 Incident or February 28 Massacre.  
It also marked the beginning of the “White Terror” period when people believed to be anti-
government in Taiwan were arrested, imprisoned and in some cases executed.  The KMT’s 
brutal repression and the Chinese’s military crackdown of dissidents during this period led to 
the death of an estimated 18,000 and 28,000 people12.   
  
Following these incidents, a period of martial law under China’s KMT party began from 
1949 until 1987.  During this time, local elections and small media (e.g. political magazines and 
crude cable service), which were not banned by the KMT, became key outlets for contestation by 
the emerging opposition, or the Dangwai movement (outside the party).  The KMT enjoyed 
broad popularity among rural voters, urban voters, working class, white collar and business 
class, theDangwai movement was also organizing citizens which suffered at the hands of the 
                                                 
12“President suggests identifying perpetrators in 228 Incident”, The China Post, February 23, 2017. 
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KMT.  Over time the movement expanded to include medical doctors, journalists, intellectuals, 
college professors and lawyers who began to challenge KMT’s patron client system, rigid social 
control, and what they deemed as a fake consensus (Ho, 2010; Lee, 1993).  Political magazines 
such as Formosa, Taiwan Political Forum, The Eighties, and Deep Roots (Fan, 2015) became 
key centers for organizing and communications (Rigger, 2001; Batto, 2004; Huang, 2009).  The 
magazines highlighted Taiwan’s origins and heroes of the “political resistance” to provide a 
counter narrative to Chinese discourse on a common identity (Fan, 2015). 
 
Themagazine Formosawould become central to opposition activism under martial law. 
Founded in 1979, Dangwai leader, Huan Hsin-chieh named the magazine Formosa, meaning 
beautiful island in Portuguese, to emphasize Taiwan’s distinct identity (Chang, 2009).13 The 
magazine established branch offices in twelve major cities throughout Taiwan allowing it to 
coordinate political activities with many activists (Chang, 2009).  By its fourth issue, it became 
the second most read magazine in Taiwan with a total circulation of one hundred thousand 
copies (Rigger, 2001).  By facilitating underground political organizing, Dangwai candidates 
won local and provincial seats during the 1977 local elections (Tien and Shiau, 2014).  These 
electoral gains were considered a resounding defeat for the ruling Nationalist Party (Jacobs, 
1998).  Additionally, following a riot in central Taiwan in 1977 against alleged voting fraud by 
KMT officials, Dangwai members began to form an alliance “based on an updated belief about 
the vulnerability of the regime” (Chu and Lin, 2005: 40). 
 
A key turning point in Taiwan’s history was the Formosa Incident which took place on 
December 10, 1979 in southern Taiwan.  On this day, pro-democracy activists held a 
demonstration commemorating Human Rights Day to promote and demand democracy in their 
country.  In retaliation, the KMT government arrested the main organizers and leaders of the 
                                                 
13Formosa was the name that Portuguese explorers gave to Taiwan in the sixteenth century.  Therefore, its non-
Chinese origin also posed an implicit challenge to KMT's claim that Taiwan was part of China.   
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Formosa magazine.  The KMT also took the opportunity to arrest more than 90 civilians and all 
the well-known opposition leaders.   Everyone who was arrested was held in prison 
incommunicado for two months (Rigger, 2001).  Reports of abuse and maltreatment were later 
reported (Rigger, 2001; Huang, 2009; Fell, 2005).  KMT’s heavy-handed approach did not fare 
well with an increasingly weary Taiwanese citizenry as well as Taiwanese organizations abroad. 
At the same time, the popularity of Formosa grew during this time.  With increased grassroots 
support the Dangwai became more vocal about their political demands which now included calls 
for an end to martial law, greater press freedoms, the release political prisoners, and freedom to 
allow the opposition movement to form a party (International Committee for Human Rights in 
Taiwan, 1981: 5)14. 
 
By early 1980’s, Taiwan’s political civil society space was expanding and now consisted of 
not only the Dangwai movement, but smaller social movements, and new civil society 
organizations in Taiwan and abroad.  Spontaneous and smaller movements and protests during 
this time centered around obtaining rights for specific sub populations such as farmers, workers, 
women, students, consumers, and religious groups, among others (Fan, 2015).  From 1983 to 
1987, more than 1,500 incidents of mass social protest occurred; in 1986 and 1987, 1,200 and 
1,800 street rallies and demonstrations on civil and social issues were recorded respectively 
(Ngo, 1993).In the US, Taiwanese human rights organizations worked on increasing ties 
between Dangwai politicians and US elected officials, scholars, and media (Cheng, 1989).For 
example, during this time World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI), “expanded from 
the promotion of political consciousness within the Taiwanese immigrant community and 
offering moral support to the domestic democratic movement to targeting American 
congressional legislation and public debates”(Fan, 2015: 89). 
 
                                                 
14 “The Kaohsiung Tapes,” International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan (Seattle, February 1981). 
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By the mid-1980s the opposition had succeeded in gaining momentum which was 
becoming increasingly difficult for the KMT to stop.  Likewise, facing growing international 
isolation and US pressure for further liberalization, the KMT did not want their authority to be 
delegitimized.  Therefore, backed with greater domestic and international support, when 
opposition leaders were released they went on to form the basis for the Democratic Progressives 
Party (DPP) (Rigger, 2001; Huang, 2009; Fell, 2005), while the ban on opposition party was still 
in place.  The illegal founding of the Democratic Progressive Party on September 28, 1986 
attempted to unite these various congeries of oppositional political figures, intellectuals, and 
activists.  From the inception, the various congeries under the DPP umbrella struggled to find 
common ground outside of their support for democracy and ethnic justice.  In absence of a 
broad ideological and programmatic consensus, the DPP could hold the party together by 
developing rules and structures to accommodate and synthesize as broad range of views and 
opinions as possible (Tien, 1992).  Together they put pressure on the KMT to bring on political 
liberalization and democratization and on July 15th, 1987 when the KMT-led government 
announced the repeal of the 38-year-old martial law, thereby formally restoring the frozen 
political freedoms of speech, assembly and organization.  This retreat on the part of the KMT 
was unprecedented in that there are few examples of transition amid prosperity, where 
authoritarian rule retreated at the peak of unprecedented growth and apparent political stability 
(Yang, 2007).   
 
Activism Post-Martial Law 
After martial law was lifted in 1987, Taiwan continue to experience a growth in social 
movements, civic groups, and opposition media which gave birth to a new "demanding civil 
society"(Hsiao, 1995; Hsiao and Liu, 1997; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).   Seeking greater 
electoral support, the DPP quickly discovered the political utility of social protests.   As a 
strategy, they set out to sponsor and support social protests as an indirect way of challenging the 
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KMT hegemony and obtaining electoral gains (Rigger, 2014).   In return, the KMT leaders were 
conflicted on how to respond.  Conservative leaders within the KMT sought to slow down the 
liberalization and appeasement of the civil society; while more liberal leaders sought a political 
strategy of conceding to the increasing demands form the mobilized civil society.  The KMT 
leadership ultimately chose appeasement.  This increased the civic power and political force of 
Taiwan’s civil society and led to a substantial increase in civil society’s impact on government 
and society.  These movements proved that the KMT’s monopoly on the political system had 
been shattered and would never again be restored (Diamond, 2001). 
 
More reforms followed which reflected the KMT’s efforts to defuse tensions and respond 
to the demands of civil and political society. During the 1990’s this progressive politics or what 
others called “new politics” became part of the mainstream political agenda (Wong, 2003; Tso, 
2014). They included further mobilizations for workers’ rights, aboriginals, students, etc. One of 
the largest movements that took place during this time was Wild Lily student 
movement (野百合學運) or March student movement which was a six-day student 
demonstration in 1990 for democracy. The sit-in at Memorial Square in Taipei (since 
rededicated as Liberty Square in commemoration of the movement) was initiated by students 
from the National Taiwan University. Participation quickly grew to 22,000 demonstrators. The 
Wild Lily demonstrators sought direct elections of Taiwan's president and vice president and 
new popular elections for all representatives in the National Assembly.  The election results were 
an outbreak of accumulated youth anger.  Although, the Wild Lily Student movement of 1990 
did not lead to a change in electoral politics or the party system in Taiwan, it was still critically 
important for many reasons. It helped the nation move toward a blueprint for democratization 
by increasing public support for greater democratic reforms. Equally important, though, was 




In response to call for greater democratic reforms, the KMT had reinvented itself as 
abroad-based party that enjoyed wide support.  In return, this left little room for an opposition 
party to mobilize economic sectors or geographic areas against the ruling party.   Still the KMT 
legalized new political parties in 1991, and in 1992, Taiwan saw free elections to its central 
parliamentary bodies, the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, for the first time. The 
first fully competitive presidential elections were held in 1996 which the KMT won again.  It was 
not until the 2000 presidential elections that DPP leader, Chen Shui-bian’s (䱇∈᠕) became 
Taiwan’s first non-KMT president and marked the end of the political transition and resulted in 
the first peaceful and democratic power transfer in any Chinese society.  However, it is 
important to note that during this time there was also allegations of rampant vote buying by 
KMT candidates (including a politician who was once convicted for doing so) (Thinking Taiwan, 
2014). Vote-buying in local elections particularly, remains a problem as it is established practice 
since the early days of democratization and regarded as inevitable by most politicians.  
 
Chen’s first term (2000-2004) took place as movement activists were achieving 
legislative successes.  In return, Chen and his accompanying DPP politicians promised to usher 
the most open era in Taiwan’s history.  They vowed to work for equal rights in a country with a 
highly patriarchal traditional culture, to reduce in equality after Taiwan’s long economic boom, 
and to guarantee women a certain number of cabinet seats, putting them at the policy-making 
table in Taiwan for the first time (Chang 2002; Chen and Lee 2008). However, although social 
movements scored some legislative successes, these did not necessarily contribute to structural 
changes.  Chen was reelected for a second term in 2004, until 2008.  During this term, Chen 
implemented an economic agenda which was barely distinguishable from the KMT’s. This 
included the privatization of parts of the banking, telecommunications and utilities sectors, and 
attacks on pensions. Many workers in these sectors remember the DPP’s time in power as one of 
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job losses, economic uncertainty and continuing government corruption. When voters threw the 
DPP out of office in 2008 it was not out of love for the KMT but rather as a punishment for these 
economic policies (Thinking Taiwan, 2014).  Thus, the gains that movement activists achieved 
through their cooperation with DPP incumbents was often more symbolic than substantive.    
President Chen’s second term was mired in controversies regarding his alleged corruption 
allegations, and he resigned in 2008.  That same year, the DPP government lost power as Ma 
Ying-jeou led the rejuvenated KMT to reclaim the presidency. Ma Ying-jeou won the 
presidential election by a larger than expected margin of more than two million votes in March 
2008(Tso, 2014; Fell, 2010).  
 
The return of conservative hegemony raised concerns for activists in Taiwan.  After 
several years of working within the government, many social movement organizations had lost 
the capacity to mobilize their mass constituencies (Tso 2014; Hsiao and Ku 2010).  The student 
movement of November 2008 called “Wild Strawberry” (䞢㤝㥧, Ye caomei) put these concerns 
to rest.  The Wild Strawberry movement started as a protest over police violence and brutality 
that took place during the visit of Chinese Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits 
Chairman, Chen Yunlin.  As part of the movement, protestors evoked a Taiwanese identity by 
displaying the Taiwanese national flag and playing Taiwanese songs.  In demanded a public 
apology from President Ma Ying-jeou, resignation of the head of police, and constitutional 
review of Taiwan’s laws on the right to peaceful demonstrations and free expression.  Although, 
not all of the students’ demands were met, the movement paved the way for Taiwan’s first 






The Integration of Media and Technology in the Political Stage 
 
The period between the end of the 1992 Consensus and Taiwan’s largest movement to 
date, the Sunflower Movement (太陽花學運), was one of rapid technology modernization and 
some media diversification.  As noted earlier, the Formosa magazine and other smaller regional 
underground progressive newspapers, were often a source of additional political conflict rather 
than an outlet for political discussion.  Therefore, in the period of post-martial law, media was 
not always seen as a force promoting greater civility and democracy. Rather, the emerging 
competitive and negative nature of politics in Taiwan slowly became reinforced by an equally 
negative and adversarial media which further complicated relations among political parties and 
strained the democratization process (Chu and Lin, 2001; Fell, 2005; Huang, 2006).  Despite 
Freedom House rating Taiwan as one of the freest media environments in Asia (Diamond, 2001; 
Freedom House, 2015)15, a study found that only 1% of Taiwanese view their media as a trusted 
source of information; the lowest in Asia-Pacific (Edelman, 2006). Additionally, despite having 
an open and competitive media market, newspapers frequently exploit and exaggerate social 
and political issues to attract readers (Rawnsely G.D., 2000).  So, many are viewed as 
sensationalist rather than substantive.  
 
As of 2015, there were over 2,000 newspapers, 8,100 periodicals, 171 radio stations, and 
107 satellite broadcasting programs in Taiwan (China.org.cn).  This is a notable achievement, 
considering that 20-30 years earlier, KMT had a monopoly on the media systems in Taiwan 
(Batto, 2004).  However, although a plurality of media exists in Taiwan, many of these are split 
into the old political establishment which sympathize with China, and new political 
establishment which favor Taiwanese independence.  To this day, Taiwan’s traditional news and 
newspapers are firmly divided between the two dominant political camps: KMT and DPP 
                                                 
15 Freedom House, Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1999- 2000 (New 
York: Freedom House, 2000): p. 469. 
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supporters.  The main players are ET Today, which try to maintain neutral and shift between a 
reunification/independence conversations, Apple News (funded by Hong Kong capital and shift 
between both sides), China Times (under the CtiTV group, therefore, centered on the KMT), 
UDN (broader pan-blue coverage), Liberty Times (pan-green), and PNN (most of reports focus 
on citizens' view, environment, social injustice, considered more independent).  Scholars have 
noted that by 2005, the China Times and United Daily News became more critical of KMT 
leaders, rather than simply serving as political mouthpieces (Fell, 2005).  Likewise, three of the 
four major television networks are still controlled by the old political establishment (the KMT, 
the military, and the government). On the KMT side the Chinese funded CtiTV covers news and 
information which is centered around reunification.  On the DPP side, SET TV is discusses news 
with a slant towards independence.  Taiwan’s news programs also feature traditional political 
talk shows where professors, politicians and journalists debate current issues. 
 
Regarding ICTs, Taiwan has been a pioneer in the adoption and use of technologies 
(Diamond, 2001). By 1994, Taiwan was one of the few countries which had three Internet 
service providers (Silkera, HiNet, and SeedNet, the latter two being state-owned) which 
emerged to provide dial up Internet connection services.  According to the 2015 United Nation’s 
Information Technology Development Index (IDI) data, Taiwan’s ICT development is 7.85, 
making it rank almost equally with other developed countries such as Singapore (7.6), United 
Kingdom (7.81), and Luxembourg (7.85) among others (Unied Nationals Information 
Technology Development Index, 2015; Sanou, 2014). The countries with the highest IDI Index 
arethe Korea Republic with 8.54 followed by Denmark and Sweden at 8.43 and 8.27 
respectively.  Therefore, Taiwan’s score is high by international standards.  Not surprisingly, 
Taiwan’s Internet adoption rate is the fourth highest in Asia (ITU, 2014). Per Internet World 
Stats (2014), the number of Internet users is18,639,773 which refers to around 80.0% of total 
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Taiwanese population (23,071,779).  Therefore, citizens’ access to the Internet is also 
unrestricted (Lee et al, 2013). 
 
Internet usage in Taiwan is prevalent among the population and does not show a gender 
divide, 56% of men vs 52% women use the Internet (FIND, 2014).  However, the most notable 
difference emerges among different age groups and location.  As of 2014, 95% of people between 
15 and 24 years old were Internet users but only less than 10% of people over 60 used the 
Internet (FIND, 2014). Research conducted by Taiwan Network Information Center in May  
2014, estimated that the number of Internet users (aged 12 years and above) in Taiwan had 
increased to 17.64 (75.43%) million as of May, 2014 (TNIC, 2014).In 2004, male users 
accounted for 62% and females 59%.  By January 2011, these figures expanded to 77% and 73%.  
The percentage is also high for citizens 12 years and younger, which accounts for 1.41 million 
citizens (TNIC, 2014).  These high numbers are warranted by the fact that most individuals 
(95.20%) can access broadband internet at home.  At the same time, Taiwan’s government has 
placed a great focus on integrating Internet in the education sector.  Chou, Condron and Belland 
(2005) argue that Internet usage in schools has helped improve literacy rates in Taiwan.   At the 
same time, since English is taught to everyone from fifth grade on, this has contributed to the 
high Internet usage found among school age youth (Wu, 2011).  
 
There are also notable differences between rural versus urban regions.  This is in line 
with the distribution of wealth across different regions of the island as wealth distribution is 
more skewed in favor of those in urban areas than those in rural areas (Feng, 2011; Wei and 
Chen, 2012).  Two of the largest cities in the northern and more urbanized region of Taiwan, 
Taipei and Kaohsiung, have the highest rate of Internet users (over 80% respectively) (Wu, 
2011).  On the other hand, the more southern and rural regions the rate of Internet usage is 68 
and 64% (Wu, 2011).  However, as Internet becomes easier to access and cheaper, the 
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relationship between Internet usage and users’ socioeconomic status is not as significant as it 
was before. 
 
Political Uses of Technology in Taiwan 
 
With a highly educated population and well-developed ICT infrastructure, its not a 
surprise that technology made its way to the political arena in Taiwan (Lee et al, 2014).  Due to 
the duopoly and competitive nature of politics in Taiwan,elections are volatile and high-stakes 
periods which provide parties with the opportunity to increase electoral power.  Elections in 
Taiwan are often described as being negative in nature, which is often attributed to the fact that 
many potential candidates simply didn’t have cogent platforms to start with. In fact, except for a 
few municipalities, the campaigns have been overwhelmingly lacking in substance and 
imagination, with candidates relying on securing votes traditionally along party lines (“greens” 
voting DPP and “blues” voting KMT, with smaller parties accounting for a small percentage of 
the ballots) (Thinking Taiwan, 2014).  Even with the integration of ICTs into politics, this nature 
of elections has not changed.  
 
In the electoral arena, Diamond and Shin (2014) identify three distinct periods in the 
evolution of ICTs.  The first use of ICTs took place during the 1994 Taipei City mayoral election.   
During this election, DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian became the first politician to create an 
online bulletin board station (BBBS) to reach out to young voters (Diamond and Shin, 2014: 34).  
BBBS was founded in 1995 by college students and quickly became a central online place for 
creating forums and various online communities.   Shortly after, other candidates began 
utilizing the BBBS platform for voter outreach and developed more complex online forums to 
help facilitate a variety of online discussions with constituents.  The first political party websites 
emerged during the 1996 presidential elections (Diamond and Shin, 2014: 59).  The websites 
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were utilized by Taiwan’s three major parties KMT, DPP, and New Party.  The websites were 
used to highlight the policies and political stances of candidates and as communication tool.   
 
The second phase of ICTs incorporation into politics took place between 1998 and 2004.  
During politicians began to incorporate multimedia instruments and online donation systems 
into their websites (Diamond and Shin, 2014: 68).  For example, during the 2002 Taipei 
mayoral elections, DPP challenger Lee Ying-yuan and KMT-challenger Chen set up online 
donations systems (Diamond and Shin, 2014).  Finally, the period between 2005- to the present 
saw the utilization of personalized social media platforms and a continued focus on creating 
multimedia such as video, blog posts, and in some cases mobile applications and websites 
(Diamond and Shin, 2014: 94).  Despite the growth in sophistication in terms of ICT use in 
politics there are noted differences among local elections in the urban and rural areas.  For 
example, in the 2010 election candidates in the northern urban region (Taipei and Mew Taipei 
city) utilized campaign websites and other web tools than candidates in the central and southern 
regions (Taichung City, Tainana City, and Kahsiung City) (Diamond and Shin, 2014: 173).   
 
Beginning in 2005, politics in Taiwan saw the emergence of personalized social media 
with multimedia programs as new campaign tools  (Diamond and Shin, 2014: 118).  This period 
began in the aftermath of the 2008 presidential election when DPP politicians shifted their focus 
to the virtual world to seek political rejuvenation.  During the 2008 elections, the KMT and DPP 
invested extensive funds and resources in ICTs to target the 8.89 million eligible voters above 
the age of 20, who make up more than 10.47 million Taiwanese that frequently surf the internet 
(Wang, 2007; Chen & Lee, 2008).  Both parties spent thousands of dollars on YouTube 
campaign films criticizing each other’s candidates, ads on YouTube, and professional 
consultants to manage their online campaigns (China Times, 2011).  During this period, DPP 
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politicians were also able to regain popularity among the younger generations simply using 
youth-friendly social media tools such as Plurk and Facebook (Diamond and Shin, 2014).   
 
In summary, several points can be made regarding the emergence of ICT use in politics 
in Taiwan.  First, electoral competitions and the availability of ICTs have been the main drivers 
in the adoption of ICT for politics.  Second, in Taiwan geography has shaped the use of ICTs for 
campaigning; with urban politicians being more active than rural politicians.  However, this 
geographical distinction is best understood at the local level rather than the federal level where 
presidential elections take place.  These geographical differences highlight a third driver to the 
use of ICTs by politicians, which is their assessment of which key constituents they want to 
reach and desire to modernize their party image.  In Taiwan, ICT use is often seen as mostly 
occupied by a younger and more urban population.  However, since all major parties are now 
using the same ICT-enabled campaign strategies, this has leveled the playing field in this respect 
(Wang, 2007; Myers et al, 1999).   
 
Scholars inside and outside of Taiwan have mixed reactions regarding the utility of ICTs 
in politics in Taiwan.  With respect to the impact of candidate websites during Taiwan's 
elections, Rawnsely pessimistically argues that they only serve voters who actively search for 
related information, so they only "preach to the converted" (Rawnsely, 2014; 123).  Yet, research 
on subsequent elections have shown mixed outcomes.  During the 2006 mayoral election, voters 
use of traditional media had a stronger effect than the new media on perceptions of the 
candidates' images (Diamond and Shin, 2014: 189). But another study of the same election finds 
that those who viewed the candidates' websites more frequently were less cynical and more 
willing to explore detailed info about the individual candidates (Chen, 2013).  Second, scholars 
have argued that ICTs have mostly led to a new form of professionalization of campaigns and in 
return the weakening of political parties.  Rawsley has observed a trend of professionalization in 
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Taiwan campaigns since the late 1990s as evidenced by the modern organization, the careful 
demographic studies, the nuanced skills to communicate with voters and the constant 
monitoring of change in public polls (Rawsley, 2014).  Therefore, this new form of 
professionalization tends to distance campaign team from the traditional party machines.   
 
Technology and the Amplification Activism in the Sunflower Era 
 
The early 2010s saw the emergence of new economic treaties and agreements between 
China and Taiwan such as the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement and Cross-Strait 
Goods Trade Agreement which deepened economic relations between China and Taiwan.  
Following the trajectory of the use of media and now technology by pro-independence and 
opposition groups in Taiwan, during the Sunflower movement in 2014, ICTs were found to help 
create new political opportunities for pro-independence activists by helping to elevate a pro-
Taiwan narrative, bringing awareness of these activists’ plights to the international arena, and 
the introduction of new political players who would help to challenge both political parties KMT 
and DPP policies in this regard.  Likewise, the movement and this renewed activism was met 
with disappointment and frustration by citizens and scholars who felt it disrupted cross-strait 
cooperation and economic integration beginning in 2008 and saw these activists as a backlash 
against cross-strait integration (Lee, 2014).  Other scholars warned that the Sunflower 
movement represented a concerning escalation of disruptive tactics and hostile rhetoric that 
threatens the rule of law, the legitimacy of democratic institutions, and the stability of Taiwan’s 
democracy (Huang, 2014).  
 
Using the emblem of a sunflower symbolizing hope, the Sunflower Student Movement 
became the largest student movement in Taiwan’s history. In many ways, the Sunflower 
Movement itself was not solely an anti-China manifestation – it was the culmination of years of 
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a maturing social movement scene and social unrest.  In past years, civic activists raised 
awareness and escalated protests on issues such as forced land evictions and the demolition of 
homes in Dapu; the suspicious death of a conscripted soldier that raised issues of accountability 
and corruption in the military and saw 300,000 protesters gather on the streets; the legalization 
of same-sex marriage; and indigenous land rights (The Diplomat, 2016).  But there was still no 
viable progressive political party for these progressive causes.  In many ways, this all changed 
with the emergence of the Sunflower Movement.  
 
On March 18, 2014 at 9:00pm local time, about 300 students, academics, community 
groups, and other protestors entered Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan and barricaded themselves for 
23 days to protest the cursory review of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), a 
bilateral agreement with Mainland China. Equipped with new media and information, 
communication, technologies (ICTs), this energetic and fast-growing movement was united in 
their concern over what appeared as greater economic and cultural dependence with China.  The 
movement also became an umbrella for 54 diverse civic organizations and NGOs operating at 
the local and national levels and engaged older generation of activists who served as political 
advisors and problem solvers for the students throughout the movement. Traditionally left out 
of politics in Taiwan, this upsurge in youth participation demonstrated a dramatic shift in the 
country’s political culture.  
 
During and in the aftermath of the Sunflower Student Movement, politicians, scholars, 
media, and pundits alike commented on its organization and efficiency, often noted that they 
ran a better campaign that traditional political parties16.   The core team of organizers consisted 
of twenty students from some of the country’s top universities: National Taiwan University, 
                                                 
16 In the article, “How Technology Revolutionzed Taiwan's Sunflower Movement. The Diplomat”, opposition leader 
Tsai Ing-wen was noted as stating that the students, “could probably run a better campaign than the DPP,” said 




National Tsing Hua University, National Chiao Tung University, National Cheng Kung 
University, and, National Chengchi University. Many were members of the Black Island Youth 
Alliance (黑色島國青年陣線) (Chen et al 2016).  Its two main leaders were Lin Fei-Fan, a post-
graduate student from the National Taiwan University and Chen Ting, a student at National 
Tsing Hua University. However, other civic groups who organized it were the Green Citizens' 
Action Alliance (綠色公民行動聯盟) and Citizen Action Coalition 1985 (公民1985行動聯盟).  
 
A key reason for protestors’ efficiency and effectiveness was their transformational use of 
ICTs.  During the movement, students used websites such as Hackpad, Hackfoldr, FB, PTT(BBS, 
Bulletin Board System), and mobile apps such WhatsApp and LINE.ion in order to exchange 
information between organizers and supporters as well as the international community (Chen et 
al 2016; Liberty Times News, 2014).  During this time, Taiwan’s emerging civic hacker 
community used hack pads, "livestreams", wireless networks, and their networked resources to 
provide public WIFI which could not be restricted by the government (Chen et al 2016; Manju, 
2014; Liberty Times News, 2014). Live streaming also come to play an important role in 
expanding the influence of the movement and keeping supporters abreast of news even though 
they may not physically be there (Chen et al 2016; Manju, 2014; Liberty Times News, 2014; 
Manju, 2014).   
 
Online communities also emerged and websites such as g0v.tw promoted public 
information and government transparency by developing tools for improving citizen 
participation in Taiwan.  Using online fundraising platforms, the students were also able to raise 
NT$6.33 million in the crowd funding site FlyingV to place an ad in the New York Times 
(Commonwealth Magazine, 2014; The Diplomat, 2014)17.  It was a powerful message, featuring 
students with their heads bowed being hosed down by a water cannon. “Taiwan,” it noted, 
                                                 
17 Accessed April 10, 2014 https://www.flyingv.cc/project/2648 
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“needs your attention and support.” The placement costs of $208,000 (inclusive of the New 
York Times ad at $153,000 and another at the Taiwan-based Apple Daily) was raised using a 
Taiwanese online fundraising platform called FlyingV (The Diplomat, 2014).  These platforms 
and tools also facilitated the development of a cross-border Chinese activist community because 
of the Taiwan-Hong Kong collaboration. ICTs were also used to coordinate materials such as 
tent, blanket, electronic rechargers, fans, food, monies, etc. that arrived from all parts of 
Taiwan18.Likewise, using ICTs movement leaders could tell their story domestically and 
internationally.  Organizers were aware that international support was not only necessary but 
essential in the public relations battle with the government (The Diplomat, April 2014). So, they 
sent out regular press releases via Facebook and Twitter and set up a live video feed on 
UStream.  These were transformative changes in communication among Taiwan’s civil society 
and with the international community which would never have been possible during Taiwan’s 
early democracy times.  
 
Even though the movement did not accomplish their goal of reinstating a clause-by-
clause review of the CSSTA with China, they did have several significant unintended outcomes.  
The Sunflower movement these newly emergent youth activists and protestors highlighted and 
brought attention to narratives in support of a “Taiwanese” rather than a “Chinese” identity.  
They also played an influential role in reshaping the Taiwanese political arena post-movement 
(Foreign Policy in Focus, 2015).  Nowhere was this most noticeable than during the “nine-in-
one” local elections on November 29, 2014.  The “nine in one” local elections put up for grabs 
11,130 public offices spanning nine administrative levels from the county to the villages. When 
the elections were over the ruling KMT only won 6 of the 22 constituencies in the mayoral and 
commissioner elections, while the DPP won 13with sizable leads (CNN, 12/2014).  Overall, the 
DPP garnered 5.83 million votes, or 47.6%, against the KMT's 4.99 million (40.7%) (CNN, 
                                                 
18 National Taiwan University survey respondent, March 20, 2014.  
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12/2014).   Thanks to the “star” status that some of the movement leaders had acquired, their 
participation in local elections helped in getting third party leaders to win elections and so and 
KMT was unprecedentedly defeated. The opposition DPP won 10 out of 16 mayoral and 
commissioner races. The ruling KMT, lost ground even in its some of its traditional strongholds 
such as the capital city which they had run for 16 consecutive years.  Instead, this seat went to an 
outsider independent political candidate who had no, political experience.   
 
During the “nine in one” local elections, an unlikely candidate also emerged which went 
on to win the Taipei mayoral election.  This unlikely candidate was medical professor, Dr. Ko 
Wen-je. Dr. Ko Wen-je became the first independent candidate to win the office of Taipei mayor, 
which is often a springboard for a later run for the island’s presidency. He was considered an 
untraditional political candidate as he had no previous political experience.  Yet he ran a 
revolutionary campaign in his use of ICTs to develop political power and in how he embraced 
Internet culture that was guided by principles and values such as crowdsourcing wisdom, 
transparency and openness. Politically, Ko steered clear of color politics by adopting a centrist 
line and emphasizing values that have substantial traction among young voters as well as the all-
important “swing voters.” Ko’s wife also actively used ICTs during the campaign.  She set up a 
public Facebook page and received more than 200,000 followers (World News Radio Today, 
2014).In addition, he vowed to implement ideas gathered by his campaign team from social 
media users as part of Taipei City policy if he won the election. Many have credited his outreach 
on social media with bringing out younger voters in droves. In Ko’s acceptance speech, he 
attributed his victory to the power of social media:  
I am an ordinary citizen, and I will continue to listen to the voices of the common people upon 
starting to serve in the Taipei City government. The power of grassroots was parallel to the rise of 
the Internet generation. The entire election campaign was let by the Internet — online donation, 
the promotion of ideals, and mobilization to events. From the White T-Shirt Army to the 
Sunflower Movement, civic movements have created a new approach to Taiwan politics.  
74 
 
Ko won with 57.16% of the vote, a landslide compared to the 40.82% his major opposing 
KMT-supported candidate, Sean Lienn received (World News Radio Today, 2014).  His 
nonpartisan campaign strategy has inspired many hopes that his victory can ease political 
polarization and open a new era for civic politics in Taiwan. So far, he has announced many 
policies that aim to keep his non-partisan appeal right after the election, which signifies his 
intention to remain politically independent and outside the DDP’s institutional framework.  His 
success in winning the capital city as an independent candidate will have a significant impact in 
shaping voter behavior and the country's political culture, some analysts have suggested.  Due to 
the influence of the movement in the November 2014 local elections, it was not a surprise that 
the movement was also credited with helping to usher the win of DPP leader, Tsai Ing-Wen 
during the 2016 Presidential elections (NY Times, Jan 2016). 
Political Polarization or Integration and the Emergence of New Political Actors 
ICTs helped to foster a “communicative consciousness” in the form of an oppositional 
identity (Chen and Liao, 2014) which contributed to the rise of the “Third Force” which helped 
to bring about electoral changes in Taiwan’s party system.  For example, in the aftermath of the 
Sunflower Movement, movement leaders and the Taiwan Citizens Union” (公民組合) created 
several smaller political parties focused on social justice.  The three notable ones were: the 
Green Party, Social Democratic Party, and New Power Party (時代力量) (NPP) which were 
founded in 2015.  These “third force” parties marketed themselves as representatives of the 
social movement scene and sought to advance a progressive agenda in Taiwan.   Of the three, the 
NPP has been the most successful to date.  They received an endorsement from former 
Democratic Progressive Party chairman Lin I-hsiung (Taipei Times, April 2015), who withdrew 
his membership in the DPP in 2006.  The NPP has been assertive on Taiwan’s independence in 
contrast to the DPP, which supports the ambiguous status quo and stability of cross-strait 
relations. Their political agenda is strongly focused on progressive social justice, human rights, 
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and democratic values such as the environment, same-sex marriage, and indigenous land rights.  
Their economic policy focuses on higher corporate and luxury taxes to redress wealth inequality.  
During the 2016 general election, the NPP won 5 legislative seats, beating out long-time third-
party People First Party.  
  
The DPP has taken notice of the growing popularity for “third force” parties.  Since, these 
parties have raised issues which have become very salient in Taiwan’s society, the DPP sought 
for ways to align with movement groups.  Nominating the first woman, Tsai Ing-wen, a former 
university professor and DPP chairwoman, the DPP could lead the opinion polls and eventually 
win the 2016 Presidential elections with their call for a more cautious relationship with China 
and greater democratic deepening.  Therefore, the future of these small parties remains to be 
seen.  Since these parties are more movement based than political organizations, and the 
political arena is still mostly taken up by the KMT and DPP, it is unclear to see how they can 
grow.  Unless, they can keep the movements’ grassroots momentum going, the major parties’ 
will continue to control most of the resources, thereby keeping the small parties marginalized.  
Likewise, this new generation of pro-independence activists and elected officials are seen as the 
drivers of political polarization in Taiwan (Lee, 2014).  Thereby, negatively influencing what was 
noted as a mostly flexible and pragmatic view on cross-strait relations among the younger 
generations in Taiwan (Rigger, 2006). Thus, some scholars noted that these views mostly 
represent a specific group of movement activists born after the 1996 cross-strait missile crisis 
and therefore grew up with a high level of native consciousness, or “Taiwanese nationalism” and 





Rise of crowdsourcing and transparency and accountability civic groups 
 
Another effect of the emergence of Taiwan’s “third force” has been the development of 
new civic watchdogs.  After the Sunflower Movement, leaders created a watchdog website which 
sought to engage youth in the political process by explaining political issues and make it easier 
for them to get involved and hold politicians accountable.  The outcome of these efforts was the 
creation of the Appendectomy Project 19.  The project was called Appendectomy to symbolize the 
removal of legislators who were perceived as been ineffective and unaccountable.  The project 
developed a website seeks to ensure accountability by reviewing campaign promises by elected 
officials, and helping to promote grassroots mobilizations to remove what they deem to be 
incompetent politicians from office.  Using recall, these activists hope to remove politicians 
unresponsive to the will of the people. So far, they have largely targeted KMT politicians and so 
their work has become synonymous with “remove blue legislator” (Foreign Policy in Focus, May 
2015).  As of 2017, the Appendectomy Project had succeeded in passing “Public Officers 
Election” amendment which made it easier for citizens to remove local elected officials from 
office.  They also continue to maintain an online active community to expose corruption and 
hold elected officials accountable as well as serve as a leadership pipeline for youth interested in 
political engagement and participation.  
 
In conclusion, the Sunflower Movement and the bottom-up appropriations of ICT-
enabled activism that followed continue to shape politics in Taiwan.  Although, youth and 
progressive initiatives reemerged strong from these efforts, it is still unclear as to whether they 
will contribute to democratic deepening in Taiwan.  Particularly, in the strengthening of 
democratic representative institutions in this emerging democracy.  ICTs helped support the 
emergence of new political parties after the movement.  However, we still need to define the 




aspects of ICT usage which interact with a country’s political context and can help understand 
its democratic utility.  To this end, I conducted a survey with college students and members of 
political parties in Taiwan to better understand how they viewed the challenges and 
opportunities of ICTs for politics in their country.    
Survey and Analysis of Political Websites 
At the macro level, we can see the ways that ICTs are contributing to new political 
opportunities for pro-independence activists in Taiwan and having some electoral gains.  
However, this does not tell us about how the new generation of activists or political parties 
themselves view their use of ICTs and their perception of its utility and how it is changing how 
they do their work.  To help bridge the gap between the macro and micro, this next section 
discusses findings from two surveys conducted in March and April 2014 in Taiwan.  One survey 
targeted college students and the second survey targeted volunteers and staff of political parties.    
The survey was developed in English and translated to Taiwanese and posted on Qualtrics 
online in a dissertation website that I created called, My Online Political Participation: 
http://myopp.org/chinesestudy/.The surveys asked students and political parties a variety of 
questions regarding their level of satisfaction with politics today, how they use ICTs, and their 
sense of the utility of ICTs.  For the sake of brevity, this section will only discuss answers 
regarding how these groups use ICTs and their sense of utility.  Qualtrics was chosen because it 
can encrypt the data collected from human participants over computer networks.  Finally, two 
Taiwanese research assistants were hired to administer both surveys in Taiwan.    
 
For the college student survey, the two research assistants employed snowball sampling 
and recruited sixty-one local college students from universities in northern and southern Taiwan 
such as National Taiwan University, National Chengchi University, Soochow University, Taipei 
Medical University, and Taiwan Shoufu University to successfully complete the survey online 
(Appendix B includes a copy of the surveys that were administered into Taiwanese and English).    
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The college student survey was divided into four parts: demographic information (i.e. gender, 
income, education level), views about political institutions and political parties, 
media/technology access and exposure, and political interest and activism. In terms of 
demographics of the student population, it is important to note that I did not recruit nor sought 
to measure differences between mainlander vs islander student populations.  Figure 2 outlines 
the basic profile of the student respondents.  We achieved an almost even distribution of surveys 
completed by male versus females.  The average age of the respondents was 23 years old.  Since 
our target audience was college students, it is not a surprise that our samples are all well-
educated.  Likewise, in Taiwan, most students do continue schooling beyond high school.  Post-
high school education is usually classified into: a vocational program, junior college, which is 
usually two years, university programs, which could be considered the equivalent of a 4-year 
school in America, Masters, and Doctorate.  Most our respondents were in 4 year schools or 
junior colleges.   
 
As noted earlier, Taiwan is one of the densest countries in the world.  Most students were 
recruited from urban cities, however, the cities could be divided from high density areas such as:  
New Taipei City, Taipei, Hsinchu, Taichung, Kaohsiung, Tainan, to lower density urban areas 
such as: Yilan, Pingtun, Keelung, and Miaoli.  Regarding income, as of January 1, 2013, the 
minimum wage in Taiwan is NT$109.oo an hour (about $3.71/hr in the United States) (Chang, 
2012).  This comes out to an average yearly salary of $NT228,564 (or equivalent of $6,978 
dollars a year).  Most survey respondents reported making below $NT200,000 a year, therefore, 
below what’s considered an average yearly salary in Taiwan.  Despite, their lower income levels 
most students reported accessing the Internet daily, using online social networks, and mobile 
devices.  Most respondents also expressed having moderate to conservative political views.  
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Table 14: Profile of N=61 Student Survey Respondents 
 # of Responses Percentage of Sample 
Male  34 56% 
Female 27 44% 
   
Average age 23  




Vocational School 2 3% 
Junior College 12 21% 
University 37 61% 
Masters 9 15% 
Doctorate 0 0% 
   
Political Views   
Very Conservative 2 3% 
Conservative 12 20% 
Moderate 38 62% 
Liberal 8 13% 
Very Liberal 1 2% 
   
Geographical Distribution   
High-Density- Urban Cities: New 
Taipei City, Taipei, Taoyuan, 
Taichung, Kaohsiung, Tainan 
59 97% 
Less-Density-Urban Cities: 
Pingtun and Miaoli 
3 3% 
   
Yearly Income   
Over NT$ 300,000 5 8.5% 
Between NT$200,000 and 
NT$300,000 
3 5.1% 
Below NT$200,000 51 86.4 
   
Frequency Using the Internet   
Daily 53 87% 
Several times a week 3 5% 
Few times a month 3 3% 
Rarely 2 3% 
Never 0 0% 
   
Mobile Device Use   
Yes 55 90% 
No 6 10% 
   
Own a social networking site 
account (e.g. Facebook, 
Twitter, Plurk, etc.) 
  
Yes 44 77% 
No 12 23% 
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Students’ Perception of How Politicians Use ICTs 
 
Students’ views and expectations of how elected officials use ICTs seem to be mixed.  
While (47.5%) reported that they can help keep people more informed about what government 
is doing and 37.8% felt that it can make government more accessible, half (52.5%) felt that 
government just delivers the same information online as they do through traditional channels.  
Some students even expressed that it was a waste of government money and time for elected 
officials to think about how to use digital tools to engage with their constituents.    




Students also seemed to have limited interest in their expectations of how political 
parties should use ICTs.  Most felt it was important or very important for political parties to: (1) 
keep the public informed by posting info and alerts on social networking sites, (2) allow people 
to contact parties online, and (3) provide general information to the public through their 
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website.  Fewer students felt it was important for political parties to allow the public to complete 
specific tasks online, such as making donations, etc.  




Finally, students were more likely to follow politicians on social media because: (1) they 
find the information from these sites are more reliable that what they get on traditional news 
organizations and (2) they want to stay current on political and social news. Students were not 








Students’ Opinions About the Role of ICTs in Politics 
 
The survey asked students for their opinions regarding the role of ICTs both in terms of 
how it changes their connection to their government and political system and how its changing 
government and politics.  Generally, students seem to have a favorable view of how ICTs are 
helping to increase access to information about the government and politics.  For example, 
47.5% of the students felt that ICTs are helping people become more informed about what 
government is doing and 39.3% felt that that the Internet generally makes government more 
accessible and 52% felt that it also helps to increase access to politicians.  The survey also asked 
students if they agreed or disagreed with this statement: “The Internet INCREASES the 
influence of those with extreme political views, OR the Internet REDUCES the influence of 
those with extreme views by giving ordinary citizens a chance to be heard”.  Nearly half of 




Figure 5: Perception of Extreme Political Views 
 
 
In terms of the benefits they gain from ICTs, 74% of students reported that the Internet 
and social networks give them access to a wider range of views than those expressed in 
traditional media and this might shape their political views (71%).  In Taiwan’s highly politicized 
media environment, its clear to see why youth coming of age in Taiwan may look for the ability 
to access a variety of political views outside of what their parents are used to.  Students did 
report relying on a mix of traditional and new mediums for getting access to news about their 
government. 
Figure 6 shows that the top three mediums reported were: (1) Internet (38.8%), (2) 
television (16.3%), and (3) social media (13.8%).  A small number of students did select other 
major sources of news and were asked to list them.  The top three news sources listed were: (1) 




Figure 6: Students’ News Consumption 
 
 
Overall, students seem to express positive views towards the utility of social networking 
sites in politics.  Most students reported that it was somewhat important to very important that 
they use social networking sites to (1) keep up with political news, (2) debate or discuss political 
issues with others, and (3) learn about what issues and policies political parties are advocating 
for.  Students were less likely to use social networking sites to recruit people to get involved in a 








Students’ Sense of Political Efficacy 
 
Generally, and not considering ICTs, more than half of the students felt that they could 
have a moderate (14.8%) to small impact (50.8%) in their government.   This is revealing for a 
country which has experienced a political stalemate since becoming a democracy.  Even under 
these political conditions, students still feel some degree of political efficacy.  Only 31.1% felt 








Figure 8: Students’ Perception of Personal Impact 
 
 
When asked to rate their interactions with either their local, state, or federal government 
in the past twelve months, 38.8% of students had mentioned they had not contacted their local, 
state, or federal government in the past year.  However, a small subset of the students had 
contacted their government through a website, email or, in-person.   Therefore, if students are to 
have contacted their government, it appears that this is more likely to take place by online 




Figure 9: Students’ contact with Government 
 
 
While students do report a sense of personal political efficacy, when it comes to day-to-
day political engagement, the majority were less likely to do so.  For example, for the question: 
“How often, if ever, do you talk about politcs or current events with your family and friends”, 
only 39% of the students reported sometimes or rarely (35%). Interestingly, even though 
students had positive views about the role of social networks in politics, they were even less 
likely to discuss politics and current events online through social networks, websites, forums.  
For the question: “How often do you discuss politics and public affairs with others online in 
social networks, news websites, forums, etc?”, half of students reported a low amount:  
 28% said less than once a month;  
 Or atleast once a month (26%).  
Only 5% of students said they discuss politics and current events online every day.  When 
asking students to rate the type of information they share on social networks,  only 37% reported 
that some of what they post online is related to politics or the economy.  Finally, regarding 
whether students use their social media accounts to follow political parties online, most students 
(68%) mentioned they do not follow political parties or candidates on social media networks.  
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Students’ Political Participation 
 
The survey had two sections which explored students’ participation in both traditional 
offline forms of political participation and more contemporary ICT-enabled forms of 
participation.  It is important to note that in terms of preference nearly half of students reported 
enjoying participating both online and offline (47%), rather than only one form.  Likewise, the 
survey asked students if, “In the past has there been a time when you decided to TAKE ACTION 
involving a political or social issues because of something you read online”, and 68% listed no. 
However, for those that listed yes, the events most mentioned were: (1) Cross-Strait Agreement 
on Trade in Services (2) the suspicious death of 24-year-old Army conscript Hung Chung-chiu in 
2013, (3) anti-nuclear protests, and (4) Sunflower Movement.   







In terms of traditional forms of political participation and activism, the survey asked 
students to select the political activities they had ever engaged in.  The political activities most 
selected were: (1) attend an organized protest of any kind (45.6%), (2) follow a political 
campaign (43.9%), and attend a political rally or speech (43.9%). The figure below outlines 
those activities which the students were least likely to do.  These include attend a political 
meeting (89.5%), contribute money to apolitical candidate, party, or cause (87.7%), (3) 
participate in volunteer activities related to a campaign (84.2%), and (4) been an active member 
of any group that tries to influence public policy or government (87.7%).   





In terms of online forms of political participation, students were most likely to: (1) Read 
the blog of a member of a political party (50.9%), watch a video online of a member of a political 
party (49.1%), and sign an online petitions or comment on an online news story or blog to 
express a political opinion (40.4%).  Students are least likely to sign up to receive text messages 
from a political party (91.2%), sign up to receive email alerts from a political party (86%), or 
follow an election campaign online (80.7%). 
Figure 12: Online Political Activities 
 
 
In terms of engaging in political participation via their mobile phones, students were 
most likely to use them to (1) keep up with news (56.1), (2) share photos or videos related to 
election campaigns (28.1%), or (3) send text messages to friends and families about the elections 










Political Party Survey 
 
The second survey was conducted with volunteers and members of political parties in 
Taiwan.  Research assistants did phone and online outreach to the various local political offices 
to get this target group to complete the survey.  Ultimately, 62 surveys were completed.  
Appendix B includes a copy of the surveys that were administered into Taiwanese and English.  
Table 15 below provides an overview of the demographics of the survey respondents for this 





Table 15: Profile of N=62 Political Staff/Volunteer Survey 
 # of Responses Percentage of Sample 
Male  38 61% 
Female 24 39% 
   
Average age 31  




Vocational School 7 11.3% 
Junior College 43 69.4% 
University 10 16.1% 
Masters 2 3.2% 
Doctorate 0 0% 
   
Political Views   
Very Conservative 2 3% 
Conservative 12 20% 
Moderate 38 62% 
Liberal 8 13% 
Very Liberal 1 2% 
   
Geographical Distribution   
High-Density- Urban Cities: 
New Taipei City, Taipei, 




Yilan, Pingtun, Keelung, Miaoli 
6 7% 
   
Political Party Affiliation   
KMT (Chinese Nationalist Party) 23 37% 
DPP (Democratic Progressive 
Party) 
13 21% 
TSU (Taiwan Solidary Union) 16 26% 




Frequency Using the 
Internet 
  
Daily 57 91.9% 
Several times a week 3 4.8% 
Few times a month 1 1.6% 
Rarely 1 1.6% 
Never 0 0% 




Political Parties’ Views on How ICTs are Changing Political Landscape 
 
Political parties were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement: 
“Internet is allowing smaller, less established political parties and politicians to get attention 
and build a following.”  Most respondents (97%) agreed with this statement, thereby, 
illustrating an almost universal belief that the Internet was playing a role in shifting political 
power in Taiwan.  The survey then asked respondents to identify the purposes they think the 
Internet serves best.  
Figure 14 outlines the respondents’ responses.  The top three items respondents felt the Internet 
served best were:  
 Giving a voice to alternative perspectives (19.1%) 
 Searching for info about politics or community (12.9%) 
 Discussion among citizens (12.4%) 
 
The items that respondents felt the Internet least served were: 
 Putting issues on the political agenda (6.7%) 
 Networking with other politically active people (6.2%) 
 Contacting politicians (1.7%) 
 

















Networking with other politically active people
Putting issues on the political agenda
Linking communities and neighborhoods together
Affecting media coverage
Organizing grassroot activities
Discussion among citizens and politicians
Giving a voice to diverse or less represented groups in society
Discussion among citizens
Searching for information about politics or community issues
Giving a voice to alternative perspectives
Which of the following purposes do you think the Internet serves 
best? (Please select no more than three please)
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Figure 15 outlines the same responses but broken down by three of the main political parties in 
Taiwan, KMT, DPP, and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU).   Although, survey responses are too 
small to make definitive conclusions, the chart demonstrates how there is very little difference 
among the three political parties.  The only significant difference was respondents’ view of the 
role of the Internet in fostering discussion among citizens.  This was rated the highest by TSU 
respondents while KMT respondents listed this among the lowest key purposes the Internet 
services.  Although, the TSU is considered the third largest party in Taiwan and is part of the 
Pan-Green Coalition along with the DPP, this could reflect the more grassroots and localized 
nature of their party makeup and participation.  









































Putting issues on the political agenda
Organizing grassroot activities
Networking with other politically active people
Linking communities and neighborhoods together
Affecting media coverage
Giving a voice to diverse or less represented groups in
society
Discussion among citizens and politicians
Discussion among citizens
Searching for information about politics or
community issues
Giving a voice to alternative perspectives
Which of the following purposes do you think the 





Political Party’s Use of ICTs 
 
The top three technologies that parties reported most using were: Facebook, website, 
and text messaging.  Twitter was the least used technology-enabled social network noted by all 
respondents.  This finding was consistent with my evaluation of political parties’ social 
networking and media accounts which will be discussed in the next section.  Figure 16 provides a 
breakdown of all the technology options that members were given to select.   
Figure 16: Technology Use 
 
 
When looking at how political parties are using technologies in their work, the top three 
tasks listed were to: (1) increase awareness of relevant political issues, (2) communicate with 
other groups and stakeholder in the country, and (3) mobilize members around specific issues.  
Half of the respondent mentioned they are least likely to use technologies to raise money.  
















Which technologies does your political party use/have?
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Figure 17: How Parties use the Internet 
 
 
Political Parties’ Views on the Utility of ICTs 
 
One of the benefits of the emergence of ICTs in political life, has been its role in helping 
less established and emerging political parties and voices to get more public attention and grow 
support.  But less discussed is about how current political parties feel about this. Figure 18 
shows that the more progressive and grassroots-driven parties (TSU and DPP) noted that this 
was a good thing about the Internet, while most of KMT respondents agreed with this statement 
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For administrative purposes
Increase awareness of relevant political issues
Raise money
Mobilize members around specific issues
Communicate with other groups and stakeholders in the…
Communicate with other groups and stakeholders…
Reach out to potential new members/volunteers
Please select the following ways that your party uses the Internet 




Figure 18 Minor Parties Online 
 
 
The survey also asked respondents to assess the ways that the Internet and ICTs had 
affected key party programmatic functions.  Most respondents did note that ICTs had made it 
easier to:  
 Communicate their message and goals (98%); 
 Increase party membership (69%); 
 Diversify party membership (95%); 
 Deepen participation and activism within their party (95%); 
 Work more effectively and efficiently (92%).   
 
Nearly half of respondents (45%), did report using ICTs to collect donations along with more 
traditional fundraising methods. Figure 19 outlines other traditional methods of fundraising 










The Internet is allowing smaller, less established political 
parties and politicians to get attention and build a 





Figure 19: Fundraising Methods 
 
 
Figure 20 breaks down responses by political party.  Although, there is not much difference 
between the three parties, several key items do stand out.  For one, 100% of KMT and DPP 
respondents agreed that: (1) that they use the Internet to increase awareness of relevant political 
issues and (2) distribute information about policy objectives and messages.  Second, TSU 
respondents were likely to select a variety of functions that they used ICTs for.  Therefore, 
although they are more grassroots in nature, their ICT use is quite limited.  The only item in 
which TSU respondents voted higher than other parties, was their expressed lack of interest in 












What traditional fundraising methods does your party use?
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Figure 20: Online Objectives Broken Down by Political Party 
 
Regarding political parties’ preference for traditional media versus more technology-
driven forms of communication tools, the survey asked respondents to select how much they 
agreed or disagreed with the statement, “Traditional media such as newspapers, television, 
radio, etc. are more useful than the Internet and other technology tools for party 
communications and outreach.” A little over half of the respondents noted that they somewhat 





Figure 21: Utility of Different Media Mediums 
 
 
When looking at the same question broken down by political party, Figure 22 shows 
that once again, there’s not much difference noted between the parties.  Most TSU members 
somewhat agreed (68.8%) and the majority of DPP and KMT respondents replied that they 
strongly agreed to somewhat agree with this statement.  This shows that even more progressive 
political parties tend to still gravitate towards more unidirectional and traditional forms of 
communication. Their responses seem to hint at a possible preference for more traditional 
forms of media, even by more grassroots-driven parties such as TSU and DPP. 













Traditional media such as newspaper, television, radio, etc. 
are more useful than the Internet and other technology tools 
for party communications and outreach.
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Figure 22: Utility of Different Media Mediums, by Party 
 
 
The survey asked respondents to rate how much they agree or disagree with the 
statement, “Most of our political party leaders embrace the Internet and other technology 
tools.” A little over half of respondents selected that they somewhat agree with this statement. 
Figure 23 shows all the responses. 
 

















Traditional media such as newspaper, 
television, radio, etc. are more useful than 
the Internet and other technology tools for 
party communications and outreach.
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Neutral












Most of our party political leaders embrace the Internet 
and other technology tools.
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Figure 24 breaks down responses by political party, and once again no major difference is noted 
between parties.  Most respondents noted that their leaders strongly agree to somewhat agree 
embrace the Internet and other technology tools.  It is important to note that, members from 
TSU and KMT were the only ones to note that they felt neutral or strongly disagreed that their 
political party leaders embraced technologies.  This shows that current campaign culture and 
overall political culture drive the use of ICTs for politics and not the other way around.   
Figure 24: Party Interest in Technology, by Party 
 
Even though most parties felt mixed feelings towards the utility of ICTs for politics, a 
little over half of respondents noted that they were happy with the interaction they were having 
with the public online and have a growing online presence.  Figure 25 outlines all the responses.  
















Most of our party political leaders embrace the 
Internet and other technology tools.
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Neutral Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree
Very happy. We have a very active 
online presence
7.0%




Not very happy. We 
have an online 
presence but they are 
not very active
28.1%
Not happy.  We don’t have an 
online presence.
5.3%
From what you know how happy are you with the amount of 




Finally, the last question on the survey was an open-ended question which asked 
political party members: “What should your party do to improve the use of the Internet and 
ICTs for citizen participation, political/community involvement or dialogue among the citizens 
and elected officials?” Most responses focused on getting parties to increase their utilization and 
use of Facebook and LINE, the most popular application for instant communication in Taiwan, 
to interact with citizens, while others addressed the challenges which parties continue to face 
since the emergence of ICTs.  Some respondents noted that age and privacy concerns that arise 
when using technologies were key factors to consider when thinking about how to use them for 
party activities: 
 
x “In my opinion, internet and other communication technologies are good tools. Some 
party members are not familiar with them because of their age. Therefore, some of them 
might ignore some review or posts on the internet. On the contrary, their voters belong to 
local chapters, so they usually communicate and talk face-to-face with constituents.” – 
DPP party member. 
x “In general, the information security is not good and safe enough for political social 
worker to share information on internet.”- DPP party member. 
x “I thought the average age in my political party is older than others. Therefore, some 
members of the Legislative Council are not familiar with the Internet and technology.  
Thus, they can’t link external relationship via internet. But they are very kind when you 
both go face to face or you meet them in their service office.” – KMT party member. 
 
A DPP member expressed real concern that the Internet and technologies could ever affect the 
real problem of power and arrogance in politics in Taiwan and inherently lack of interest in 
integrating citizens’ perspectives into policies: 
 
x “The internet or communicated tools might be useful for some left-wing parties (for 
example, Taiwan Solidarity Union). However, it is hard to use the internet as a real 
communication tool. Only a few members of Legislative Yuan, care about the citizens to 
the point that they are willing to spend time to listen people. As we have seen, the 
comments or letters citizens post on PTT, the traditional channel, can still be ignored by 
members of legislative yuan for political identity or political interest. In my opinion, the 
internet could boost opinion exchange or group like-minded people. However, it has 
limited influence for politically appointed official or members of legislative yuan. That is 




x “Many public policies were propagated in ineffective way. The ruling party could make 
announcement or explanation via internet community. However, the ruling party always 
ignore this method. Some people just take a part for the whole to prevent the 
implementation of policy”. -DPP party member. 
 
x “Our party could post an issue, then citizen would discuss under the post. Currently, the 
Facebook page by president Ma Ying-Jeou is the popular page. Unfortunately, they 
barely get feedback from comment. Those comments were reduced to the unilateral 
communication. No significant effect of communicating.”– KMT party leader.  
 
 
Others were more open to exploring how technologies can facilitate more live and deeper 
interactions between constituents and political parties:  
 
x “My party should use Ustream, a live, interactive video broadcast platform for civic 
movement. Use social network to connect politician in present,” – KMT party member. 
x “Talking directly to constituents might be the next trend. However, people in Taiwan 
maybe focus on website building and Facebook page.”- DPP party leader. 
x “It will be attractive that political party members interact with citizen in real person and 
real time. However, Internet is one of way communicating.  It may be better to keep your 
feet on the ground.  That is more practical than surfing on the internet.”- DPP party 
member. 
x “My party should create an interactive section instead of F&Q. For example, online 
answering on internet. Even though it is troublesome for some people, it is necessary to 
interact with citizen. Maybe non-anonymous is better one.”- KMT party member. 
x “As a middle-edge person, we know the importance of the internet, even I didn’t know 
what is internet when I was young. When parties use the internet in proper way, realize 
their culture, they could drive the internet tech with effective way for the benefits. The 
question is exactly how to implement? They should organize the new department for 
social networking related issue. The internet plays a larger role in politic. You will in the 
underdog position if you ignore the power of the internet.” – TSU party member. 
x “Now, most politics Facebook pages are managed by other people. There might have 
cognitive difference in the feedback for voter’s question between the politician and the 
page manager. For voters, it is difficult to know whether the real politician or other 
answered the questions. From my guess, there will have opportunities to make politician 
directly interact with voters in online chat room.”- KMT party leader. 
 
Some respondents did feel that there was much more that their parties could still do to utilize 




x “I would suggest our party to continue to work on catching more attention of any current 
issues, by using the Internet, and to spread out the word. A good way of using the modern 
technology is to have the party leaders to directly speak with supporters over the 
communication systems on the Internet. For example, supporters can share a same 
conference with party leaders such as Tsai Yin Wen, or other representatives, and share 
any thoughts or experiences that might help win the election, or to discuss any current 
events that is happening around the country that needs attention, i.e., nuclear power.”- 
KMT party member. 
 
 
Analysis of Political Parties use of the Internet and other Technologies 
 
The next phase of the work involved an analysis of the political party websites, social 
media account, and use of other technologies such as mobile apps and text messaging.  This took 
place during the week of September 22-September 29, 2014.  This means that the figures 
reflected for each of the parties’ websites and technologies are from three years ago.   
The strategies I used to collect this information are as follows: 
x For campaign and political party websites, I obtained the site’s URL though a 
Google search and an estimate of its unique monthly visitors, global rank, and average 
time visitors stay on the site from the Site Analytics publicly available service provided 
by the market research firm Alexa (http://www.alexa.com). 
x For Facebook profiles, I obtained the profile’s URL from direct links from candidate 
websites or, absent these, from a direct search for the political parties’ name on 
Facebook. I then coded the number of “likes” (or “friends,” in the rare instances in which 
a candidate had a personal rather than a public page) for that profile. In case a candidate 
maintained multiple official profiles, I coded the profile the campaign website linked to. 
x For Twitter profiles, I identified through the same procedure as for Facebook, I coded 
the number of “followers” for each political parties’ profile. 
x For YouTube channels, I identified through the same procedure as for Facebook and 
Twitter, we coded the number of “total upload views,” which is the sum of all views of all 





Table 16 below outlines the key findings after analyzing the websites and technologies of the 
main political parties in Taiwan.      
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Several things stand out when looking at the website and various technologies political 
parties are using.  First, most political parties tend to employ western technologies and 
westernized style of campaigning using a combination of traditional and ICT-enabled mediums.  
Only two parties are using Taiwanese developed text messaging technology called, LINE.  This 
means that parties in Taiwan are largely using the Internet and other technologies to build up 
their party image, share information about their political agendas, etc.  The websites and 
accompanying technologies primarily serve as a one-way portal that present information in a 
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static manner and don’t encourage citizen-party interaction and communication.  The few 
interactive features offered are mainly propagandistic intentions, instead of trying to increase 
citizen participation in political decision making.  Second, consistent with survey findings, 
Facebook seems to be the social media tool for political parties in Taiwan.  As of September 
2014, when this data was collected, most political parties did not have a Twitter account.  
However, while Facebook is by far the most popular of these mediums and has a large user base 
in Taiwan, its use is not leading to any revolutionary evolution of party-citizen linkages.  Rather 
parties, seem to be using them as platforms upon which they can try to reach the youth 
population.   Third, parties that are more grassroots and progressive are not necessarily more 
active online and run active online communities.  Therefore, grassroots origins do not 
necessarily translate to citizen-driven uses of technology.  Thus, technology strategies of political 
parties are a function and driven by a larger factor such as resources and political culture in 
Taiwan.  Therefore, after this analysis, I concluded that the opportunities that the Internet offers 
to facilitate an interactive dialogue between representatives and citizens in Taiwan are largely 




Due to the small sample size for both surveys, findings must be treated as areas for 
future research rather than definitive conclusions.  There are a few key takeaways that provide 
some insight into how a new generation of activists and political parties’ views on ICTs in 
politics are both converging in some areas and not others.  First, the survey findings show that 
there is a wide spectrum of political views among college students and therefore, age is not 
predictor of support for progressive politics or anti-establishment.  The survey findings revealed 
that not one student was wholeheartedly against all the political parties.  Therefore, when 
understanding emerging-student led movements in Taiwan it is important to point out that 
there is a wide spectrum of political views being supported by technology and not just 
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democratic or progressive ones.  Second, a key function of the Internet and other technologies in 
Taiwan is to provide a platform to make it easier for alternative views to be heard and found.  
Both students and political parties noted that having the ability to access a variety of political 
views and research different policies was one of the key purposes that the Internet and 
technologies serve.  This appreciation for the information-gathering abilities of the Internet and 
ICTs may be due to Taiwan’s high level of education, ICT infrastructure, and digital literacy.  
Therefore, it will be important to see students’ views on this in Chile, which has a higher rate of 
poverty and lower education attainment among its youth.   
 
Third, in terms of political efficacy over half of students expressed that they can have a 
small to moderate impact in their society.  This is remarkable for a new democracy and for a 
country with a political polarization and duopoly which is not always accountable to the people.  
Studies have found higher levels of political efficacy among East Asian youth when compared to 
the preceding generations (Chu et al, 2012) and education is widely believed to be a positive 
factor for greater civic engagement. Fourth, although students feel a sense of political efficacy, 
they are selective in the ways that they engage politically and tend to not necessarily favor 
technology-enabled political participation over more traditional methods.  Additionally, even 
though students had positive views about the role of social networks in politics, they were even 
less likely to discuss politics and current events online through social networks, websites, and 
forums.  For the question: “How often do you discuss politics and public affairs with others 
online in social networks, news websites, forums, etc.?”, most students reported a low amount: 
28% said less than once a month.  Only 5% of students said they discuss politics and current 
events online every day.  Finally, regarding whether students use their social media accounts to 
follow political parties online, most students (68%) mentioned they do not follow political 




Regarding the survey with political party members and volunteers and the assessment of 
their websites, a main take away is that party use of the Internet and technologies is more a 
function of current party culture and desire to appeal to modern and young constituents, than 
an interest by parties to elevate their interactions with citizens.  Facebook seems to the 
technology of choice by political parties in Taiwan, followed by home grown text messaging 
service, LINE.  Consistent with the findings in the book Asian Cyberactivism: Freedom of 
Expression & Media Censorship, parties are mainly using technologies for campaigning, 
communication and interaction (2015).  Therefore, parties are not necessarily interested in 
exploring ways to be more responsive to citizens and improve their transparency and internal 
party democracy.  This is especially the case during periods of electoral campaigning were 
political parties and candidates tend to use the Internet as a top-down channel for information 
or party propaganda rather than as an opportunity to encourage two-way discussion and debate 
with potential voters (Gibson and Ward 2002; Gibson et al. 2003; Jankowski et al. 2005). 
Therefore, the Taiwan case study does not support the hypothesis that political parties are less 
likely to use ICTs dynamically to reach out to constituents if they know that the citizens or target 
population are not using these technologies (Oates, 2003).  Here in Taiwan, political parties 
have highly educated and connected citizenry, but are not taking the opportunity to truly 
transform traditional political party-citizen linkages.  Therefore, in Taiwan it is the pre-existing 
campaign culture and social context that is driving parties use of the Net, not necessarily the 




Taiwan is a wealthy and fully functioning democracy with a highly educated and 
technologically-connected citizenry packed into one of the most densely populated countries in 
the world.  Consistent with other Asia democracies in the region, in Taiwan the most dynamic 
use of ICTs for politics can be found within the NGO and civil society communities (Gan, Gomez 
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& Johannen eds. 2004).  The growing grassroots appropriations of ICT-enabled activism, 
dubbed the “Third Force” in Taiwan, is creating a need for a more complex understanding of 
power relations among citizens, civil society groups, and political actors.  In Taiwan, ICTs are 
facilitating the linking together communities of like-minded individuals online, which are 
reshaping and reinforcing a Taiwanese social identity rather than “One China” identity (Chen et 
al, 2014).  Likewise, consistent with this study, Taiwanese scholars have begun to ask whether 
these new political players and civic groups will give rise to a changing landscape of party 
system, (Lee, 2014) or if they will lead to greater political polarization. 
 
This remains to be seen, but there are several patterns we can note that warrant further 
exploration.  So far, the surveys with members and volunteers of political parties show although 
most embrace and find benefits to using ICTs for politics, most parties do not seem to be using 
these technologies to transform traditional political party-citizen linkages.  Therefore, political 
party use of the Internet and ICTs is much more a function of traditional party culture than a 
strong interest to change and transform this culture from top down to more participatory forms 
of interactions with constituents.  This is a factor which may not be accepted by a population 
growing in their sense of personal political efficacy and growing Taiwanese identity.  Due to the 
wide spectrum of political views that exists within the student community in Taiwan, it remains 
to be seen whether youth will continue to lead the way in terms of the deepening democracy in 
Taiwan or just contribute to greater political polarization. To better understand the possible 
continual divergence between elites and mass attitudes about the changing nature of politics and 
cross-Strait policies may depend on changes in Taiwan’s economy, the rise of a new and better-
educated generation, and the increasing use of social media to voice criticism and build 
communities, and the role of the traditional highly partisan media in Taiwan (Templeman, 
2014).  Therefore, a better understand of how ICTs are not only shaping social movements and 
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digital media, but also how these changes intersect with other socioeconomic and demographic 
factors.   
The Taiwan case study also highlights the importance of looking at the local level to 
understand how technology is being used to infuse and shape politics.  As we can see from the 9 
in 1 local elections in 2014, Taiwan saw the emergence of a non-traditional actor, elected mayor 
of Taipei City, Dr. Ko Wen-je as well as KMT loss of traditional strongholds throughout the 
country.  Thus, in Taiwan we are seeing many instances of democratic empowerment enabled by 
technology take place at the local level and thus eluding national-level measures of democratic 
gains. This is an important distinction to make, because when looking at how ICTs are being 
used at the national level by political parties, the surveys hint at the possibility that there are 
very little distinctions between political parties and that most simply rely on traditional 
westernized campaigning strategies when using ICTs to communicate with the constituents.  
Therefore, due to the political stalemate at the national level and lack of institutional 
responsiveness that this creates, I can expect that restless citizens, with persistent frustration 
with their national political parties, will continue to access technological tools to focus their 
energies locally — engaging in their local community.  This is consistent with studies from 
2000s which have shown (Pharr and Putnam 2000; Norris 1999), how people are either turning 
away from politics altogether or demanding greater involvement and finding new ways to 
communicate their demands. 
 
Finally, due to several supportive demographic and country-level factors at the national 
level, such as high level of education and ICT infrastructure, and urban areas with dense 
population, I can expect that technology’s positive political effects will continue to gain traction 
in sub-national ways in Taiwan. While this may inject new voices into politics, it can also lead to 
weak and fragmented legislatures unable to support stable governing coalitions or create 
effective checks on executive power.  Moving forth, Taiwanese political parties will need to find 
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new ways to co-exist, complement social movements and empowered civic communities 
(Nahon, 2015).  They must learn to use social media strategies to commit to pursue debates on 
issues of concern; design a clear, professional and transparent political party profile: a unified 
party presence on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube; and develop and enforce a clear and 
transparent communication strategy to engage with the various interests in society. How 
technology will impede or promote this transformation will be an area of future research in 
Taiwan.   
In summary, this chapter argues that recent ICT-enabled activism in Taiwan, 
particularly, with the Sunflower movement is creating new political opportunities that are 
interacting with preexisting identities (in Taiwan’s case an ethnic nationalistic identity), highly 
partisan nature of politics, and previous cultures of resistance.  In addition to the successful 
block of a major trade deal with China, the aftermath of the Sunflower movement saw increased 
expressions of a Taiwanese identity which intensified popular counter narratives around a 
Taiwanese vs One China identity and the introduction of new untraditional power players (Dr. 
Ko Wen-je, New Power Party, Appendectomy Project, etc.).  These factors have increased 
demands for greater transparency and accountability of the government to the public and its 
citizens, especially as it relates to interactions with China.  However, will these factors change 
political parties in Taiwan?  Based on the surveys from political parties and partisan view on the 
use of ICTs by parties and by citizens and activists, I would argue no.  It is very likely that 
student activism will continue to be seen by elites as a mostly marginal and “disruptive” effort, 













Political Cleavages, ICTs, Social Movements: Chile Case Study 
 
It has been nearly three decades since General Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship gave way to 
redemocratization in Chile.  Since then Chile has been dubbed the “Latin American Tiger” 
(Pietrobelli, 1998), for its rapid growth, social progress, and strong institutions similarly found in 
East Asia countries.  Yet these economic successes often hide the complexity of Chile’s political 
development which over time has been shaped by the interdependency between historical, 
institutional, socioeconomic, and cultural factors (Boyd, 2006).  Most notably, these factors have 
given way to political cleavages which over time divided Chilean society along two ideological 
and programmatic extremes.  Originally the political cleavage was divided among the clerical 
versus anticlerical during Spanish colonial rule, however, it would later evolve into a Right 
versus Left division in terms of socioeconomic policies and programs (Valenzuela, 1995: 199).  
While there have been two central political players which have occupied this space, the left-
leaning Concertación and right-leaning Alianza por Chile (Alliance for Chile) – other political 
actors have introduced a variety of extreme, moderate, or centrist political positions throughout 
the years.  Consequently, no single party has had an absolute majority of the Chilean electorate, 





Despite these challenges, Chilean society has benefited from relatively stable political 
institutions over time and deeply democratic traditions which date back to the 19th century and 
peaked during the “poder popular” (popular power) era during Allende’s Popular Unity 
government despite an often-fragmented poor and working class.  Like Taiwan, most recently, 
ICTs have been contributing to a rise in new forms of youth-led activism, populism, and new 
anti-establishment political identities (Valenzuela et al, 2012).  Recent popular mobilizations 
have been taking place against free market policies bequeathed by Pinochet and left largely 
intact by his successors (Economist, 2014). The student-led movements known as “las marchas 
de los pingüinos” (Penguin Revolution) which began in 2006, have been creating new political 
opportunities for progressive social issues to be added to the political agenda (Rosemont, 2014; 
Cortes-Abad, 2015).  These student-led movements are providing a powerful countervailing 
trend against historically elitist political institutions (Huneeus, 2009) and challenging neo-
liberalism as the hegemonic ideology supported by Right, Center, and Left groups (Siavelis, 
1997: 37; Boyd, 2006).   
 
Within this context, this chapter will explore what types of political opportunities are 
being enabled for ICTs in a wealthy, democratic, yet deeply divided country.  Like the Taiwanese 
case study, there are questions as to how new political players and new civic groups change the 
landscape of Chile’s party system.  Additionally, special attention will be given to how existing 
political cleavages interact with ICTs and whether they contribute to greater polarization or 
greater democratic deepening.  The chapter will end with findings from surveys conducted with 
college students and members of political parties in Chile which highlight the ways that ICTs are 





Current Socioeconomic Context 
 
Since the late 1970s Chile has emerged as the nation with the fastest growing economy in 
Latin America, following one of the most extensive economic reform programs ever taken in a 
developing country. Chile is now considered an economic powerhouse both in Latin America 
and around the world.  Chile’s economic model, largely constructed by the Pinochet regime, 
remains relatively unchanged.  It is still dependent on a flexible and restrictive labor regime 
(Frank, 2004; Staab, 2012) and trade liberalization.  Its market-oriented economy is 
characterized by a high level of foreign trade and a reputation for strong financial institutions 
(Bianculli, 2016).  On January 1, 2004, it signed a free trade agreement with the United States of 
America, however, Chile has twenty-two trade agreements covering 60 countries including 
agreements with the European Union, Mercosur, China, India, South Korea, and Mexico” (CIA, 
2015: 3). The Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement was originally negotiated by Chile, the 
United States of America20, and 10 other participating countries.  Chile was the first South 
American country to join the OECD by signing the OECD Convention in May 2010.Finally, Chile 
has one of the highest GNI’s in South America (World Bank, 2015), which is an indication that 
real incomes are continuing to grow.  
 
In 2015, the World Bank estimated a poverty rate of 18.7%, during 2006 global recession 
it climbed to over 20%, then dropped to 14.o% in 2013 (World Bank, 2015).  At the same time, 
Chile has achieved high human development (HDI).  Chile’s HDI value for 2015 was 0.832 — 
which places it in the very high human development category—positioning the country at 41 out 
of 187 countries and territories (United Nations Development Program, 2015).  Chile’s citizenry 
has the highest literacy rate in Latin America, 98.9 percent of both males and females ages 15-24 
are literate (UNICEF, 2013).  Yet, despite this remarkable progress, income inequality remains a 
                                                 
20 President Trump pulled the United States out of the TPP in January of 2017. 
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significant challenge. Chile’s GINI index of 50.8 (World Bank, 2015) confirms that inequality 
still needs to be addressed by the political leadership.   
 
Currently, most of Chile’s national population lives in the urban areas.  Forty percent of 
Chile’s national population lives in Santiago, the largest city in Chile, while only eleven percent 
of the population lives in rural areas (CIA, 2015; World Bank, 2013)21.  Chile’s indigenous 
communities are among those in poverty and are mostly concentrated in the rural provinces of 
La Araucanía, Bío Bío, Los Lagos, Los Ríos and Valparaíso, with many increasingly migrating to 
the cities (UNPO, 2010). The Mapuche are Chile's largest of the seven recognized indigenous 
communities, making up around 9% of the national population (Barandiarán 2012, 166).  In the 
recent years, the Mapuche have been migrating to Santiago (UNPO, 2010).  The migration of 
indigenous communities to the central more urban regions have reinforced a belief of cultural 
and ethnic homogeneity among Chileans (Crow, 2014; Haughney, 2009).   
 
 Access to education is essential for social mobility in Chile.  For example, in Chile, one 
year of additional education can greatly affect the attainable salary of an individual. According 
to Kolijatic and Silva (2013), “In Chile, one additional year of elementary education has a 
marginal effect of only 6% on salaries; for secondary education, the increase is 10% and for 
higher education the increase is 22%” (1427). This has resulted in severe competition for the 
available seats at the university level. “Every year, over 200,000 high-school graduates vie for a 
slot in prestigious universities, since social mobility largely depends on it” (Kolijatic and Silva 
2013, 1427), and only 25,000 are admitted to the most prestigious universities. Those left 
unselected go to the lesser esteemed universities or technical training centers. “Needy students 
were condemned to a low quality of high school education that limited their capacity to break 
free from the poverty circle through access to quality higher education” (Kolijatic and Silva 2013, 
                                                 
21 The rural population was last calculated in 2013 by The World Bank. According to the World Bank, there were 
1,840,766 people living in rural areas of Chile in 2013. 
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1429). Chile’s rural population has been especially underserved by the education system (Barr-
Melej, 2001; Silva, 2012). Addressing the rural and urban educational disparities also served as 
a catalyst for the student movement (Valenzuela and Dammert, 2006).  
 
Left and Right Divisions and the Emergence of Working Class Politics 
 
Chile is one of the wealthiest, most developed, and democratized countries in Latin 
America.  Yet despite its success, Chile’s historical legacy of deep social divisions, military 
dictatorship, and fragmented civil society continue to pose challenges.  Throughout its history, 
social conflicts and religious, urban/rural class cleavages have been crystallized into Chile’s 
political space (Scully, 1992).  These path-dependent aspects of its history have contributed to 
the formation of deeply-rooted, yet deeply-divided democratic representative institutions.  They 
have also led to the formation of a uniquely Chilean tripartite party system made up of a strong 
left, center, and right.   Although, this tripartite has been relatively stable since the 1930s, there 
has and continues to be much volatility within those blocs –intense in some periods as parties 
divide and sub-divide, and less so in other times when parties remain intact but just experience 
a rise or fall in their bloc vote (Webb & White, 2009; Montes et. al, 2000; Scully, 1992;).  
Nevertheless, to this day, Chile’s party system is prone to crisis if majority coalitions cannot be 
built.  These institutional challenges have been one of the factors blocking the implementation 
of a progressive social agenda to address persistent issues of inequality and poverty.  
 
Like in Taiwan, the end of World War II resulted in a period of greater political conflict.  
However, unlike Taiwan, Chile experienced growing class conflict between rural, working class, 
and state elites (Scully, 1992).  During this period, Chile implemented an import substitution 
industrialization strategy.  This set the stage for the gradual and institutionalized, but 
conflictual, integration of socioeconomic groups into the political system as well as highly 
politicized struggles for state benefits (Silva, 2007:45).  Intensive peasant and urban 
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mobilizations emerged from poblaciones and shanty towns which challenged the deeply-rooted 
clientelism control of state elites.  Scholars have noted this event as a critical juncture in that 
these factors contributed to the new the growing politicization of the Chilean party system 
(Garreton, 2003; Manni, 2001; Scully, 1992).  Together these factors ushered in an era of 
expansion for class-based party politics which lasted until the 1970s (Manni, 2011; Scully, 1992).   
 
Following the Popular Front period (1937-1941), two new left-of-center political 
coalitions emerged which would define Chile’s political scene for years to come.  One of these 
leftist coalitions united the Falange Nacional and Social Christian Conservative Parties under a 
more centrist yet left-leaning platform which would eventually be called the Christian 
Democratic Party.   The other coalition, brought together the Socialist and Communist parties 
under a new coalition called, Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP) or Popular Action Front 
coalition.  FRAP was led by Salvador Allende.  Believing they were the only party able to rule and 
promote change in the climate of social and political instability, the Christian Democrats refused 
any other alliances, particularly with the increasingly militant FRAP group which was pushing 
for radical change (Manni, 2011; Foweraker and Landman, 2000).  Consequently, what were 
once united working-class groups had splintered even further as peasants began to mobilize for 
agrarian reform and unionization and the urban marginales mobilized for goods and services 
through state-linked local organizations.  Even though these two left-leaning coalitions were not 
united under a common purpose, their emergence created suspicion and insecurity among 
conservative and free market parties.  In 1958, the conservative parties joined forces and gave 
birth to the National Party which was led by Jorge Alessandri, who later that year was elected 
President.  The emergence of the National Party also signaled a change in ideology for right-
leaning groups that were becoming increasingly authoritarian and nationalistic in response to 
working class mobilizations.  Nevertheless, facing an increasingly oppositional Congress, 
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Alessandri was forced to implement modest land-reform legislation to appease increasingly 
militant working class.   
 
During the early 1960’s, socialist leader, Salvador Allende, began to gain popularity at 
the height of the Cold War.  In response, the CIA set about supporting Christian Democrat 
leader, Eduardo Frei Montalva by financing most of his campaign and distributing anti-
communist propaganda throughout the country (Erikson and Perre, 2002; Schneider, 1998).  In 
1961, John F. Kennedy the Alliance for Progress, which provided monetary assistance to Latin 
American countries which supported democratic governments.  Chile also became one of the 
biggest recipients of this aid.  With the monetary and policy support of the US, Frei won the 
presidency in 1964.  Shortly after, he began a process of capitalist modernization and 
democratization that incorporated previously excluded peasants and urban marginales.  He 
undertook agrarian reform which consisted of an expansion on social security, education, and 
social services to rural areas, as well as state regulation of rural labor relations (Loveman, 1988). 
However, as Chile’s economy grew and expanded, dependent capitalist development eventually 
came into conflict with the process of democratization (see Garretón 1983, 1986e; Moulián 
1983; Pinto 1971; Loveman1979). Despite better living conditions for many rural workers and 
good gains in education and public health, the country was still plagued by inflation, 
dependence on foreign markets and capital, and inequitable income distribution.  At the same 
time, the Christian Democrats’ policies threatened the traditional elite and did not satisfy the 
expectations of an increasingly militant and polarized society.   
 
Under Frei’s administration, peasants continued to mobilize due to the availability of a 
wide assortment of allies (Scully, 1992). Therefore, Chilean peasants and agrarian issues became 
central to national political conflicts (Loveman, 1988; Castells, 1976; Kay, 1981). Not 
surprisingly, unionization, strikes, and land invasions rose dramatically.  Violent groups such as 
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the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR; Leftist Revolutionary Movement), which 
began among upper-middle-class students in Concepciónand Frente de Trabajadores 
Revolucionarios (Revolutionary Workers Front) began to challenge their power and supported 
strikes and land seizures. During this time, the US continued to engage in covert and overt 
interventions aimed at destroying pro-land reform policies and instead supporting pro-business, 
corporate agriculture. Before the Pinochet era, the Communists were “an architect of the via 
pacifica, or peaceful road,” and they “favored multiclass political alliances, pragmatic changes in 
property relations, strict adherence to constitutional legality, and negotiated compromise with 
opposition forces” (Roberts 2005, 496). The Socialist Party, however, “favored a narrower, class-
based ‘Worker’s Front’ alliance and rapid economic socialization; believing revolutionary armed 
confrontation was inevitable on the road to Socialism” (Roberts 2005, 496). The socialists also 
resisted Allende’s efforts to negotiate, and instead “sought to create grass-roots forms of 
‘popular power’ as alternatives to ‘bourgeois democracy’ (Roberts 2005, 496).  
 
As the Christian Democrats became increasingly isolated, the coalition Unidad Popular 
(UP) led by Allende continue to strengthen.    The UP consisted of loosely-united socialist, 
communist, and radical parties.  The UP coalition was also sustained by college students who 
left the city centers for rural and mining towns to work with Allende (Vylder, 1976).  Backed by 
this coalition, Allende became the first democratically elected Marxist President in 1970. Soon 
after he began implementing a radical program of state takeover of private enterprises and 
massive income redistribution.  These policies pitted the working class against the upper classes, 
foreign capital, and Chilean monopoly capital (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Silva, 1988).  It 
also began to cause concern and apprehension among business owners who began to sell off 
properties and assets (Vylder, 1976).  Additionally, these factors contributed to an industrial 
production decline, hyperinflation and black marketeering.  Towards the middle of his term, the 
militant factions of Allende’s party became increasingly frustrated with agrarian reform and 
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Allende’s indirect style of governing.  Most notably, one of these factions, Movimiento de 
Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) intensified its guerrilla activities and started forming armed 
communist organizations (Roberts, 1998).   
 
Military Dictatorship and the Silencing of Left-Leaning Activists 
 
As divisions within Allende’s own party began to intensify, his government became 
increasingly isolated as new alliances were being formed in time for the 1973 parliamentary 
elections.  This election saw alliances between an increasingly uneasy middle class, the Christian 
Democrats, and the Right.  At the same time, US government intervention played a pivotal role 
during this period as it pursued a policy of political destabilization by refusing to extend 
economic aid and supporting his opponents (Vylder, 1976; Valenzuela 1978; Garretón and 
Moulián, 1983; Garcés, 1976; and Prats, 1985).  Therefore, Allende faced an opposition 
Congress, a hostile US government, divisions within his own party, and an increasing number of 
middle, upper class, and right-wing extremists who began to support a coup d'état (Vylder, 
1976).  Therefore, bitter party hostility - in a system described by Sartori (1976: 160) as one of 
extreme polarization - led directly to the coup of 1973. 
 
Allende was eventually ousted from power by a military junta led by General Augusto 
Pinochet in 1973.  Many expected a return to civilian government, however, in 1974 Pinochet 
assumed presidency (Valenzuela 1978, Garretón and Moulián 1983, Garcés 1976, and Prats 
1985).  Pinochet’s presidency began a 17-year period of repression and torture in Chile’s history 
where he headed a durable junta that dissolved Congress, banned leftist parties and suspended 
all others, prohibited nearly all political activity and ruled by decree (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 
1986; Silva, 1988). During this period, the secret police, called the Directorate of National 
Intelligence (DINA), apprehended thousands of Socialist and Communist Party members, 
Allende appointees, union leaders, other suspected leftists and sympathizers, and either 
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detained, tortured, or murdered them.  The college students who had supported the UP 
movement were also targeted and many disappeared or fled into exile (Vylder, 1976).  In total, 
almost 28,000 were targeted.  In addition to arresting and torturing its victims, the Pinochet 
regime exercised complete control over civil society, and eliminated all channels of collective 
expression including the media.   
 
In terms of economic policy, the Chilean military regime restructured the economy by 
adopting a neoliberal development model which included disbanding anti-poverty relief 
programs and reducing the state’s role in the regulation and organization of the rural class 
(Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Silva, 1988).  This severed the ties between 
peasants, rural unions, and the state, and transformed labor relations in the countryside.  The 
legal framework fragmented and weakened peasant and union organization and political space 
for contestation was reduced as regional and socioeconomic differences among popular classes 
was further heightened (Bossert, 1980; Silva, 1988; Vylder, 1986).  These new grassroots 
realities also shaped the dynamics of national partisan competition in that for the first time in 
Chile’s post-colonial history the salience of democratic politics for peasants and the availability 
of key allies was reduced (Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Bossert, 1980).   
Therefore, with limited supply of both internal resources and external allies, rural groups were 
not able to regroup and organize at the levels they had accomplished back in the 1960s and 
1970s.  This condition would go on to persist even after democratic transition in Chile as peasant 






The Reemergence of the Popular Sectors and End of the Military Dictatorship 
 
By early 1980’s the effects of Pinochet’s laissez-faire economic policies and global 
recession hit small business owners and the middle and working classes who saw their living 
standards drop (Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).  In response to these 
economic and political difficulties, Pinochet began a process of political institutionalization, 
resulting in a new Constitution in 1980(Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).  
However, the cracks in his power were beginning to show.  This period saw the reemergence of 
mobilizations, albeit, limited in scope in that they either addressed specific government abuses 
or concerns of individual socioeconomic sectors (Martínez 1986, Campero 1986, and Agurto, 
Canales, and de la Maza1985). During this time, militant groups began to regroup in 
shantytowns and leftist groups reemerged (Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).  
 
It was not until 1983, that groups began to reassert themselves in ways that they had 
done pre-Pinochet.  Mass mobilizations in the form of the National Protests began in May 1983 
(de laMaza and Garcés 1985, Martínez 1986, Campero 1986, and Agurto, Canales, and de la 
Maza1985.)  By July 1983 these mobilizations became monthly occurrences and gained a 
broader geographic scope.  Government responded to these mobilizations with increasing force.  
Notably, during the Fourth Protest in August 1983, Pinochet placed 18,000 soldiers in the 
streets of Santiago and low-income neighborhoods.  During this upheaval, hundreds of 
protestors were either detained or sent to internal exile (Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and 
Schmitter, 1986).  At the same time, that Pinochet’s regime responded with force, it also made 
attempts at liberalizing their stronghold. During the mid-1980’s, the government increased 
freedom of the press, allowed political exiles to return, and met with political opposition groups.   
 
With increased political space to mobilize, working class groups sought to build alliances 
with an increasingly unhappy middle class (Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).  
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Under Allende, these two groups were violently and militantly opposed to each other, so this was 
a dramatic change from the past.  Additionally, the involvement of Chile’s most influential 
unions, the Copper Workers' Confederation, also helped to bring on board a diverse group of 
parties and supporters (Martinez, 1986).  Finally, new alliances emerged during this time.  
Alianza Democrática (Democratic Alliance) united small parties of the Right, Christian 
Democrats, social democratic parties, a Socialist party, and other socialist groups.  Movimento 
Democrático Popular (Popular Democratic Movement) included the other Socialist party, the 
Communist Party, the Left Revolutionary Movement (MIR), and other leftist groups.  Since the 
Pinochet regime is more reluctant to use force against the middle classes than against 
theworking and lower classes, middle class participation reduced fears that the protest would 
end in a massacre (Martínez, 1986; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).  There were also new forms 
of mass mobilizations such as political rallies, marches and human rights campaigns also took 
place during this time (Martinez, 1986; Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).   
 
However, the Protest movement underwent another shift between 1983 and 1986.  
During this time, the support of the middle class began to wane due to government concessions 
to middle class gremios (trade and professional associations) and ongoing fear of government 
repression (Martinez, 1986; Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).  Nevertheless, 
political parties and other opposition groups continued to make attempts to regroup and unite 
(de laMaza and Garcés 1985, Martínez 1986, Campero 1986, and Agurto, Canales, and de la 
Maza 1985).  One of these efforts was the formation of the Asamblea de la Civilidad (Civic 
Assembly) in 1986.  The Asamblea included representatives of a wide variety of socioeconomic 
groups and political parties.  Consistent with its goal to establish a broad base, the Asamblea 
included the National Workers'Command and representatives of groups of pobladores, college 
students, and numerous labor and professional organizations such as, truck drivers, women's 
associations, human rights organizations, and the Study Group for an Alternative 
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Constitution(de laMaza and Garcés 1985, Martínez 1986, Campero 1986, and Agurto, Canales, 
and de la Maza 1985).United these various groups could organize an effective two-day national 
strike in July 1986.  
 
These mobilizations were successful in that they sent a powerful message to Pinochet 
that the collective identities of the past would not be eliminated.  Rather they were prepared to 
build alliances to overcome the fear and repression that had made civil society withdraw 
(Schneider, 1985; Taylor, 1998; Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).  Although, 
most protestors during this period still mainly consisted of young pobladores who faced social 
and economic isolation, the Protest movements allowed them to gain a sense of participation 
and belonging.  However, a main challenge during this period was still the interference of 
political parties who were still outlawed, who sought to mobilize pobladores.  During this time, 
the Christian Democrats, the Christian Left, the Communist Party, and the MIR continued to 
build up their own political bases in low-income neighborhoods; and in doing so, they created 
divisions among the poor (Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Schneider, 1985).  
A defining attempt to unite pobladores came with the formation of the Unitary Congress of 
Urban Pobladores in 1986.  However, due to the competing activities of the political parties, 
groups were not able to build an effective and united broad-based coalition (Schneider, 1985; 
Taylor, 1998).  A final attempt at uniting opposing forces to defeat Pinochet took place with the 
announcement of a national plebiscite in 1987.  In response, opposition groups formed the 
Concertación de Partidos por el NO (coalition of parties for NO). With 15 minutes of television 
airtime every night for 28 nights, the opposition sent a message of hope and unity in order to 
helpcitizens overcome fear and isolation (Huneeus, 2009; Ackerman and Duvall, 2000). The 
national plebiscite was held on October 5, 1988 and Pinochet lost with a little over half of the 
population voting NO (Valenzuela, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Schneider, 1985; 
Huneeus, 2009; Ackerman and Duvall, 2000).   
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Democracy-Building Initiatives After Pinochet  
 
Pinochet’s military dictatorship and neoliberal policies left an undeniable imprint on 
Chile.  Although Chile’s political institutions remained strong and stable throughout earlier 
periods of political conflict and rapid economic development (A. Valenzuela & J.S. Valenzuela, 
1983, J.S. Valenzuela, 1995, Scully, 1992, Luna, 2008) relations between state, party system, and 
progressive groups were forever transformed under the dictatorship (Siavellis, 1999; Garretón 
1983, 1986).   Political parties have played a key role in navigating the tumultuous history and 
they are once again central players in helping to promote the consolidation of democracy in 
Chile.  Post-Pinochet, the Constitution of 1980 effectively split the party system among two main 
opposing coalitions (Valenzuela, 1999), left-leaning Concertación coalition, led by the Partido 
Demócrata Cristiano party and the right-leaning Conservative coalition, Coalición por el 
Cambio, led by the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and National Renewal (NR).  
Originally created to contest the plebiscite in 1988, the Concertacióncoalition persisted and 
became instrumental as parties were forced to collaborate and unite as electoral necessity in the 
elections of 1989 and beyond.  So, the new post-Pinochet political division fit the political 
experiences of most Chileans – for or against Pinochetismo, or in other words pro- or anti-
authoritarianism (Torcal andMainwaring, 2003; Aguero and Tironi, 1999; Valenzuela, 1999; 
Fuentes, 1999; Siavellis, 1999; Luna, 2008).  Hence, Pinochet’s legacy is a crucial factor that has 
structured the party system – and appear to have successfully incorporated the political 
divisions of the past based on class voting or religious cleavages (Tironi and Aguero, 1999; 
Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003).  
 
This duopoly has created a big incentive for political parties to remain inside one or 
other of the two major coalitions that have dominated the political landscape since 1990, 
thereby contributing its durability and stability (Scully, 1995; Boas, 2008; Linz, 1996; 
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Mainwaring, 2003; Dix 1991; Scully, 1992; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Valenzuela, 1999; 
Angell, 2003).  However, there is still the existence of deep divisions within the two blocs. 
Scholars have noted how, far from encouraging unity and discipline, the electoral system in 
Chile promotes interparty bickering, made worse by a tendency toward heightened ideological 
polarization (Valenzuela and Dammert 2006). For example, the Communist Party was 
marginalized and completely shut out of the Chilean government in the post-Pinochet era. The 
Communist Party was “excluded from the multiparty governing coalition and failed to win seats 
in the newly installed congress” (Roberts, 2005: 25). In prior years, the Communist Party had 
been among the political leaders and was a driving force in the popular protest movements that 
helped to weaken and oust the authoritarian rule, but they were unable to rally support once the 
democracy was in place. 
 
Post-Pinochet, the Concertación governments have tried to govern and unite the country 
but were initially heavily constrained by several key players.  Authoritarian enclaves with veto 
powers, business leaders whose influence was increased due to market reforms, and reemerged 
labor groups all exerted pressure on the Concertación governments (Staab, 2012).  Additionally, 
although Pinochet was removed from power, democracy in Chile was built on the foundations 
set in place by the 1980 Constitution and the systems and institutions implemented during 
Pinochet’s tenure (Huneeus, 1998).   Therefore, parties found themselves having to operate in 
an institutional framework imposed on them by an (anti-party) military regime (Scully, 1995; 
Boas, 2008; Linz, 1996; Mainwaring, 2003).  Therefore, although the government was 
eventually able to relinquish power from authoritarian enclaves through amending the 
Constitution several times, for many Pinochet is considered the father of today’s Chile (Navia, 
2010; Angell, 2003).  Despite these institutional challenges, the Concertación coalition persisted 
for over ten years, having won three presidential, four congressional and three municipal 
elections, as well as overseeing a period of unprecedented economic growth.   Likewise, all of 
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Chile’s political parties should be acknowledged for managing a difficult transition more 
successfully than in any other Latin American country.   
 
Chile’s Political Parties and Period of Redemocratization 
 
Most recently, new challenges have emerged from Chile’s party system.  First, the 
percentage of the population identifying with a political party has decreased significantly since 
the transition to democracy. This decrease is matched by a drop in valid, registered voters in 
Chilean elections, particularly among younger electoral segments (Carlin 2006; LAPOP 2006; 
Angell, 2003).  Second, scholars have noted that the Chilean electorate is undergoing a process 
of partisan dealignment, as more than 85 percent of Chileans do not currently identify with a 
political party, according to (LAPOP 2010 results) and party identifiers are not representative of 
the electorate (Luna and Altman, 2011).  In this regard, Chile seems to be following the pattern 
of many countries in seeing a decline of mass party membership. Finally, the continued 
existence of clientelism and pork barrel, suggests that constituency-service, patronage, and 
brokerage networks continue to play a vital role in institutionalizing and strengthening the pre-
authoritarian party-system (Valenzuela, 1999; Garretón 1988; Borzutzki 2002; Valenzuela and 
Scully, 1997; Posner 1999).  Notably, some have found that today linkages forged at the local 
level are usually non-partisan and highly personalized, with local candidacies gaining autonomy 
and strength from national (partisan) leaders (Jones, 2007). Rehren (1997: 327-8) points to a 
new feature of Chilean politics – “the penetration of the locality by the market and the 
introduction of private enterprises as a new component of local political machines and 
clientelistic networks”. This has created a sense in Chile that those in the higher income and 
more political socialization, vote according to their party identity.  While those at the lower end 
of the spectrum and are not as politically socialized, tend to rely on localized personal ties to 
connect with their elected officials, who engage in an exchange of support in return for electoral 
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support (Luna, 2008; Drake& Jäksic, 1999).  Morgenstern, Polga-Hecimovich, and Siavelis 
(2012) compare the analysis of Chilean politics by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Montes 
(2000), and found that the Chilean party system has characteristics reminiscent of Europe in 
that it is very institutionalized, but it is like other Latin American party systems in that there is 
also high electoral volatility, rapid changes in party labels and episodic outbursts of 
personalism.   
 
The economic dimensions of Chile’s political system also cannot be ignored. Chile’s 
macroeconomic model is rarely questioned - even though paradoxically the opposition to 
Pinochet strongly criticized the defects of the economic model. The result is a restricted political 
agenda with little debate on important issues such as environmental concerns, income 
inequality, the power and role of the trade unions, ways of increasing political participation.  
Therefore, as demands for political parties to become more participatory and inclusive increase, 
parties also must face the constraints placed by the continued dominance of market-based 
policies.  This factor has presented challenges to social movements and political parties which 
have largely failed to unite a fragmented opposition (Rodrigues, 2008; Roberts, 2002; Svolick, 
2012).  Both have struggled to unite leftist and middle-class groups to foster and support a 
transition to democracy (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Garretón 1986; Valenzuela, 1999).  
Thus, scholars have noted that the Chilean experience highlights both the strengths and the 
weaknesses of mobilization as a strategy for bringing about a transition from dictatorship to 
democracy in the absence of a consensual and coherent political strategy (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter; Svolick, 2012; Levitsky and Way, 2010).  
 
In the absence of a consensual and coherent political strategy, the fragmentation of the 
poor and working classes can also be an enduring legacy of Pinochet’s regime. The military 
dictatorship and neoliberal economic policies gutted and isolated what was one of the most 
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highly organized and politicized agrarian sectors with strong social and political roots 
(Houtzager and Kurtz, 2000; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).  Rather, the post-Pinochet era 
saw that the social forces which were most negatively impacted socially, politically, and 
economically during the dictatorship remained isolated from both the more established party 
leadership and the social bases of the "popular" organizations (Huber et al 2010; Kurtz, 1999; 
Evans, 1996).  Even to this day these factors contribute to a persistence division and lack of trust 
within the leftist coalitions, high inequality, rural poverty, and elitist political culture. 
 
Politics and the Emergence of ICTs and New Modes of Expression and Activism  
Like Taiwan, Chile has a developed information technology infrastructure.  Per the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council (2013), “ICTs represent an average of 3.2 per cent 
of the gross domestic product (GDP) in Latin America” of which Chile is a significant part. Chile 
is among the Latin American countries ranked in the Upper category of ICT development (IDI 
index) of 4.90 (ITU, 2015).   Not surprisingly, they also have one of the highest Internet usage in 
Latin America.  As of 2014, 72.3% of the population were using the Internet (ITU, 2015).  It 
Chile citizens have achieved an elevated level of ICT access, use and skills (Development Index, 
2012).  It is significant that by the last quarter of 2008, 32.3 percent of Chilean households were 
linked and able to access the internet from home (Cordoba-Pachon 2010, 277).  Additionally, it 
should be noted that almost the whole population has access to affordable individual handset-
based mobile-broadband subscriptions (International Telecommunication Union, 2014).  
Finally, Chile has one of the highest Internet and social media usage in the world, especially 
among the youth population. For example, Chile has the fourth-highest usage of Twitter per 
person in the world, with almost 30% of the population tweeting and eight out of ten people 




The ease and availability of low-cost Internet access has also extended to schools with 
Chile’s Enlaces Initiative, which partners’ schools with the private sector to provide Internet 
access and has been very effective in improving Internet access in schools, resulting in 78 per 
cent of schools being connected to the Internet in 2013, compared to just 44 per cent in 2009 
(International Telecommunication Union, 2014; Heppet al, 1996; Núñez, 1995).  The availability 
of the Internet in schools throughout Chile is believed to have played a part in facilitating 
student population’s involvement in the political process (Kahan, 2008). Per the UNCTAD 
(2004) report, Chile spanned the digital divide and climbed 21 spots from being ranked 67th in 
1995 to being ranked 46th globally in the ICT Development Indices in 2002 (194). The 18-24 age 
demographic has the highest proportion of Internet users at 86 percent reportedly using the 
internet in their daily lives. This is not a startling increase, as nearly 60 percent of the entire 
population uses the Internet regularly (Valenzuela et al, 2012).   
 
The development of the media during Chile’s history has been shaped by the country’s 
political circumstances.  Before Pinochet, the media was very diverse and included a variety of 
political views, from ultra-right to ultra-left. The media also had freedom to question and 
critique elected officials and operate without fear of political repression (Fagen, 1974).  Most 
notably, during President Allende’s tenure, the media played a critical role in reporting political 
infighting, economic crises, and movements and protests that took place between from 1970 to 
1973 (Fagen, 1974).  This ended with the military dictatorship, which saw the media turn into a 
tool for promoting state propaganda (Bresnahan, 2003).  During this time, radio became the 
venue for grassroots and underground activism.  For example, the grassroots radio station, 
Radio Umbral, played a key role in fostering grassroots activism (Bresnahan, 2003).   Although 
Pinochet stepped down from power in 1989, the laws restricting freedom of the press were in 
effect until June 2001.At this time, President Ricardo Lagos signed the "Law on Freedoms of 
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Opinion and Information and the Practice of Journalism" into effect providing the press and 
media with more freedoms and the right to political leaders and their policies.  
 
In Chile, the most widely used communication medium has been radios followed by 
newspapers.  Nearly every household has a radio, therefore, it is often the primary source of 
current news and reaches more people in more remote places than any other medium, including 
the Internet.  Radio news range from political, religious, to covering several working-class 
sectors such as Radio Agricultura.  Regarding newspapers, the most widely read newspapers are 
El Mercurio and La Tercera.  According the official statistics by the United States Department 
of State, the daily El Mercurio attracted conservative audiences (World Fact Book, 2001). Chile 
also has a variety of widely-read magazine publications that present a spectrum of political 
opinions.  These include magazines such as: El Siglo, the Communist Party's official weekly 
publication; Punto Final, a biweekly publication of the extreme-left group Movimiento de 
Izquierda Revolucionario (Revolutionary Left Movement).   
 
Political Uses of ICTs 
 
ICTs have been shaping the political landscape in Chile in several ways.  First, they 
influenced efforts at opening government and increasing citizen participation through various e-
government strategies.  Second, they have shaped the political strategies that political parties 
have used, especially during periods of electoral contestation.  Finally, they have contributed to 
the empowerment of civil society and progressive efforts in Chile.  Now that political parties and 
progressive parties have been empowered and Chile continues to lead among Latin American 
countries in terms of ICT infrastructure, the question remains as to whether they will contribute 




Chile is one of the most advanced countries in terms of integrating technology into 
government.  At one point, the United Nations rated the Chilean e - government among the "top 
10" worldwide by 2005 (UN, 2005).  Over ten years ago, Chile began implementing traditional 
e-delivery programs aiming to (1) deliver information to citizens and (2) allow them to perform 
tasks online.  Since this time, it has launched at least four key tech initiatives.  In 2003, the 
Chilean government launched Senador Virtual (Virtual Senator), an application that allows 
citizens to vote for bills pending in the Senate and   solicit support material for discussion. To 
this date, user participation on the platform is relatively low and it remains unclear how far 
citizen participation in these forums will impact the formal process of political decision making 
(Araya & Barría, 2009).  Participation tends to be greater around those issue areas which have 
the most public interest such as crime, health and employment (CEP, 2006).  Studies have noted 
that the platform should aim for greater deliberative democracy by allowing citizens to vote on 
legislation rather than just commenting (Moreno et al, 2009).  This same year, the government 
developed a new platform to improve transparency and public cost efficiency, ChileCompra, 
(Chile Buys).  The website allows government officials and citizens to compare the costs of bids 
to and services purchased by the governments.  Since its launch, ChileCompra has become a 
popular open data platform which allows citizens to search and download data related to public 
procurement22. A year later a pilot video platform called Chat Senators (Senador Virtual) was 
implemented from May 2005 until September 2005.  The platform allowed citizens to have 
weekly video chats with their local senators.  Review of this pilot project later revealed that the 
service was under-utilized and only 12 senators participated, who were all men (Navia, 2004; 
Araya & Barría, 2009).  Therefore, the platform failed to engage a wide variety of citizens.  As 
with the platform Senador Virtual, the belief was that the Chat Senators was also not successful 
in opening spaces for deliberation.  Some criticized that by placing the senator in the center of 
                                                 
2222 ChileCompra – Datos Abiertos: http://datosabiertos.chilecompra.cl/home 
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communication flows diminished the possibility of back and forth exchange and debate between 
Senators and citizens (Navia, 2004; CEP, 2006).   
 
Efforts to use ICTs to as a political strategy did not start in Chile until 2005.  This year, 
the Senate made it possible for all senators to set up their own blog using one common platform.  
At the same time, political parties began to launch their own political party websites.  The utility 
of party websites is best studied during period of political contestation such as elections.  Most 
notably, candidates have adopted a strategy of using ICTs to detach their public persona from 
the political parties and to generate an identity on the web to establish a rapport with the public.   
In this sense, ICTs have been used to build a bond between the candidates and the public 
(Roberts, 2008). The earliest example of this was seen during the 2005 presidential elections.  
During this election, candidates set up blogs to allow for interactive communications with 
visitors and made extensive use of the Web and email to recruit, organize, and mobilize a 
network of campaign volunteers (Boas, 2008).  Bachelet more than other candidates, used ICTs 
to spread her campaign slogan “Estoycontigo” (“I am with you”) online and give the impression 
to people that she is directly connected with the people (Boas, 2008).  She also avoided putting 
any of her party’s logo or emblems on her website to reduce her association with them.   
 
Second, per Boas (2008: 56), the 2005 presidential campaigns serve as examples of this 
adaptation as several of the candidates “established blogs to allow for interactive 
communication with visitors to their websites, and a third made extensive use of the Web and 
email to recruit, organize, and mobilize a network of campaign volunteers”. This expands the 
reach of politicians to an influential audience across the citizenry. It should be recognized that 
politicians have yet another incentive for integrating their campaigns into the web. It allows a 
candidate “to project an image associated with being ‘modern’” (Cordoba-Pachon 2010, 278). 
Bachelet has successfully used the ICTs to her advantage during her prior campaigns to reach 
135 
 
the people her party theoretically will represent while in office. However, once the candidate is 
in office, the political party is involved in governmental activities rather than solely focusing on 
constituent representation. It is a discrepancy “that starts from the premise that the 
fundamental role of political parties—at least during much of the twentieth century—has been to 
connect society and particular groups of interest with the political system” (Cordoba-Pachon 
2010, 278). This disconnect leads to dissension from the party followers who voted per the party 
line. This evolution from approval to dissension within the constituency of political parties is 
further explained by Cordoba-Pachon: “The aggregation and filter of social demands, social 
integration and mobilization, as well as the structuring of the vote” contribute to the discord 
once a president has been elected (278).  
 
The United Nation Development Program issued its 2006 Chilean Human Development 
report and in it they outlined their findings regarding the utility of party websites in Chile.  They 
analyzed the websites according to: (1) the information supply, (2) access to public information, 
(3) interaction degrees and (4) service rendering.  Their study found that the right-wing party, 
Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) had the most developed website (UNDP, 2006).  In 
terms of information made available on the site, the study found that there was no great 
different among the various political parties.  They all included information about members, 
agenda, events, and history (UNDP, 2006).  Thus, the integration of ICTs by political parties 
could be more a tactic to appear professional and modern, rather than a genuine attempt to use 
technologies to get closer with constituents.  
 
ICTs have also been instrumental in helping the emergence of a renewed and 
strengthened progressive force in Chile (Fung et al, 2013).  Defining this shift in political 
activism in Chile, leaders of the movement have turned to ICTs and social media, to 
communicate with the student body and to amplify the voice of the demonstrations to attract 
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media attention and public support (Valenzuela et al, 2012).  Through ICTs, civil society groups 
have been able to bypass Chile's generally conservative media and speak directly with the public. 
Studies have found that social media has been closely associated with protest activity 
(Valenzuela et al, 2012). During the student movements, these tools served a dual purpose of 
facilitating conversations and organizations among interested parties (Trippi 2004; Chadwick 
2006).  Therefore, ICTs continue to nurture further interaction among citizens who before 
would have had no contact with one another. With the generation of new relationships, new 
meaning formation and new ideologies are also likely to increase (Fung et al, 2013). The 
availability of ICT-enabled communication tools has been especially valuable for student 
protestors as the Chilean government has been accused of many violations of freedom of 
information (World Press Freedom, 2013).  Additionally, media ownership continues to be 
concentrated in few hands. Two privately-owned companies, El Mercurio and Copesa, own 
about 95 percent of the print media while the Spanish media company Prisa owns about 60 
percent of the radio stations (World Press Freedom, 2013). 
 
Finally, ICTs have shaped how citizens participate and hold elected officials accountable.  
Bachelet’s disapproval rating recorded in 2015 is an example of this disharmony of the political 
campaign promises and the tangible activity that occurs during a presidency. University of Chile 
Student Federation (FECH) continue to use ICTs to organize to put pressure on Bachelet to 
foster greater relationships with other Leftists governments in Latin America and place more 
Left-leaning political officials in charge of the Education department23.  Regarding her 
predecessor, the right-wing Piñera, activists used ICTs to hold him accountable to his campaign 
promises. For example, Piñera had pledged that he would prohibit power plants from being built 
in environmentally delicate locations, during his presidency (Valenzuela et al, 2012).  When the 
announcement of the planned power plant was released, environmental activists used ICTs to 
                                                 
23In 2014 the University of Chile Student Federation (FECH) forced the ouster of Bachelet’s newly-appointed 
education undersecretary and her replacement with a more politically compatible designee. 
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assemble support for halting the project. Following two days after the environmental agency 
approved the project, 118 Facebook Groups against the project were created, which together 
garnered more than 25,700 ‘Likes’ and 177,450 ‘Fans’ (García & Torres, 2011; Valenzuela et al, 
2012). At the same time, 3,000-plus citizens—coordinated via Facebook and, to a lesser degree, 
Twitter—marched to the presidential palace in Santiago, demanding Piñera to fulfill his 
campaign promise that no power plants would be built in environmentally sensitive areas 
(García & Torres, 2011). Consequently, on the following day, Piñera announced that he had 
overridden the agency’s approval and personally asked the company to relocate the plant 
(Valenzuela et al, 2012).  
 
Absorption or Polarization? The Future of ICTs and Activism in Chile 
 
The back-to-back Concertación administrations from 1990-2006 tried to implement 
social reforms despite facing challenges in demonstrating how economic development was 
compatible with democracy (Simon and Verdejo, 2005).  Trying to unite both, Concertación 
President, Richard Lagos (2000-2006), implemented several key poverty-fighting schemes and 
sought to equalize womens’ participation in the electoral arena which historically has been male-
dominated.  President Lagos was a founder of the Party for Democracy (Partido por la 
Democracia, PPD) and a socialist. It was during his administration that he succeeded in 
repairing the economy after the effects of the Asian calamity. “It also promoted and 
implemented significant reforms aimed at combating extreme poverty and modernizing 
education, health, culture, labor relations, public financing of electoral campaigns, laws on 
probity in state management, and constitutional reforms” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014, 3). 
 
The desire for education reform was a key impetus in the consolidation of all the 
university student federations which created a new expansive and empowered civic group.  
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Initially, the students focused on trying to effect change within the university system.  However, 
over time students began to take their struggles to the streets.  Nicknaming themselves 
pinguinos (penguins) for their uniforms, by 2006, the students began to stage marches, sit-ins, 
and protests.  They were often met with violence by either police or other private citizens who 
were unhappy with the disruption they were causing.  Yet, by taking their struggle to the public, 
they were also able to influence public opinion.  They came to represent the widespread feeling 
that in Chile, the economy, politics, and the media are all rigged in favor of elites.  Consequently, 
the students could strike a chord with the middle-class along and aligned their cause with the 
existing land miners’ and workers’ rights’ movements.   
 
In 2006, Michelle Bachelet, who herself was imprisoned and tortured under Pinochet, 
became Chile's first female President when Ricardo Lagos stepped down in early 2006.  
However, despite her progressive outlook, she faced deep divisions within her coalition which 
made passing reforms difficult (Garcés, 2012; Mayol, 2012).  For example, although she raised 
the voucher to $100 per pupil each month, and added an extra $50 for poorer children, her 
finance minister, agreed this was not enough to make enough impact for poor students.  She also 
orchestrated the loosening of eligibility requirements for certain benefits (Bachelet, 2014). Her 
strategy included a ‘life-course approach… to create equal opportunities and protect citizens” 
from birth to senior adulthood (Staab 2012, 307). During her tenure, she spearheaded health 
reform, pension reform and childcare service expansion to enhance equity, while shying away 
from reforms related to the country’s labor market where many of the fundamental social 
inequalities originate (Staab 2012, 307; Garcés, 2012; Mayol, 2012).  For example, she 
developed, Chile Crece Contigo(Chile Grows with You), an integrated early childhood protection 




The Concertacion’s winning streak came to an end with the election of the first 
conservative President since the 1988 plebiscite, Sebastian Piñera, in 2010.  During his tenure, 
Piñera’s administration faced a surge in protests by students, indigenous organizations and 
citizens who felt their demands were not being met (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014, 2).  Piñera’s 
popularity continue to decrease as his defense of the private market education and rejection of 
the students’ request for public ownership led to two waves of massive nationwide protests from 
in 2011.  During this year, Chilean students intensified their efforts to end the unequal, 
privatized, and market driven education system and challenge Chile’s neo-liberal system.  The 
eight month long protests spread through the whole country.  These protests were noted for 
their ability to combine old and new repertoires of contention (Della Porta and Diani, 2006).  
For example, they used newer repertoires such as flash mobs, with older ones such as the 
traditional cacerolazos, the banging of pots reminiscent of the Salvador Allende era (Figueroa, 
2012; Jackson, 2013; Della Porta and Mosca, 2009; Papacharissi, 2011).   
 
In the run, up to the 2013 Presidential election, the student movements played a pivotal 
role in creating political space for progressive voices and placing issues of extreme inequality on 
the center of the national agenda (Rosemont, 2014). Several creative acts received extensive 
domestic and foreign media attention, including flash mobs, a zombie walk in front of the La 
Moneda presidential palace (a metaphor for Chile’s “walking dead” educational system), as well 
as kiss-ins and a massive “pillow fight for education” (Haynes, 2016:72). Despite these 
lighthearted methods, the protests have had serious consequences. Public elementary and high 
schools and some college departments (facultades) were completely shut down and occupied, 
and students forced to lose a year of schooling (Haynes, 2016: 58). Massive demonstrations 
continued, mobilizing up to two hundred thousand demonstrators, with others turning violent. 
At the height of the protests in August 2011, almost 900 protesters were detained and police 
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cordoned off the streets and used tear gas, with protesters setting fires in the streets and reports 
of 100 injured police. One student has been killed, and many were injured and arrested. 
 
The student movement also helped to transform the political landscape during the 2013 
Presidential election.  Progressive movements highlighted the increased unpopularity of both 
major coalitions and their lack of policy answers to the issues at hand.  The Concertation lost the 
trust of progressive social groups as they became deeply-engrained in the state’s bureaucratic 
structure and implemented policies which deepened Chile’s neo-liberal system.  Although the 
student movement eventually settle on an uneasy alliance with Bachelet and the leftist coalition, 
the students did express tension with this union.  They hung up signs in Bachelet’s campaign 
headquarters which quoted Salvador Allende last words, “Change is not in the Presidential 
Palace, but in the ‘wide avenues” (Achtenberg 2014, 20). In response, the Concertación changed 
their name to Nueva Mayoria (New Mayority).  The Nueva Mayoria became a center-left 
coalition made up of her own Socialist Party, the Christian Democratic Party, Party for 
Democracy, and the Communist Party backed up Bachelet for the elections.  Bachelet opted for a 
more radical platform and sought to build an alliance with the student movement (Randall, 
2011).  Likewise, conservative parties also rebranded themselves as the Chilean Alliance for the 
elections in hopes of getting right-wing youth support.  They occupied a hard stance against any 
progressive initiative, therefore, moving away from leading a center-right movement.  This was 
initially led by the charismatic candidate, Laurence Golborne, however, he had to step down 
after it was revealed that his company was involved in fraud which affected 600,000 consumers 
(Al Jazeera, 2013).  This created a political vacuum which shaped the landscape of potential 
candidates.   
 
The growing gap between progressive grassroots movements and the duopoly coalitions 
led the emergence of non-traditional alternative political actors.  The fact that the Communist 
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Party joined the Nueva Mayoria in supporting Bachelet was a testament of how much they had 
lost touch with popular grassroots movements. The lack of a strong leftist voice and weak 
Communist Party, led to the development of Partido Igualdad (Equality Party).  The precursor 
to this party was the Movement of Dwellers in Struggle (MPL) which mobilized citizens around 
housing rights and gentrification in the poorest area of Santiago.  The leader of this party, 
Roxana Miranda, became a local celebrity and personified the new generation of Chilean 
activists.  She led several local occupations and protests against financial institutions and 
politicians, including Michelle Bachelet.  The Partido Igualdad did not align with either the 
Communist or other left-leaning parties and claimed to be the only party which truly 
represented the interests of the poor (Haynes, 2016).  Alternatively, the lack of a strong 
alternative to the charismatic right-wing leader, Goldborne led to the rise of Franco Parisi.  
Parisi ran as an independent and embodied a more center-right platform which focused with a 
focus on some liberal values and social rights (Benedikter et al, 2016).  Other new dynamic 
candidates that broke up the dual political landscape during the 2013 Presidential elections were 
Alfredo Sfeir and Ricardo Israel who brought environmental issues onto the political agenda.   
 
The rules of the election process were also changed in 2013. Citizens were no longer 
mandated to go to the polls to vote, and they could make their decision on their own if they 
wanted to vote or not. This led to voter apathy.  Yet, together they drew a total of 5.7 million 
voluntary voters to the polls in the first round of the election, but the margin was too close to 
call, and it required a second-round runoff election to determine that Bachelet had won by a 
clear majority (Achtenberg, 2014, 20).  The promise of structural reforms to address the deep 
divide between rich and poor in Chilean society propelled Bachelet and her center-left New 
Majority coalition to a landslide victory in December over Evelyn Matthei, candidate of the 
center-right Alliance (Achtenberg, 2014).  Bachelet’s promise to equalize the economy that tends 
to favor the wealthy stems from the opposition of the former dictatorship. “The political and 
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economic system inherited from the dictatorship that largely favors the wealthy” is one of the 
central criticisms of the constituency (Achtenberg 2014, 20).  Ultimately, only 51% of the voting 
age population cast ballots, with the lowest voter turnout taking place in the poor northern and 
southern districts along with the youth population.  When looking at the 18-34 age group, 
analysis found that more than half, 60%, did not vote24.   
 
The New Majority’s progressive focus was well-received and the left was once again able 
to garner enough public support to go on to win strong majorities in both houses of the National 
Congress.  Riding on the wave of popular support, the student movement could gain the support 
of more than two thirds of the population, so they have the national attention.  Several student 
movement leaders also went on to be elected into office.  Most notably, Camila Vallejo (of the 
Communist Party) and Gabriel Boric (an Independent), both won their bids to join the Chamber 
of Deputies. With a clear mandate from citizens, Bachelet’s government set forth a plan to 
develop constructive relations with the new civic and progressive energy in Chilean society.  She 
quickly set forth to implement her ambitious agenda by raising the corporate tax rate from 20% 
to 25% and closing significant loopholes.  She then planned to use half of this new revenue 
stream to provide free education for all Chileans by the year 2020 and roll back the for-profit 
schools from the military dictatorship era.  The other half of these funds would be used to 
improve the health care system and other social programs.  Bachelet’s administration could pass 
the bill through the Chamber of Deputies and secured a 33-1 victory in the senate.  On 
September 28, Bachelet signed the bill into law.  Her administration also “created advisory 
councils for policy development and launched projects with the goal of promoting social 
protection and equity” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014, 4).  However, by 2016, social unrest was 
                                                 
24 “Elections in Chile: Confronting the Legacy of Dictatorship,” North American Congress on Latin America, 
December 10, 2013. 
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beginning to reemerge from the student body, who expressed frustration that Bachelet had 
failed to deliver the reforms in education that were expecting.25 
 
Student and Political Parties Survey 
 
In a country like Chile with a historical legacy of political polarization, it was interesting 
to see how views about the utility of ICTs and how it is changing politics would differ from 
Taiwan.  Thus, this section discusses the findings from two surveys conducted from December 
2013 until February 2014 in Chile.  This period also covers the aftermath of the 2013 
Presidential election which took place between November and December 2013.  As with the 
survey conducted in Taiwan, one survey targeted college students and a second survey targeted 
volunteers and staff of political parties.   The survey was developed in English and translated to 
Spanish, then posted online on Qualtrics on the dissertation website: http://myopp.org/en-
espanol/.  Finally, three Chilean research assistants were hired to administer both surveys in 
Chile.    
 
For the college student survey, the research assistants employed snowball sampling and 
successfully recruited eighty-eight local college students to complete the survey (Appendix B 
includes a copy of the surveys that were translated from Spanish to English).    The college 
student survey was divided into four parts: demographic information (i.e. gender, income, 
education level), views about political institutions and political parties, media/technology access 
and exposure, and political interest and activism.  Table 17 outlines the basic profile of the 
student respondents.  Most of the students surveyed were males (60%). Most of the students 
that we spoke to are attending University (74%) and not a technical program.  Additionally, only 
17% of the college students are in graduate school for a Master’s Degree.   
                                                 




Chile is one of the densest countries in Latin America, therefore, we tried to recruit 
students from major city hubs such as Santiago de Chile, Viña del Mar, Valparaíso.  Regarding 
income, as of January 1, 2013, the minimum wage in Chile was $257,500.00 (Chilean Pesos) a 
month (about $390 a month in the United States)26.  Most survey respondents were making 
under $CLP200,000 a year, below what’s considered an average yearly salary in Taiwan.  
Despite, their lower income levels most students reported accessing the Internet daily, using 
online social networks, and mobile devices.  Most respondents also expressed having moderate 
to conservative political views.  
Table 17: Profile of N=88 Student Survey Respondents 
 # of Responses Percentage of Sample 
Male  53 60% 
Female 35 40% 
   
Average age 26.6  




University 65 74% 
Institute professional 5 6% 
Technical education center  3 3% 
Master 15 17% 
   
Political Views   
Left 37 42% 
Right 10 12% 
Center 8 9% 
Independent 24 27% 
Any-Flexible 9 10% 
   
Geographical Distribution   
High-Density- Urban Cities: 
Santiago de Chile, Viña del mar, 
Valparaíso, Temuco 
73 75% 
Less-Density-Urban Cities:  
San Felipe, San Bernardo, San 
Vicente 
13 15% 
   
Yearly Income   
Below 500 mil CLP 42 51% 
500 – 800 mil CLP 11 13% 
                                                 
26"¿Cuál es el valor del ingreso mínimo mensual? - Centro de Consultas. Dirección del Trabajo. Gobierno de Chile". 
Dt.gob.cl. 2013-08-24. Retrieved 2016-01-04. 
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Over 800 mil CLP 29 35% 
   
Frequency Using the Internet   
Daily 82 93% 
Several times a week 5 6% 
Few times a month 3 3% 
   
Rarely 1 1% 
Never 0 0% 
   
Own a social networking site 
account (e.g. Facebook, 
Twitter, Plurk, etc.) 
  
Yes 70 93% 
No 5 8% 
 
Views on Political Parties Use of ICTs 
More than half of students (64%) reported that they disagree to strongly disagree that 
elected officials’ use of digital tools was a waste of money.  This highlights 
the fact that most students value having government be more technologically-savvy and 
therefore see it as a worthwhile pursuit.  
























Overall, they make government and politicians more
accesible
Help people to be more informed about what
government does
They make the government waste time and money
Is one way more for communicate the same information
Some politicians and elected officials allow citizens to obtain information 
and communicate online using digital tools. Do you agree or disagree with 
the following statements  regarding the use of these technology tools:
Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree Neutral Somewhat agree Strongly agree
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In terms of being able to perform specific tasks and have interactions with political parties 
online, most people felt it was important or very important for political parties to: (1) provide 
general information to the public through their website, (2) keep the public informed by posting 
info and alerts on social networking sites, and (3) allow people to contact parties online.  To a 
lesser degree, students expressed not being as interested in having the ability to perform specific 
tasks online, such as make donations.  Therefore, one can form the hypothesis that students may 
be more inclined to view ICTs as mainly a communication platform rather than on a more 
functional level.   
Figure 27: Chile Students’ utility of Political Parties online platforms
 
 
Finally, students were more likely to follow politicians on social media because: (1) they want to 
stay current on political and social news and (2) they find the information from these sites are 
more reliable that what they get on traditional news organizations. Students were not inclined to 
use social media to feel closer to their political party. Finally, students were more likely to follow 
politicians on social media because: (1) they find the information from these sites are more 

















To provide general information to the public on their
website
To allow  people connect trough a website
To allow people make arrangements trough the website
(donations, etc.)
To provide useful information and  remainders on social
networks (Facebook, Twitter, etc.)
In general, how important you think it is for a political party or 
coalition…?
Not important at all Not very important Important Very important
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onpolitical and social news. Students were not inclined to use social media to feel closer to their 
political party. 
Figure 28: Chilean Students following Political Parties online
 
 
Students’ Opinions About the Role of ICTs in Politics 
The survey asked students for their opinions regarding the role of ICTs in politics.  
Generally, students seem to have positive views.  Seventy-four percent feel like the Internet 
makes it easier to connect with politicians.   Eighty-eight percent of students felt that the 
Internet gives them access to a broader spectrum of points of view and opinions about politics 













I like to stay current with political and social news
I feel more personally connected to the political
candidates or groups that I follow
The information I get on these sites is more reliable than
the information I given on traditional chanel news
People follow politicians or political parties on Twitter, Facebook, or other social 
networking sites for a number of reasons. Please tell me if each of the following is 
a reason why you follow political candidates or organizations on social networks.
Not applicable to me Not a reason Minor reason Major reason
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Additionally, nearly half (47%) of students mentioned that online social networks and 
media expose them to other points of views that can help change their political opinions.  In 
Chile’s highly politicized media environment, it is not surprising that youth appreciate having an 
avenue that can provide them with a variety of viewpoints.  Nevertheless, students did report 
that they still rely on a mix of traditional and new mediums for getting access to news about 
their government.  Figure 30 shows that the top three mediums reported were: (1) Internet 
(77%), (2) television (61%), and (3) social media/networks (57.8%).  Students are least likely to 




Do you think that the Internet gives access to a broader spectrum of points of 




Figure 30: Chile Students’ News Consumption 
 
 
A follow up question asked students to list their top five websites to get most of their 
political news.  The top sites listed were: Elmostrador, Emol, and Latercera-Diario.  The full 
breakdown of sites is in the figure below: 
 
Table 18: Chilean News websites 









www.biobiochile.cl 11                                                             
www.mercurio.cl 10 



























How do you get most of your news about government and 












www.nytimes.com 1   
www.papeldigital.info 1 
www.mer.cl 1 











Overall, students seem to express positive views towards the utility of social networking 
sites in politics.  Most students reported that it was somewhat important to very important that 
they use social networking sites to (1) keep up with political news, (2) debate or discuss political 
issues with others, and (3) learn about what issues and policies political parties are advocating 
for.  Students were less likely to use social networking sites to recruit people to get involved in a 
political cause or find other people who share their political views.  Additionally, nearly half of 
students (47%) mentioned that social networks give them exposure to alternative political views 









Students’ Sense of Political Efficacy 
 
Not considering ICTs, students were asked to rate how much impact they thought they 
could have if they wanted to improve their community.  More than half of the students felt that 
they could have a moderate (42%) to small impact (23.9%) in their government.   This is notable 
for a country which has not always provided an avenue for political organization and 






















Keeping updated about political news
Debating or discuss political issues with others
Finding other people that share points of vew about
important political issues
Recruiting people to get involve in political issues that you
are interested
 Finding out what are the issues and political policies that
the parties intent to promote or advocate for
In general, how important  are the social networks when it 
comes to…
Not important at all Not very important Important Very important
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When asked to rate their interactions with either their local, state, or federal government 
in the past twelve months, 40.5% of students had mentioned they had not contacted their local, 
state, or federal government in the past year.  However, a notable segment of respondents 
(33.3%) mentioned they had contacted government via social networks. Therefore, I can assume 
that if students are to have contact with their government, it is most likely to take place by 
online versus more traditional offline means.  Figure 33 outlines the responses.    
Figure 33: Chile Students’ interaction with Government 
 
 
In terms of political efficacy, the survey asked, “How often, if ever, do you talk about 
politcs or current events with your family and friends”?  A majority of students reported 
discussing politics or current events on a regular basis.  Seventy percent reported they discuss 
3.4% 30.7% 42.0% 23.9%
If you would like to make your community a better place to live, 
how much impact do you think to have?









In-person by visiting a government office or agency
Email
Via social networks (like Facebook, Twitter, others)
I never have contacted government
In the past 12 months, have you contacted the autorities, local, 
state or federal government by… (Mark all that apply)
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this very often and 23% reported sometimes.  Interestingly, even though students had positive 
views about the role of social networks in politics, they were less likely to discuss politics and 
current events online through social networks, websites, forums.  For the question: “How often 
do you discuss politics and public affairs with others online in social networks, news websites, 
forums, etc?”, students reported:  
 Everyday (28%) 
 Atleast once a week (26%) 
 Less than once a month (18%) 
 Once a month (17%). 
 
Only 11% of students reported never talking about politics or public affairs online.  When asking 
students to rate the type of information they share on social networks,  only 33% reported that 
some of what they post online is related to politics or the economy.  Finally, regarding whether 
students use their social media accounts to follow political parties online, 52% said that they do 
follow political parties or candidates on social media networks.  
 
Students’ Political Participation 
The survey had two sections which explored students’ participation in both traditional 
offline forms of political participation and more contemporary ICT-enabled forms of 
participation.  It is important to note that students did not express a preference for either online 
or offline forms of political participation, 31.6% said preferred any and 31.6% said they preferred 
both.  Likewise, the survey asked students if, “In the past has there been a time when you 
decided to TAKE ACTION involving a political or social issues because of something you read 
online”, and 67% mentioned no. For those students that checked off yes (33%), the survey then 
asked for them to list the issues they read online which caused them to take action.  The most 
common were education and the student movements.  However, other issues noted were general 
human rights issues such as: the defense of the Panul Forest in Santiago, protection of animals, 
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abortion, and child abuse.  Meanwhile, only 39% of students mentioned they were currently part 
of an online political group or social network site.   
Figure 34: Chile Students’ Political Participation Preferences 
 
 
In terms of traditional forms of political participation and activism, the survey asked 
students to select the political activities they had ever engaged in.  The top three most reported 
political activities were: attended a march or political speech (79.5%), attended an organized 
protest (73.5%), signed an online petition (67.5%).  Students were least likely to contribute 
money to a candidate, political party, or any organization or cause, participate in activities as 











Do you prefer participate in political issues online, offline (such 
as in events and activities) or both?
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In terms of online forms of political participation, 93% reported having either a 
Facebook or Twitter account.  However, these social networks were not always utilized for 
political participation.  When looking at specific forms of ICT-enabled participation students 
were most likely to: watch a video online of a member of a political party (77.3%), post pictures 
or video online related to a political or social issue (69.3%), comment, post questions or 





















 Attended a march or a political speech
Attended an organized protest
Attended a political meeting in your town or school
Worked as volunteer for a political party or candidate
Been member of a group with intention of influencing on
public policies, without political parties
Worked with other citizens to resolve problems in your
comunity
Contributed money to a candidate, political party, or any
politic organization or cause
Signed an online petition
Follow a political campain
Participate in activities as volunteer related with a campain
(ej. Making calls, sending emails, helping people to enroll, or
looking for people to vote)
Have you ever done or participate in one of the following 
political activities?
No, I haven’t done it Yes, I have done it
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up to receive text messages from a member of a political party, sign up to receive email alerts 
from a member of a political party), send text messages to others about a political or social issue. 




In terms of engaging in political participation via their mobile phones, students were 
most likely to use it to keep up with news relate to the election or politics (57.3%)share photos or 
videos related to the election campaigns (36%), download or use any software applications or 




















Contacted a national, state or local government official
ONLINE, by email or by text message about an issue…
Commented, posted questions or information on a Blog,
online discussions, listserv, or forums about public or…
Posted PICTURES or VIDEO online related to a political or
social issue
Sent text messages to others about a political or social
issue
Read the blog of a member of a political party
Signed up to receive email alerts from a member of a
political party
Signed up to receive TEXT MESSAGES from a member of
a political party
Watched a video online of a member of a political party
Participate in a group online that is traying to influence 
on the governement’s public politics
Please check off if you have use the Internet for any of the 
following activities:
No, I haven’t done this Yes, I have done this
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Political Party Survey 
 
For the second survey, the research assistants recruited volunteers and members of 
political parties in Chile.  The research assistants called and emailed the local field offices of 
political parties in Chile to recruit participants to take the survey.  Ultimately, 62 surveys were 
completed with this target group.  Table 19 below provides an overview of the demographics of 
the survey respondents for this second survey.  Notably, most of the respondents had left-leaning 
political views (90%) and identified with the following political parties: Socialist Party of Chile 
(Partido Socialista de Chile), Party for Democracy (Partido Por lar Democracia), and Communist 
Party of Chile (Partido Comunista de Chile).  Therefore, we were not able to get any complete 
surveys from the more conservative leaning parties: Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and 
Renovación Nacional (RN).  This is an important point to keep in mind for the results that 











Keep up with news related to the election or politics
Send text messages related to the election campaigns to
friends, family members or others
Contribute money by text message to a candidate, group, or
political party
Share photos or videos related to the election campaigns
Download or use any software applications or “apps” that 
provide updates from a candidate or a political party
We’re interested in how people use their cell phones for political 





Therefore, I can assume their opinions and views would greatly differ from political party 
members that are in more rural areas of Chile and have more limited access to the Internet.  The 
survey asked members and volunteers of political parties assess their parties’ use of ICTs as well 
as how they feel these technologies are changing the political landscape.   
Table 19: Profile of N=62 Political Party Staff/Volunteer Survey Respondents 
 
 # of Responses Percentage of Sample 
Male  30 53% 
Female 27 47% 
   
Average age 36  




University 37 60% 
Professional Institute 4 7% 
Technical School 2 4% 
Masters 16 28% 
Doctorate 1 2% 
   
Political Views   
Right-Wing 2 4% 
Center-Right 3 6% 
Left-Wing 37 60% 
Center-Left 14 30% 
   
Geographical Distribution   





Less-Density-Urban Cities: El 




   
Political Party Affiliation   
Partido Socialista de Chile 22 42.3% 
Partido Por la Democracia 10 21.54% 
Partido Comunista de Chile 8 10.53% 
Partido Democrata Cristiano 4 7.02% 
Partido Radical Socialdemocrata 6 9.15% 
Renovacion Nacional 2 5.26% 
Union Democrata Independiente 2 5.26% 
   
Frequency Using the 
Internet 
  
Daily 50 88% 
Several times a week 5 9% 
Few times a month 2 4% 
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Rarely 0 0% 
Never 0 0% 
   
 
ICTs and the Evolution of the Chilean Political Landscape  
 
Political parties were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement: 
“Internet is allowing smaller, less established political parties and politicians to get attention 
and build a following.”  In Chile, most respondents (82%) agreed with this statement, thereby, 
illustrating a potential view among politicians that the Internet is shifting political power.  The 
survey then asked respondents to identify the specific purposes they felt the Internet serves best. 
Figure 38 outlines the respondents’ responses.  The top three items respondents felt the 
Internet served best were:  
 Putting issues on the political agenda (51%) 
 Networking with other politically active people (40%) 
 Conversations among citizens (38%) 
 
The items that respondents felt the Internet least served were: 
 
 Contacting politicians (9%) 
 Organizing grassroots activities (11%) 









Figure 39 outlines the same responses but broken down by three of the main political parties in 
Chile, Socialist Party of Chile, Party for Democracy, and Communist Party of Chile.   Although, 
survey responses are too small to make definitive conclusions, the chart demonstrates 
significant differences among these three left-leaning parties.  Socialist Party of Chile found the 
Internet is best for searching information about politicians and community issues and expressed 
that the Internet is least effective at giving a voice to the less represented in society.  Party for 
Democracy rated the ability to contact politicians and facilitate conversations among citizens as 
the best purpose the Internet serves and giving a voice to the less represented as the least.  
Finally, members of the Communist Party of Chile expressed the Internet is best for giving a 
voice to less represented of the society and least effective at facilitating conversations among 

















Linking communities and neighborhoods together
Search for information about politicians and community…
Giving a voice to diverse or less represented groups in…
Giving voice to alternative perspectives
Conversations among citizens
Conversations between citizens and politicians
Networking with other politically active people
Putting issues on the political agenda
Which of the following purposes do you think the Internet serves best?
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Figure 39: Chilean Parties’ view of Internet divided by Political Party 
 
 
Political Party’s Use of ICTs 
The top three technologies that parties reported most using were: website, Facebook, 
and Twitter.  Text messaging was the least-used technology-enabled social network noted by all 
respondents.  Figure 40 provides a breakdown of all the technology options that members 































Conversations among citizens and politicians
Incorporate issues in the politic agenda
Give a voice to different perspectives
Give a voice to the less represented of the society
To get in contact with politicians
Search information about politicians and community
issues
Networking among people that actively works on
politics
Which of the following purposes do you think the Internet serves best? (Split 
up by political party)
Socialist Party of Chile Party for Democracy Communist Party of Chile
162 
 




When looking at how political parties are using technologies in their work, the top three 
tasks listed were to: (1) distribute information about policy objectives and proposals, (2) 
mobilize members around specific issues, and (3) increase awareness of relevant political issues.  
Over half of respondents, mentioned they are least likely to use ICTs to raise money.  Responses 
can be found in Figure 41. 








































Communicate with other groups and stakeholders…
Communicate with other groups and stakeholders in…
Reach out to potential new members/volunteers
Increase awareness of relevant political issues
Mobilize members around specific issues
Distribute information about policy objectives and…





Political Parties’ Views on the Utility of ICTs 
 
The survey asked respondents to assess the ways that the Internet and ICTs had affected key 
party programmatic functions.  Most respondents did note that ICTs had made it easier to:  
 Communicate their message and goals (82%); 
 Increase party membership (53%); 
 Diversify party membership (54%); 
 Deepen participation and activism within their party (76%); 
 Work more effectively and efficiently (76%).   
 
A small subset of respondents (38%), did report using ICTs to solicit donations.  Figure 
42 outlines other traditional methods of fundraising that political parties listed such as event-
driven fundraising and collecting party membership fees.  
 




Regarding political parties’ preference for traditional media versus more technology-
driven forms of communication tools, the survey asked respondents to select how much they 
agreed or disagreed with the statement, “Traditional media such as newspapers, television, 
radio, etc. are more useful than the Internet and other technology tools for party 
communications and outreach.” Forty-five percent of respondents mentioned that they strongly 











What traditional fundraising methods does your party use?
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The survey asked respondents to rate how much they agree or disagree with the 
statement, “Most of our party-political leaders embrace the Internet and other technology 
tools.” A little over half of respondents selected that they strongly agreed with this statement 
(51%).  Figure 44 shows all the responses.  













Traditional media such as newspaper, television, radio, etc. are more 










Figure 45 breaks down responses by political party.  Members and volunteers for the 
Socialist Party of Chile were the ones most in agreement with the statement that party members 
embraced the Internet and other technologies.  Respondents for the Communist Party of Chile, 
expressed the most ambivalence towards whether their members embraced new technologies.  
This shows that current campaign culture and overall political culture drive the use of ICTs for 
politics and not the other way around.   
Figure 45: Parties’ embrace of Technology (broken down by Party) 
 
 
Although, overall most respondents expressed an interest in ICTs and their utility in 
their daily politicking, there were split about their views on how successful their online 
communities were.  The survey asked them to rate how happy they were with their political 
parties’ online communities.  Response were almost evenly split, between 41.5% which were 











0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250%
Party for Democracy
Socialist Party of Chile
Communist Party of Chile
Most of our party political leaders embrace the Internet and other technology 
tools
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Neutral Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree
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Finally, as seen in the Taiwan survey responses, 82% of respondents mentioned that they 
thought it was a good thing that the Internet helped small, less established political parties and 
politicians get attention and build a following.   
  
Very happy. We 
have a very active 
online presence, 
15.1%
Happy.  We have a 
growing online 
presence, 41.5%
Not very happy. We 
have an online 
presence but they are 
not very active, 41.5%
Not happy.  We don’t 
have an online 
presence., 1.9%
How happy are you with the amount of interaction among party members 
and their public online?
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The last question on the survey was an open-ended question which asked political party 
members: “What should your party do to improve the use of the Internet and ICTs for citizen 
participation, political/community involvement or dialogue among the citizens and elected 
officials?” Most of the comments and suggestions were centered around finding ways that ICTs 
can facilitate greater substantive engagement and communication between political parties and 
citizens.  At the same time, some respondents felt that political parties still had to be taught how 
to use ICTs effectively, while others felt that a more sophisticated and strategic approach was 
needed to really build unity and effect change using ICTs:  
 
Need for more substantive direct communications and interactions  
x Establish the option of multiple/simultaneous video chats between citizens and party 
officials, deputies, mayors, etc., so that they can directly approach some sensitive 
issues. -Member of Party for Democracy 
x Create more interaction between the party leaders and civil society. Also, deliver 
information about the performance of congress party. -Member of Party for 
Democracy 
x Enable new ways of communication that are more effective and creating direct links 
between the party, representatives and citizenship in unique platforms. -Member of 
Communist Party of Chile 
Yes, 82%
No, 17%
The Internet is allowing smaller, less established political parties and 




x Generate discussion forums open to anyone. Also, it seems interesting to explore a 
communication system using instant messaging such as Google Hangouts or 
Whatsapp. -Member Social Democrat Radical Party 
x Set face sessions and online conversation with representatives of the party to take 
citizens' demands and incorporate them into the public agenda. 
x Set rounds of online questions with party representatives in several geographical 
places. -Member of Citizen Left (formerly the Christian Left Party). 
x Generate massive video conferences with leading representatives of the party. 
x Promote the "brand" of the party and the position regarding politically-relevant topics. 
-Member of Progressive Party 
x More efficiently use of existing social networks to increase dialogue with the 
citizenship. Humanize the contents, meaning that the way to express ideas it uses a 
language that facilitates understanding. -Member of Socialist Party of Chile 
 
Need for greater digital literacy among political parties 
x Acquire good computers, enable computing rooms at our headquarters with modern 
technologies and train our members in its use, motivating the interest towards these 
modern technologies and the need for being connected and communicated on other 
social realities. -Member Christian Democratic Party. 
x Promote the use and management of IT in senior party members and have greater 
presence online. -Member of Communist Party of Chile 
x Encourage better use of social networks on all party members to increase online 
presence. -Member Party for Democracy 
x Assess mechanisms for better information delivery to citizenship. Above all, to research 
in what way we can bring the party closer and more visible. 
x Deepen the use of Twitter by the authorities of the party who become the party voice. 
Member of National Renovation. 
x Establish party accounts with their respective regional representations and encourage 
the use of these accounts at national level to respond to citizens' requests-Member of 
Socialist Party of Chile. 
x What should be done is to develop an instructional guide of the proper use of 
technological tools, to give a unified image addressing certain issues for the public 
opinion. -Member of Party for Democracy. 
 
 
Better strategies for engaging youth and uniting different voices and perspectives  
x To formalize the position of the movement against certain issues and appear as a 
united front. -Member of Democratic Revolution 
x Use social networking is important to approach more young militants because 
generally most of contact with adult militants is made on the headquarters, through 
meetings. -Member of Christian Democratic Party 
x I think we should join youth with more emphasis, is the youth who use the Internet the 
most, so the party can recruit new members. -Member of Communist Party of 
Chile. 
 
Need to confront challenges reducing the utility of ICTs 
x It is difficult because interactions can lead to discussions with people from other 
parties.  However, ultimately the goal of putting on the agenda the opinion of the party 
is not achieved. -Member of Socialist Party of Chile. 
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x Overall my view is that the Chilean voter is not very open to the use of new 
technologies. -Member of Socialist Party of Chile 
x While the party is using more active forms of certain technologic tools, like twitter as 
an interactive platform for stakeholders seeking to understand the public opinion 
addressing issues and specific situations, Internet is used only for general aspects not 
working to generate a permanent and systematic relationship between the party 
organization, its politicians and militancy, and the global adherence. This last 
constitutes a great niche and challenge in which the party can maximize the use of 
Internet. - Member of Socialist Party of Chile 
x I think in Chile dissatisfaction with politics is associated with the non-compliance of 
promises, therefore, more than use ICTs, I think parties must return to its essence. 
Similarly, I think it should be increased the politician interaction with citizens through 
Facebook or Twitter, be closer to each other, but it is important to understand that 




Analysis of Political Parties’ use of the Internet and other Technologies 
 
Table 20 below outlines the key findings after analyzing the websites and technologies of 
the main political parties in Chile.      






























Blog, website, SMS 
text messaging, 









most active, and 
















YouTube Not very active 
in any social 
media, in both 
                                                 
27 List of party names: UDI: Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Independiente); PDC: Christian 
Democratic Party(Partido Democrata Cristiano); RN: National Renewal (Renovación Nacional); PPD: Party for 
Democracy (Partido Por la Democracia); PSC: Socialist Party of Chile (Partido Socialista de Chile); MAS: Broad 
Social Movement (Movimiento Amplio Social); PCC: Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Chile); PRS: Social 
Democrat Radical Party (Partido Radical Socialdemocrata); PP: Progressive Party (Partido Progresista); PH: 
































use; very active 
























Blog, Flickr Modern, 
westernized use.  




































and not very 
cohesive.  
Twitter is the 
most active.  

















Twitter is the 
most successful.  







































































PH Left Low: Low: Friends: Since March Flickr, YouTube Inconsistent 
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A political leader 






Still seem to 
invest time and 
resources.  
 
There are several insights which we can gain by looking at the online strategies of 
political parties.  First, most political parties started employing online strategies in the late 
2000s.  For example, the first party to have opened a Twitter account was the National Renewal 
(Renovación Nacional) party in 2007; while the Equality Party (Partido Igualdad) opened theirs 
in 201228.  Second, Twitter seems to be the online platform of choice, with most parties seeming 
to apply most of their focus to using Twitter when communicating with constituents and the 
public.  Third, there is a lot of variation in terms of the sophistication and effectiveness of online 
strategies.  Some parties which appear especially innovative and effective in their online 
strategies are, Party for Democracy (Partido Por la Democracia) and National Renewal 
(Renovación Nacional).  These groups standout above the rest because they employ more than 
one online tool and are effectively using them to create community and facilitate 
communications with the public.   
 
Fourth, although the list of parties is not definitive, there are some conclusions I can 
make about right and left-wing differences.  As noted earlier, political alliances in Chile have 
historically been divided between the left-wing and the right-wing. Although there are multiple 
                                                 
28 This party is fairly new, being founded in 2009.  
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parties involved in the Chilean political arena, these parties tend to flow along a continuum that 
trends toward one or the other extremes. For the most part, the Christian Democrat Party has 
been the only central party that based its opinions in the mid-range between the two poles.  
However, based on the way that the Christian Democrat Party employs online platforms, their 
voice and community and consensus facilitation appear minimal as they have a weak online 
presence and community engagement.  There could be many internal reasons for this, but it 
does highlight the potential limits of technology to help parties build consensus.  The case of the 
Communist Party also highlights this.  Schneider (1991) pointed out that former “residents of 
Communist-influenced neighborhoods absorbed the lesson that individuals can make a 
difference that they can, in collective organization with others, take control over their lives” 
(263).  Yet, when you look at the online participation of supporters of the Communist Party, you 
see a mix of limited interaction and engagement using online platforms.  We know that students 
from the youth wing of the Communist Party have been key leaders in the mobilizing of the 
student movement, yet their energy and commitment may be a function more of their youth and 
age and technology as secondary.  Fifth, most political parties tend to employ western 
technologies and westernized style of campaigning using a combination of traditional and ICT-
enabled mediums.  Sixth, as seen in the Taiwan case study, parties that are more grassroots and 
progressive are not necessarily more active online and run active online communities.  
Therefore, grassroots origins do not necessarily translate to citizen-driven uses of technology.  
As a result, political parties’ Internet and technology-driven strategies appear to be influenced 
by resources available and political culture in Chile.  Finally, most political party websites 
appear to be under-utilized.  The time that most visitors spend on these sites are low (under 2 
minutes).  The political parties that appeared to have the most engaged visitors to their website 
were: Progressive Party (Partido Progresista), Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Chile), 






There is no doubt that democracy in Chile is more consolidated and inclusive than it is 
ever been.  Chile’s fledgling democracy continues to show that the country is making efforts to 
shed its authoritarian past (Navia, 2010).  Nevertheless, there are still considerable challenges 
getting in the way of greater democratic deepening.  Although, ICTs have proven to be very 
effective at facilitating the emergence of new participation forms (Cordoba-Pachon 2010, 278) 
and greater communication among civil society and progressive forces, the question remains as 
to whether it will deliver more substantive change in the relationship and dynamics between 
citizen and political parties.  Therefore, it is a good reminder that while ICTs help to facilitate 
communication and interaction and makes it easier to disseminate information, this does not 
necessarily make it democratic (Antiroiko, 2003: 125).   
 
Chile’s modern society and stable economy have laid down the foundation for an 
advanced technology and communications infrastructure. Not surprisingly, Chile has one of the 
highest Internet usages in the world.  Chilean political parties are as advanced as western 
countries in term of employing ICT-enabled strategies.  Therefore, Chile is in many ways a 
fascinating case study to examine the potential democratic utility of ICTs.  What we learn from 
Chile is that although ICT usage is advanced there and has contributed to the creation of 
political opportunities like Taiwan, it remains to be seen how these changes will shape the party 
system landscape.  ICTs have not been successful at facilitating the greater consensus that is 
needed between political parties and Chile’s institutionalized collective interests, such as the 
impoverished and labor unions.  Second, Chile’s multi-party system continues to demonstrate a 
remarkable ability to survive and adapt (Valenzuela, 2012), which in turn is one of the 
impediments to gaining greater political consensus.  There continues to be an inadequate 
balance of clout between the parties and their fragile coalitions. Party leaders have tried to work 
the multi-party system to their advantage (Venezuela and Dammert, 2006). Rather, as seen 
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during the 2013 Presidential elections, ICTs are facilitating the emergence of non-traditional 
third-party political actors and greater personification of political parties, such as seen in the 
case of Laurence Golborne and Franco Parisi.  The survey responses from students and 
members of political parties reveal this to be a favorable outcome of ICTs, but it remains to be 
seen the ways that the emergence of third parties can shape political parties or evolve them into 
less elitist institutions.   
 
 
Scholars have noted that one reason for the limited democratic utility of ICT’s is the lack 
of activism of “empowerment” (Santana, 2013). The expectations of progressive groups were 
magnified with the emergence of ICTs and political rhetoric calling for strengthening of 
“authentic participation” (Picazo 2005, 2). Defining this shift in political activism and as seen in 
the surveys, students would like more substantive interactions and voice in the policy making 
process and for the most part have a healthy sense of political efficacy.  They have turned to ICTs 
to amplify their voice in order attract media attention and public support (Valenzuela et al, 
2012).  However, when it came to policymaking the movements were coopted by the Bachelet-
led Nueva Mayoria (previously the Concertación) (Randall 2011, 20).  In this sense, they have 
been divided and so the student movement has been weakened.  At the same time, for the 
members and volunteers of political parties that we spoke to, ICTs were mostly a 
communication tool with only a subset of respondents being interested in exploring how it could 
be used to transform power imbalances between collective interests and parties.  Therefore, 
ICTs are forcing political parties to act more like professional organizations and less like 
grassroots-driven entities.   
 
Finally, the future of Chile’s democracy rests on the ability to build consensus among the 
various single-issue groups.  It is not until they can merge and present a united front against the 
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current political system, (Randall, 2011) that true transformative change can happen in party-
citizen linkages.  There is a possibility that ICTs can help play a role in this by helping providing 
tools and platforms for bottom-up political uprisings and social forces to be heard and 
acknowledge and to strengthen and continue to grow the new civil society in Chile.  However, it 
remains to be seen what role ICTs will play when it comes to helping Chile’s progressive forces 
find common ground.  The case of Chile also shows that there is still much more work to be done 
to increase direct connections between citizens and politicians and policy makers.  Scholars had 
originally believed that a "central contribution of the new ICTs to democracy would be to take 
out the ‘middle men’—the intermediaries of traditional organizations and media” (Fung, 
Gilman, and Shkabatur 2013, 37) and usher in an era of direct and participatory digital 
democracy.  However, as we see here, this is easier said than done.  Persistent inequality and 
citizen apathy when it comes to politics will be barriers to implementing strategies to achieve 
greater direct connections.  Therefore, concern over a widening democratic divide because of the 
diffusion of ICTs (Nam & Stromer-Galley, 2012) should be one to be monitored closely in Chile.  
 
In summary, although Chile and Taiwan share similar socioeconomic factors, ICT-
enabled activism there is taking a different shape.  Unlike in Taiwan, the uses of ICTs in activism 
are as much about the introduction of new political players and parties as they are an extension 
of Chile’s preexisting cultures of resistance and activism which have been a long running 
response to Chile’s religious, urban/rural class cleavages which have been crystallized into 
Chile’s political space.  Unlike Taiwan, Chile has deeply democratic traditions and the current 
discourse regarding new activism in the digital era is framed as the emergence of a “New Left”.  
Therefore, while Taiwan would be a continuation of political identities with new ones, Chile 
there is a longer historical continuum, and ICTs are amplifying existing collective and political 
identities.  When reviewing the political party surveys, political parties expressed interest in 
using ICTs to legitimize these acts of activism and try to engage these new actors, rather than 
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marginalizing them, as in the case of Taiwan.  I argue that it is in cases such as this, where we 










Political Cultures, ICTs, and Low Human Development:  







The Taiwan and Chile case studies highlight the ways that ICTs are creating new political 
opportunities in politics as well as how these factors interact with preexisting political cultures.  
The case studies of Indonesia and Peru explore how socioeconomic factors and preexisting 
cultures play out in two countries with considerably less wealth, human development, and ICT 
usage.  Like Taiwan and Chile, Indonesia and Peru also have authoritarian legacies which have 
shaped political and economic development.  In Indonesia, after four decades of 
authoritarianism, the country has emerged as the world's third largest democracy. Although, the 
country faces persistent problems of political elitism, poverty, weak justice systems, ethnic 
divisions, and economic growth (Bhakti, 2004), its democratization experience is notable.  At 
the forefront of the various attempts at democratization, has been Indonesia’s civil society and 
student-led movements which have forced oppressive leaders from power and pushed for 
progressive policies.  While in Peru, the legacy of Fujimori’s authoritarian regime persists in 





In Indonesia, ICTs are playing a significant role in contemporary political politics. With 
more than 50 million active users, Indonesia is the fourth largest source of Facebook users after 
the USA, Brazil and India (Socialbakers, 2016; Alexa, 2016). Social media with their user-
generated and peer-to-peer sharing features has significantly changed people’s modes of social 
and political participation (Fortunati, 2009). While in Peru, ICTs have yet to make their mark.  
This chapter explores the contextual and historical factors that can account for differences 
between each countries’ use of ICTs to increase political opportunities.  
 
Human Development in Indonesia 
 
Indonesia is rated as a middle-income country by the World Bank (World Bank, 2016).  
With a GNI per capita of $3,630, it is considered one of the largest economies in the world 
(Asian Development Bank, 2015).  However, despite its sustained economic growth, inequality 
has also been rising faster there than in any other East Asian country due to high child rural 
poverty.  Inequality is most visible when comparing rural Indonesian areas and the big cities.  
Urbanization and development of urban economic activities are still heavily concentrated in big 
cities, particularly Greater Jakarta, Surabaya and its buffer cities, and Greater Bandung, while 
the development of cities outside Java remains slow, except for Medan, Palembang, Makassar 
and Manado (Firman, 2011).  Fifty-two percent of Indonesia’s more than 240 million citizens 
live in urban areas, which are characterized as having high poverty, crime, slums, overcrowding, 
and high unemployment (UNDP, 2015).A second area were Indonesia’s inequalities are rampant 
are reflected in its education system.  Despite having one of the 4th largest educational systems 
in the world (The Economist, 2014), the quality of the education varies greatly between the 
urban and poorer rural areas, resulting in poor overall educational outcomes (Welch, 2007).  
Additionally, it has been noted that adolescents in secondary school are still at risk to drop-out 
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of school because of financial issues, pregnancy or marriage. For example, data from the 
National Statistics Office, abound 1 in 4 girls are married before the age of 18 and around 
300,000 girls are married before age 16 every year (UNDP, 2015). Most recently Indonesian 
President, Jokowi made education a cornerstone of this campaign.  Right after his election, he 
fulfilled one of his campaign promises to launch the “Indonesia Smart Card” which pays for 
school fees and stipends to 24 million poor students across Indonesia, guaranteeing them 12 
years of free education29. Despite the societal challenges, Indonesia has a high national literacy 
rate of 99% and youth are increasingly well educated, socially mobile, and digitally connected 
(UNDP, 2015). 
 
Media and Technology in Indonesia 
 
Indonesia is an emerging democracy, facing a multitude of challenges such as 
corruption, oligarchy, cartel, and issues regarding transitional justice.  Corruption is one the 
most serious issues in contemporary Indonesia (Henderson & Kuncoro, 2004). According to the 
recent statistics released by Transparency International, Indonesia’s corruption score was 36 
out of 100 (on this scale, 100 denotes the cleanest and 0 shows least transparent country 
(Transparency International, 2014).  At the face of these challenges, media and technology have 
played key roles, helping to facilitate collective action, participatory culture, and civil 
engagement (Arifuddin, 2014; Nugroho & Syarif, 2012 Lim, 2013; Nugroho, 2007, 2008).  
However, while contributing to a vibrant and empowered communities, the media landscape 
also faces many challenges.  First, after the return of freedom of expression in Indonesia after 
Suharto’s regime, the corporatization and centralization of media ownership took place post-
Suharto (Haryanto, 2010; Robinson & Hadiz, 2004).  These two factors combined contributed to 
rural-urban divisions in media infrastructure and corporate and political control of the media 
                                                 
29The National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction, Government of Indonesia’s Smart Card Program. 
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(Bagdikian, 1997).  For example, most media conglomerations currently in Indonesia are owned 
by oligarchic political parties rooted in the legacy of the Suharto’s authoritarian regime (V. R. 
Hadiz, 2004, 2008; V. Hadiz, 2003; A Heryanto & Hadiz, 2005).  As a result, a positive attribute 
of ICTs in Indonesia has been its ability to provide spaces for alternative political information 
and discourse to be created and shared.   
 
Despite, Indonesia’s low ICT development and infrastructure30, Indonesia is one of the 
most digitally active countries in the world.  Statistics show that only 55 million Indonesian 
citizens had Internet access and there currently 85% of the population have mobile phones (ITU, 
2016).  Three factors in this growth have been the expansion of (1) mobile phone usage, (2) 
freedom of expression, (3) commercialization of the media following Suharto’s fall (Lim, 2011).  
It should be noted that early in the internet boom, internet cafés were the primary points of 
access for 2/3 of Internet users (Wahid, Furuholt, & Stein, 2004).  “In their heyday, Internet 
cafés could be found inside shopping malls or by the main roads in Jakarta, but now the 
establishments are more often deep in the back alleys of crowded neighborhoods”(Internet 
Cafes are still alive in Jakarta, Barely, 2011).  The proliferation of Internet access and mobile 
phones led to the development of a ‘cyber-civic space’ in Indonesia (Lim, 2013, p. 639) that 
played a critical role beginning with the removal of Suharto (Armando, 2011; Harris and 
Forresti, 2011).However, the democratic utility of ICTs continued after Suharto as the reform 
movement produced an assortment of websites devoted to political change in Indonesia.  “KdP-
net and SiaR are only the oldest and longest surviving of them” (Hill & Sen, 2002, p. 172).  
Censorship and page space restricted what the groups could publish in formal media 
publications, but the internet continues to provide a new venue for opinions to be shared with 
                                                 
30 Indonesia’s ICT Development Index is low by global standards.  The UN’s International 
Telecommunication Unit gives Indonesia a rating of 3.94 in terms of the ICT Development Index. 
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the public.  The Indonesian political activists joined with a variety of international human rights 
organizations to spread their message to a global audience.   
Most recently, Indonesia has witnessed a tremendous growth in social media usage, with 
90% of online activities devoted to browsing social networking sites (Lim, 2013, p. 639).  During 
2015, only 29% of the population “have access to the web, and most connections are relatively 
slow” (Plucinska, 2015).  Not surprisingly studies have found that Indonesians are among some 
of the most social media active citizens around the world  (Lim, 2013, p. 636).  A recent study 
found a vibrant social media scene with Facebook and Twitter as the dominant platforms as well 
as extremely affordable mobile phones (Nugroho et al 2012). Social media users are 
concentrated in urban areas with over 60 per cent of traffic coming from big cities such as 
Jakarta, Bandung, Medan, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, and Semarang (Saling and Silang, 2011). This 
is reflective of the broader pattern of technological dependency in Indonesia in that there are 
still gender and age disparities when looking at ICT usage.  For example, when looking at 
Facebook, a study found that users are predominantly 18-34 years old (62 per cent) with only 2 
per cent over the age of 5531. Similar disparities are found with mobile web users: 53 per cent are 
18-27 years and 82 per cent are male32.  Finally, getting news from the Internet has also become 
a major online activity of Indonesian users. The most popular local news sites are Detik.com, 
followed by Kompas.com, Vivanews.com and Okezone.com. The most popular websites among 
Indonesians, however, are global rather than local sites such as Facebook, Google, and 
Blogger.com.  Blogging is very popular in Indonesia and as of 2012, the country supported over 
150,000 bloggers33.  
 
 
                                                 
31 Ibid 
32 InMobi, 2009. Blackberry Beating iPhone in Indonesia by Mobile Ad Requests, 7 October [online] 
http://www.inmobi.com/press-releases/2009/10/07/blackberry-beating-iphone-in-indonesia-by-mobile-adrequests/ 
[Accessed 28 July 2011] 
33 SalingSilang.com, 2011. Indonesia Social Media Landscape, 2nd report, [online] http://www.slideshare.net/saling 
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Yet, despite demonstrating a keen ability for digital activism, Freedom House rates 
Indonesia as partly free, including in terms of Internet and Press freedoms (Freedom House 
2016). Additionally, treason and blasphemy laws are routinely used to limit freedom of 
expression by minority groups and separatists (Indonesia, 2015).Media groups have found a way 
to circumvent some of the barriers to access.  For example, thousands of the radio and television 
stations in Indonesia operate illegally because there are “stringent though unevenly enforced 
licensing rules” (Indonesia, 2015).  Restrictions on foreign journalists restrict the flow of 
information from Papua and West Papua because they are not authorized to travel into these 
areas without special permission.  In August 2014, two French journalists were apprehended 
and held “for violating their tourist visas while filming a documentary about human rights in 
Papua” (Indonesia, 2015).  These two journalists were convicted and sent to prison for 2.5 
months.   
 
Activism and History of Student Movement 
Students and civil society first demonstrated their power during President Sukarno’s 
regime (1959-1966).  In 1966, it was a student-led coup which ousted Sukarno from power after 
a failed army coup d’état on March 11, 1966(Bhakti, 2004).   Likewise, as noted earlier, the 
proliferation of Internet access and mobile phones led to the development of a ‘cyber-civic space’ 
in Indonesia (Lim, 2013, p. 639) that played a critical role beginning with the removal of 
Suharto.  One of the earliest efforts at using ICTs to create an alternative civic space, was the 
development of an email discussion list by John MacDougall of the state of Maryland in the US 
called “Indonesia-L” or “apakabar” (Harsono, 1996).  This discussion forum became the first to 
facilitate the communication of critics of Suharto’s New Order and played a key role in 
distributing information to other activists. (Hill & Sen, 2002, p. 170).  Additionally, one of the 
political internet pioneers in Indonesia was PIJAR, an organization created by student activists 
as a “mechanism for democratic struggle in September 1989” (Hill & Sen, 2002, p. 170).  
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PIJAR’s mission of social and political justice was furthered by its program of public advocacy, 
publications, education and training.  PIJAR was best known for its print periodical, Kabar dari 
PIJAR [News from PIJAR].  It was one of the illegal publications that circulated among 
students, sharing the critical views on government policies.  “In July 1995, its editor Tri Agus S. 
Siswowihardjo was charged with insulting the president in an article in the magazine and 
sentenced to two years in jail” (Hill & Sen, 2002, p. 171).  The student activists were able to 
bypass the “government-controlled television and radio stations” (Marcus, 1998, p. A01) as the 
revolutionists spread their messages about their demonstrations by email, and they flooded 
newsgroup websites “with stories of President Suharto’s corruption, and used chat groups to 
exchange tips about resisting troops” (Marcus, 1998).  Rather than spend excessively on 
telephone calls between people located on thousands of islands, the Internet spread the 
messages to activist organizers in each locale quickly and inexpensively.  At the same time, 
despite oppression of civil society, students continued to meet underground in “study groups” 
providing a continuance of student organization leading up to the events of 1998 (Aaron, 2007).   
Criticism of Suharto also began to emerge from influential NGOs, political leaders and parties, 
Muslim organizations, etc.  Student-led violent protests took place all around the country and 
were increasingly supported by Indonesia’s middle class as well as political opposition groups, 
academics, retired generals, and NGOs (Moreau & Lin, 1998). After rallying, the students could 
occupy parliament before forcing Suharto to resign. Reports were sent directly from an activist 
using a laptop inside the parliament building while surrounded by the military troops.  “The 
Internet in Indonesia functioned as a weapon against state censorship, until that censorship 
crumbled in the final few weeks of the Suharto regime”(Hill & Sen, 2002, p. 173).  Eventually, 





The shift from Suharto’s New Order to democracy was dramatic since the authoritarian 
rule had been in power for more than 30 years.  Additionally, moving from centralized rule to a 
lively and functional democracy took a series of concerted reforms which faced many challenges 
along the way.  The free and fair electoral process was a part of a “general overhaul and 
liberalization of the political system, including the establishment of a multiparty system, 
freedom of the press and the first free and fair elections in the country since 1956” (Heiduk, 
2014, p. 300).  Unfortunately, focus on Indonesia’s conversion procedure rapidly deteriorated 
“as concerns over the future stability and territorial integrity of the country” (Heiduk, 2014, p. 
301) dominated. At the same time, Indonesia experienced conflicts in the provinces.  With 
Suharto out of power, the communal and religious tensions in the provinces began to appear.  
Indonesia’s 87% Muslim population and the Christian and other minority faiths had been stifled 
during the Suharto regime.  Without the fear of repercussions, the discussion of prior taboo 
topics, such as racial, ethnic, religious, or class divisions, became more visible in the mass 
media, and this caused the tensions between the various groups to escalate. The religious wars 
in Maluku contributed to the destruction and interruption of internet service to the region.  As 
the instability worsened and after humanitarian intervention, “East Timor seceded from 
Indonesia in 1999” (Heiduk, 2014, p. 301). Additionally, “post-Suharto Indonesia was troubled 
by the outbreak of communal violence between Christians and Muslims in the Moluccas and 
parts of Sulawesi, as well as by the escalation of secessionist conflicts in Indonesia’s outermost 
provinces of West-Papua and Aceh” (Heiduk, 2014, p. 301).  The post-Suharto regime has also 
included a group of holdovers who “also have sustained a corrupt, undemocratic political culture 
in which patrimonial networks and money play central roles” (Nankyung, 2014, p. 366).  
Indonesia’s anti-corruption body, Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi or Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK), has taken a strong stance against corruption and since their founding in 
2002 they have jailed high profile politicians and figures. However, vote buying and money 




Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was the first elected president after Suharto’s rule, and his 
time in office was an extremely stable period for Indonesia.  Yudhoyono’s term lasted from 2004 
to 2014.  Parameswaran (2014) gives credit to Yudhoyono “for giving Indonesia a decade of 
political stability and economic growth in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 
the overthrow of Indonesian autocrat Suharto” (Parameswaran, 2014).   Unfortunately, the 
political stability was interrupted by a political rift.  “Yudhoyono’s quiet rule was followed by the 
most divisive elections since the end of Soeharto’s New Order regime in 1998” (Mietzner, 2015, 
p. 119).   According to Mietzner (2015), “The 2014 elections returned Indonesia to a more 
‘normal’ state of politics — one in which the heterogeneity of views and interests played out in 
the open instead of being absorbed into Yudhoyono’s quest for societal harmony” (p. 120).  
 
Further Integration of ICTs into Political Landscape 
 
Electoral reforms are critical for the sustainability of transitional democracies, like 
Indonesia which experienced long periods of authoritarian rule (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2014; 
Heiduk, 2014; Bhakti, 2004).  Post-Suharto, the country underwent a series of institutional 
reforms aimed at changing the electoral process and representative institutions in preparation 
for the 2004 presidential elections (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2014; Bhakti, 2004; Fionna and 
Njoto-Feillard, 2015; Heiduk, 2014; Mietzner, 2015).  Therefore, these elections proved to be 
critical for the country’s young democracy.  It was also the first election which would lack many 
of the rigid controls and manipulations that were seen in elections under Suharto’s New Order.  
Therefore, perhaps for the first time in the country’s history, politicians would have to earn 
people’s vote, rather than arranging for them (Bhakti, 2004; Fionna and Njoto-Feillard, 2015; 
Heiduk, 2014; Mietzner, 2015; Wanandi, 2010).The Internet and digital activism also played a 
pivotal role in the elections.  It continued to be a unifying force for democracy in the days 
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leading up to the election.  For example, it was note that on the eve of the election, the 
candidates called on the “community” to use the Internet to express their opinions rather than 
go out on the streets and face the military”(Bhakti, 2004; Fionna and Njoto-Feillard, 2015; 
Heiduk, 2014; Wanandi, 2010).Therefore, scholars argued that the Internet in Indonesia had 
become the space from which educated middle-class liberal democrats could become guerilla 
combatants in defense of democracy (Bhakti, 2004; Heiduk, 2014). 
 
Yet despite digital activism and reforms, elite politics continued to dominate elections. 
Although, the 2004 elections highlighted the growing power, independence, and political 
awareness among citizens (Singh, 2003; Bhakti, 2004; Dagg, 2007), critics noted that reforms 
and digital activism did not change much (Wanandi, 2010; Fionna and Njoto-Feillard, 2015; 
Heiduk, 2014; Mietzner, 2015).   For one, the incumbent President Megawati Sukarnoputri did 
return to power that year.  Second, studies noted that despite the proliferation of political 
activity, the ability of newly-activated groups to grab power from traditional political elites 
remained largely limited (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2014; Bhakti, 2004; Fionna and Njoto-
Feillard, 2015; Heiduk, 2014; Mietzner, 2015; Wanandi, 2010; Singh, 2003).  For example, 
during the electoral process, “the Democratic People’s Party (PRD), with its base in the radical 
student movement, used the Internet more actively than any of the other political parties, but 
did not even come close to winning a seat” (Nugroho, 2008; 59; Lim, 2013).Consequently, 
although the Internet had played an integral role in the changeover from authoritarianism to 
democracy, it did not have any direct impact on the ballot (Nugroho, 2008; Lim, 2013).  
Meanwhile, political parties did not use the Internet to their advantage (Nugroho, 2008; Lim, 
2013).   Whereas the young urban professionals and the students viewed the internet as a 




It was not until the 2009 and 2014 Presidential elections, that Indonesia began to show 
the signs greater democratic deepening.  The 2009 elections largely seen by the public and the 
international community as democratic, fair and peaceful (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2014; Fionna 
and Njoto-Feillard, 2015; Heiduk, 2014; Mietzner, 2015).  The 2014 Presidential elections put 
Indonesia’s emerging civil society at the forefront once again.  In October 2014, Joko Widodo, 
better known as Jokowi, was inaugurated as the seventh president of Indonesia”(Connelly, 
2015). Opposing Jokowi in the electoral race was retired Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto. After the 
ballots cast during the 2014 election on 9 July 2014 were counted, Jokowi won by a 6.3 percent 
margin in the presidential election. “Golkar, the party of former president Suharto, came in 
second, but won fewer seats than in the past. The Democrat Party (PD) of outgoing president 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (also known as SBY) lost a significant number of seats” (Indonesia, 
2015).  Immediately after the elections, controversy surrounding the election led to violence in 
Aceh. “A power struggle between two political parties whose members were once part of the Free 
Aceh Movement led to shootings, grenade attacks, and destruction of property” (Indonesia, 
2015). Voter list inflation and ballot stuffing caused a 99% turnout of voters in more than half of 
the districts of Papua (Indonesia, 2015).  The controversial ‘noken’ system of voting was also a 
part of the political process even though the Election Commission ruled against the practice. The 
noken system allows community leaders to “engage in bloc voting for their communities” 
(Indonesia, 2015). The noken system was a part of customary law and was upheld by the 
Constitutional Court in both 2009 and 2012 judicial reviews (Indonesia, 2015).  Regional direct 
elections were a customary practice, but the 2014 law brought that to a close, and the law was 
detested by the public. “Direct elections for provincial and district leaders began in 2005, often 
leading to tensions between the central government and local authorities” (Indonesia, 2015). 
District elections had been corrupt, and “in June 2014, former Constitutional Court chief justice 
Akil Mochtar received a life sentence for corruption and money laundering related to his role in 
fixing rulings on contested district elections” (Connelly, 2015).  However, direct elections did 
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have a positive aspect. They also allowed “local leaders who are not part of existing national elite 
to gain office, such as Jokowi” (Connelly, 2015).  
 
An integral part of Jokowi’s winning campaign strategy was to rely “on a network of 
volunteers, who were often mobilized through social media”(Fionna & Njoto-Feillard, 2015, p. 
147).  However, their opposition, Gerinda, had the necessary funds to deploy thousands of 
salaried campaigners on the ground” (Fionna & Njoto-Feillard, 2015, p. 147).  And Prabowo’s 
campaign was even more organized than Gerinda and Jokowi’s campaigns. In addition, this 
election was different than those of years past.  The media was extensively involved in spreading 
propaganda for the political campaigns.  In fact, “in the history of Indonesia’s presidential 
campaigns, this was the first time that the media would have such a critical role in polarizing the 
electorate or the country” (Fionna & Njoto-Feillard, 2015, p. 147). After such hard-fought 
campaigning, “Prabowo challenged the result – far closer than the winning margins in two 
previous polls in 2004 and 2009 – before the General Elections Commission and the 
Constitutional Court, but both institutions unanimously ruled that Jokowi had won” (Connelly, 
2015).  Although, Prabowo contested the ballot count, “The [inaugural] ceremony completed the 
first peaceful transfer of power between two popularly elected leaders in the world’s third-
largest democracy” (Connelly, 2015).  
Political Parties and the Use of ICTs in Indonesia 
Within a context of invigorated student population and emergence of new political actors 
in the political stage, I explored how political parties are currently using ICTs.  Currently, 
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Several things stand out when looking at the online political uses of social media 
platforms by political parties.  First, there is great variability in the ways that parties utilize these 
platforms and the successes they have in creating a vibrant online community.  Second, Twitter 
is the most utilized social media platform.  This is not surprising considering Indonesia has been 
dubbed the Twitter nation (Lim, 2013).  Third, not surprisingly, the major political parties such 
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as Democratic Party, Party of the Functional Groups, Indonesia Democratic-Party Struggle, 
Great Indonesia Movement Party, also have the most sophisticated uses of ICTs in their online 
politicking as well as the most vibrant online communities.  Therefore, although the non-
traditional candidate Joko Widodo successfully utilized social media to become President during 
the 2014 elections, however, social media and other ICTs in Indonesia are not contributing to 
any other break from traditional politics.  Finally, Indonesian political parties have integrated 
mobile technologies into their political outreach and communications to higher varying degrees 
that seen in Chile and Taiwan.  The uses of ICTs in Indonesia as well as the historical context 
that has created a progressive voice, greatly differs from another emerging democracy, Peru.  
Nevertheless, for a country that is plagued by poverty and low ICT development, the utilization 
of ICTs in politics demonstrates how youth and a culture of civic mindedness in society can 




Despite having one of Latin America’s strongest economies, Peru is a weak democracy 
due to a lack of strong parties and civil society (Vergara and Watanabe, 2016).  In Peru, 
corruption and nepotism have contributed to a loss of trust for democratic representative 
institutions.  Likewise, the country’s lack of coherent social policy has led to growing inequality 
and persistent poverty (Cameron, 1994, 1997). Large segments of the population, such as 
indigenous groups lack effective political representation and voice regarding decisions on land 
use that directly affect them. Due to these factors, citizens in Peru tend to have an unfavorable 
view of democracy and have among the lowest rates of satisfaction and public trust in their 





Human Development in Peru 
 
Peru has historically been one of the most unequal countries in Latin America. Sustained 
economic growth has reduced poverty by over half and extreme poverty by three fourths in the 
last ten years (Peru, 2015).  With a GNI per capita of $6,370 (Peru, 2015), Peru is considered an 
upper middle income per the World Bank.  However, its human development is low due to high 
inequality, with a Gini coefficient of 44.73 as of 2013 (World Bank, 2015), widespread poverty 
among indigenous communities, and very low social spending.  During the 2000s, Peru only 
spent 8% of its GDP on social spending, considerably lower than other countries with low social 
spending such as Mexico (13%), Colombia (14%), and Chile (15%) (Economic Commission on 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 2006).  Peru’s public expenditure on conditional cash 
transfers (CCTs) Junta constituted .14% of GDP in 2010, (UNESCO Institute for Statistics & 
World Bank, 2015) and only reaches 21% of the Peruvian poor.  
 
Likewise, Peru has one of the lowest rates of public spending on education.   The average 
in Latin America is 5.1% of a country’s GDP and Peru only spends 3.5% on education (UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics & World Bank, 2015).  Thus, there is a wide educational and vocational 
gap in Peru and quality education is difficult to access. The chief educational problem is the 
dropout rate. Due to family circumstances, “many poor children temporarily or permanently 
drop out of school to help support their families” (The World Factbook: Peru, 2015). 
Additionally, about a quarter to a third Peruvian children work to help support their families. In 
fact, children ages 6 to 14 work at hazardous mining jobs or dangerous construction sites (The 
World Factbook: Peru, 2015).So, only about half of Peru’s poor citizens finish primary school, 




There are sharp economic divisions between Peruvians in the urban areas and rural 
centers, as well as among Peruvians of European-descent rather than the indigenous population 
(Graham, 1993, p. 46).  The Afro-Peruvian, are among one of Peru’s poorest group of indigenous 
people.  They live in rural areas where the poverty rate is more than 55% (World Bank, 2013). 
Overall, the city dwellers are more skilled and have access to more educational opportunities. 
According to Losson (2013), the indigenous populations have not been well represented in the 
national community. A group of intellectuals known as the indigenista elites “sought a greater 
inclusion of indigenous (mainly, Andean) populations in the national community” (Losson, 
2013). However, the indigenista endeavors failed “in proposing alternatives to social inclusion 
for indigenous people other than the abandonment of cultural markers and the adoption of 
more western-oriented standards of living” (Losson, 2013).   
 
Media and Technology in Peru 
 
By many standards, Fujimori’s media corruption persists today.  Peru’s media is 
considered Partly Free by the Freedom House (Freedom House, 2015).  Although, freedom of 
the press is permitted by the 1993 constitution, it is not often respected in practice.  Journalists, 
press media, and activists are often threatened, murdered, or charged and fined with criminal 
defamation charges if they speak against the ruling government or try to uncover corruption of 
individual politicians.  Efforts to make the government more transparent through open data 
initiatives have also resulted in criminal charges for anyone who attempts to undertake this.  In 
October 2013, President Ollanta Humala, signed a cybercrime law which restricts the use of 
government data (Freedom House, 2015).  Finally, activists have noted that journalists often 
accept bribes from government officials in exchange for biased coverage (Freedom House, 
2015).  Therefore, for citizens it is often challenging to distinguish between real news and 
information and government propaganda.   
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A second concern regarding Peru’s media landscape is the concentration of media 
ownership. According to the Peruvian media watchdog group, Ojo Público, political parties are 
not behind the ownership of any private media at the national level. There are three media 
companies which control 84% of the Peruvian market: Grupo El Comercio, ATV, and Latina.  In 
2013, the largest one of these conglomerates, Grupo El Comercio, also purchased a 54% state of 
Empresa Periodistica, which owns popular newspapers, Ojo, Correo, El Bocón, and Ajá. The 
purchase gave Grupo El Comercio a 78% share in Peru’s newspaper market. Consequently, there 
are concerns that the concentration of media ownership will negatively affect the diversity of 
opinions available in the media.  Peru also has state media, although it has a relatively small 
audience.  The government owns one television network, two radio stations, and the print news 
agency Andina.  
 
The emergence of ICTs in Peru has been momentous but it has also faced challenges.   
When the Internet was first introduced in Peru, its consumption was mostly among intellectuals 
and wealthy individuals (Barreto, 2000).   However, in the early 2000s usage began to expand 
to the public and Internet in the capital of Lima alone increased 160 percent (Fernandez-
Maldonado, 2005, p. 48). Commercial cybercafés, or cabinas, began emerging throughout Peru 
and allowed middle and low-income groups access to the Internet.  The continued expansion of 
the Internet, has now made Peru the fifth-biggest internet user market in Latin America, with 
18.0 million consumers of all ages (ITU, 2015).  Internet usage currently penetrates 58.6. % of 
the population (ITU, 2016), although most of the users are 24 years and younger (Gutierrez and 
Gamboa, 2010). The government currently does not restrict the use of the Internet or social 
media; therefore, Facebook is the top social media platform most used by most millennials 
there34.  Likewise, Peru has a flourishing blogging culture and community that has been helping 
                                                 
34 ¿Cuántas personas están en las redes sociales? El Comercio, June 30, 2017. 
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to support online activism.  According to the blog Peruanista, Peru has more than 10,000 active 
blogs35. 
 
Political Transformation and Dominance of Elite-Led Politics 
 
Peru began its political transformation as a third wave democracy in the mid-1970s, 
following the demise of the leftist military regime, Gobierno Revolucionario de la Fuerza 
Armada (1960-1980).Attempts at democratic reform during this period created a political crisis 
and instability in society as armed conflict erupted between the government of Peru and armed 
resistance groups such as Ejército Guerrillero Popular (People’s Guerilla Army), communist 
militant group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), and Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac 
Amaru (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) a radical socialist group took place from 1980-
2ooo.  This period of intense civil conflict resulted in the deaths of 69,000 lives at the ends of 
armed rebel groups and government forces.  In response to this social turmoil, Alberto 
Fujimori’s led anautogolpe (self-coup) in 1992.  He suspended the constitution and eliminated 
the Parliament and judiciary shortly after taking power.  Citizens tired of social conflict and 
turmoil, initially supported Fujimori’s authoritarian stance at restoring peace and order (Vich, 
2004; Cameron, 1994, 1997; Cotler, 1994).  Likewise, his free market policies ushered in a 
period of dramatic economic growth in Peru. 
 
Fujimori placed economic growth above all else.  In 1991, he adopted a series of 
aggressive structural reforms aimed at ending Peru’s import-substituting industrialization 
strategies as well as stopping the high inflation which had plagued the country.  He 
implemented several supplementary measures which deregulated the labor market and foreign 
trade as well as privatized most state companies, established a central bank, and liberalized the 
market for agricultural land (Cotler, 1994). Fujimori’s reforms ushered in an era of rapid 
                                                 
35http://peruanista.blogspot.com/, Blogs en Peru (2015). 
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economic recovery and macroeconomic stabilization which lasted largely until the Asian and 
Brazilian crisis of 1998.  To this day, Peru is categorized as an upper-middle income country.   
 
During Fujimori’s dictatorship, democratic institutions were further weakened and no 
coherent social policies were put in place.  Fujimori also ushered in an era of wide-spread 
corruption and nepotism which only served to further reinforce citizens’ lack of trust for 
politicians.  During his term, videotapes showing Fujimori spy chief and legal adviser, Vladimiro 
Montesinos bribing a congressman-elect were leaked (McMillan & Zoido, 2004). The 
‘Vladivideos,’ as they came to be known, revealed the identities of those on Montesino’s payroll, 
thereby, destroying the political careers of the bribed group of politicians, congressmen, judges, 
electoral authorities, mayors, and journalists (Calderon, 2001, p. 47).  Following this release, 
there was strong public outcry which followed Fujimori to his second inauguration day in 2001.  
It was during this time, that the emergence of a strong progressive national voice arose.   During 
this period, the Civil Society Collective organized regular symbolic events which after time 
aimed to build a broad citizen movement (Roberts, 1998).  They organized protests such as “flag 
washing” and “put the trash in the trash” protests in cities throughout the country (Vich, 2004; 
Roberts, 1998).  During this time, women’s and student groups also began taking to the streets, 
organizing weekly protests in front of the Palace of Justice to denounce the absence of the rule of 
law and the monopolization of power by Fujimori and his cronies (Burt, 2016; Roberts, 1998).  
They set up banners called “Wall of Shame”, which displayed the names and images of regime 
officials, including Fujimori, Montesinos, congress woman Martha Chavez, as well as Monsenor 
Luis Ciprani, an Opus Dei bishop who were supporters of the regime.  However, after Fujimori, 
there was no central unifying issue for the various groups that had emerged out of the protests.   
 
The administrations that followed Fujimori, Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), and the 
twice elected Alan Garcia (2006-2011) largely failed to address the culture of patronage and 
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nepotism, weak governing institutions, and persistent poverty that continue to plague the 
country.  A 2006 report published by the Inter-American Development Bank, found Peru’s 
“bureaucratic functional capacity” to rank near the bottom in Latin America, below Bolivia, 
Guatemala and Nicaragua (Inter-American Development Bank, 2006). For example, it has been 
noted that state functions such as law enforcement, courts, schools and health clinics were 
missing staff and were largely inoperative (UNDP, 2015).   
 
President of Peru from 2011 to 2016, Ollanta Humala made “social inclusion” the 
centerpiece of his 2011 presidential campaign and launched several new anti-poverty initiatives.  
These efforts help to reduce poverty from 50% to 26% in Peru (Guigale & Cibilis, 2007).  
However, overall the social spending increases have been modest.  As of 2013, 23.9% of the 
people were at or below the national poverty line, according to the World Bank (Peru, 2015).  
Within Latin America, Peru is the only country that has devoted very little towards instituting 
public services and anti-poverty programs for its citizens.  Like Alan Garcia, most of the other 
post-Fujimori politicians tended to abandon established parties and become “independents” in 
pursuit of short-term and individualistic electoral strategies (Levitsky and Cameron, 2001: 113: 
Schmidt, 2000; Tanaka 1998: 96-97).  Noted exceptions of this wave was Alejandro Toledo, who 
created Perú Posible (PP) in preparation for a 1995 presidential bid and Frederico Salas, who 
was elected mayor of Huancavelica as an independent, and co-founded (but ultimately 
abandoned) Peru Now in preparation for a 2000 presidential bid.  Nevertheless, after Fujimori, 
all of the country’s successful parties— including both progovernment parties and opposition 
parties such as Somos Perú and Perú Posible— were personalistic, candidate-centered and 
lacked overall, programs, national agenda, and strong roots in society (Levitsky, 2003).  At the 
national level, We Are Peru, Possible Peru, Peru Now, Union for Peru, and Peru 2000 also 
emerged between 1995 and 1999. At the local levels, smaller parties emerged some which 
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proliferated such as We Are Huancayo, Forward Chiclayo, Ayacucho 95, Eternal Cuzco, Let’s 
Save Huaraz, Chim Pun Callao, and Put Some Heart into Lince.   
 
How ICTs are Being Integrated by Political Parties 
 
Within the realm of politics, the use of ICTs by political parties aiming to increase 
engagement has been limited.  Although, there are some "political" websites, specialized on 
political activism or discussion - citizens’ dislike of politics and preference for using ICTs for 
social purposes has limited its scope.   Thus, the online political sphere is just as fragmented as 
the offline and the apathy that most citizens’ experience regarding politics in their country also 
extends to online.  
 
Activists working alongside technologists and international actors have sought to change 
this trend by supporting the development of platforms to increase citizen engagement. One of 
these platforms was 131 Voces (Voices) platform which was developed in 2012 by a Peruvian 
civil society organization, software development companies CitiVox and Democratic Reflection, 
in addition to the National Democratic Institute.  The Peruvian Congress supported this 
platform and integrated it into their website.  131 Voces made voting records and pending 
legislation easily available to the public through the Peruvian Congress36. The platform then 
encourages public scrutiny and feedback with the aim of making government more accountable 
(131 Voces: Accountability and Transparency in the Peruvian Parliament, 2012). The website 
creates transparency and stimulates dialog among issues ranging from consumer protection to 
human rights (131 Voces, 2012)37. The platform was utilized by a handful of politicians to also 
create individualized pages which included their bio, social media feeds, and actions on key 
                                                 





pieces of legislation.  The utility of this platform was limited as an evaluation study showed that 
although it created political space for citizens to get engaged, this was not sufficient to overcome 
citizens’ lack of interest in politics (Price, 2014). More recent technology platforms in Peru have 
been centered around fact-checking elected officials, particularly during elections. In 2015, an 
investigative media website, Ojo-Público was launched to provide real-time fact-checking for the 
President’s public remarks. 
 
ICTs have been embraced in varying degrees by political parties the past ten years.   An 
analysis of the online presence and strategies of the major political parties in Peru highlights the 
limits on the utility of ICTs to transform political power and culture in Peru.  The analysis shows 
that three major parties in Peru: Left-wing-Partido NacionalistaPeruano,right-wing Fuerza 
Popular, and center-left Solidaridad Nacional, have the most active online political communities 
and utilize the most professional and sophisticated uses of ICTs for engaging citizens.  Their use 
of ICTs utilizes common Westernized ICT strategies such as creating groups and communities 
on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram among other platforms.  The remainder of 
smaller parties in Peru employ ICTs in limited ways and so have smaller and inactive online 
communities.  Below is a table of how the major political parties are using the Internet and 
social media in Peru.  
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Therefore, unlike the case in Indonesia, the use of ICTs in the political context is less 
transformative.  In Peru, these technologies have become yet another communication and 
organizing tool for the more established and well-resourced political parties; rather than 
transforming traditional power bases and helping to overcome the political apathy that has 
become endemic to Peru’s political culture.  Additionally, the success of media-based candidates 
such as Fernando Belaúnde Terry have shown politicians how ICTs can be used to for 
supporting individual politicians rather than building party organization (Smith, 2009).  
Likewise, scholars have noted how in Peru, ICTs are creating further fragmentation and 
undermining the party system by further reducing the need for party building and constructing 







In Indonesia and Peru, we have two emerging democracies overcoming authoritarian 
legacies and dealing with domestic challenges such as corruption, high poverty rate, and social 
divisions.  In Indonesia, the third largest democracy in the world, youth are driving political 
change using technologies (McRae, 2013), despite low levels of ICT development, high poverty, 
and low tertiary education.  The election of a non-traditional and third-party candidate, Joko 
Widowo, who capitalized on ICTs to engage with citizens, ushered in a new era of online political 
engagement which has further spurred lots of online civic technology communities.  In Peru, 
where education attainment is low, and youth attribute ICTs with social rather than political 
purposes, the utility has been more limited.  ICTs have failed to reengage citizens at a national 
level and to foster new cross-cutting networks and ties which can form the basis for a 
progressive movement.  In Peru, the use of ICTs in politics by politicians has been to use it as 
another communication platform.  Therefore, unlike the case in Chile and Taiwan, in Peru the 
persistent lack of trust in the political system has resulted in youth remaining largely apathetic.  
Although, Indonesia continues to struggle with weak political party system a campaign finance 
laws (Transparency International, 2014), citizens of Indonesia appear committed to the idea of 
democracy and are relying on digital activism to help push change along. 
 
In summary, Indonesia presents a fascinating case study.  Indonesia highlights the ways 
that preexisting cultures of resistance and activism can overcome demographic and 
socioeconomic factors.  Although, Indonesia is the poorest and least developed economically 
and ICT infrastructure-wise, it has some of the most vibrant ICT-enabled activism in the world.  
A reason for this is that ICTs are amplifying a political culture of student activism which has a 
historical legacy of being able to force oppressive leaders out of power.  Additional, analysis of 
political party websites showed how half of all political parties in Indonesia have high level of 
engagement and online communities.  Meanwhile, although Peru has a more educated and 
204 
 
connected population, Peru has a weakened legacy of activism that has is characterized as 
apathetic and disengaged from politics.  This is seen in the limited usage that political parties 
give to ICTs in their communications and outreach.   Therefore, in this context ICTs are seen 
more as social tools than political/activism tools.  I can also argue that like in Chile, Indonesia is 
another country where I would predict we may see political parties shifting and becoming more 





























Historical Legacies, ICTs, and Human Development: 




There is democratic uncertainty all over the world.  The reported decline of political 
parties and other institutional forms of engagement, loss of social cohesion, increasing economic 
inequality, and emergence of populism, have raised concerns about the competency of 
democratic societies.  Likewise, the emergence of ICTs has led to new “empowered publics” and 
“mediazation of politics” (Mazzoleni, 2008) which are contributing to greater dynamism and 
unpredictability in politics today.  How will political parties respond and adapt to these 
challenges and opportunities and how much of what we are seeing today is new and not a 
continuation of existing political and cultural practices?  As complex as these questions are to 
unravel, this study examines patterns and mechanisms which can help explain how ICT-enabled 
activism is shaping political parties in emerging democracies.  Specifically, it seeks to 
understand how demographic, socio economic, and cultural factors interact with ICTs to shape 
relations between social movements and political parties in the 21st century.   
 
To answer these questions, this study sought to do two things.  First, I argue that a 
comparative approach to analyzing the relationship between ICTs and political parties has the 
potential to offer renewed understanding of the development of the ICTs in social and political 
life.  There is increasing comparative literature that is starting to examine how the Internet 
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shapes democratic politics in a variety of national contexts (Gibson et al. 2003; Chadwick, 2006; 
Vaccari, 2008; Gibson & McAllister, 2011) and this study seeks to supplement that work.  
Therefore, the study is centered around four case studies featuring two regions with the highest 
rate of Internet usage, Latin America (Chile and Peru) and East Asia (Taiwan and Indonesia).   
Second, I argue that political scientists can no longer ignore the role of ICTs and digital media.  
Consequently, this study sought to incorporate four pieces of literature that rarely all interact 
with each other in political science: literature on social movements, digital media, technology, 
and democracy (Porta, 2011).  There are studies which are increasingly integrating these bodies 
of work, for example, by introducing new theories on how political communication works in the 
digital age and how politics is increasingly defined by organizations, groups, and individuals 
who are best able to blend older and newer ICT-media logics, in what has been coined hybrid 
systems (Chadwick, 2016).  Therefore, an area ongoing research will continue to explore how 
ICTs and digital media challenge traditional established political parties in these new “hybrid” 
contexts (Coleman, 2017; Chadwick and Strommer-Galley, 2016). Likewise, social movement 
theory helps to bridge our understanding of digital media’s mediating effects on social and 
political life, through its ability to foster new frames and opportunity structures for activists and 
political parties to leverage.  Finally, research on democracy tends to be centered on 
representative institutions and often provides structural explanations of democratic 
developments (Della Porta, 2010) which are often missing in discussion of ICTs in political and 
social life.   
 
By combining pieces of these literatures, I then examined the ways that ICTs interact 
with contextual factors which pre-date their existence in Taiwan, Chile, Indonesia, and Peru.  
What I find is that, history matters.  Rather, I argue that the shifting nature between social 
movements, ICTs, and political parties that can be shaped by a variety of demographic and 
socio-economic factors as well as preexisting cultures of resistance, activism, and electoral 
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campaigning.  Specifically, factors such as successive student movements and a country’s human 
development, particularly education may be fruitful patterns that are worthy of further 
exploration.  The case studies also show how different types of environments can catalyze or 
diminish the development of ICTs for politics, although there were five political opportunities 
structures that were found in varying degrees throughout the case studies.  These were the: (1) 
elevation of domestic issues to the international arena, (2) support the emergence of “third 
party” non-establishment candidates, (3) facilitation of peer-to-peer communications which can 
strengthen alternative and common/shared views and perspectives, (4) creation of new 
government accountability and transparency advocate communities, and (5) diversification of 
new and complementary forms of organizing, mobilizing, and movement building strategies.   
 
Regarding the role of these political opportunities, in the Taiwan case study I discuss 
how existing ethnonationalistic claims and complex cross strait relations have caused many to 
argue that ICT-enabled activism especially post-Sunflower movement, disruptive to current 
politics in Taiwan (Lee, 2014); therefore, lose its influence in the Taiwanese political landscape.  
At the same time, Taiwan’s history of student movements demonstrates a preexisting culture of 
resistance and activism often centered on media, of which the Sunflower movement could just 
be a next phase, albeit with new ICT tools.  In Chile, the dominance of elite politics and market-
centered reforms interacted with Chile’s preexisting culture of student activism to create new 
and dynamic forms of ICT-enabled activism.  However, despite the student movements’ ability 
to garner domestic and international support, they were still unable to overcome the 
embeddedness of Chile’s preexisting elite and market-driven political culture.  Therefore, 
despite the emergence of “empowered publics” creating new political opportunities in Taiwan 
and Chile - political parties and the political landscape suggested that it would still be “politics 
as usual”.  Therefore, these preliminary findings suggest that the ICT-political parties-
democracy relationship may not be absolute, but rather more dialectical - which means that not 
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only can we expect great variability among regions and countries (Best & Wade, 2009), but that 
it is possible that ICTs can reshape political parties, but political parties will mediate eventual 
outcomes. 
 
The same can be said for my supplemental case studies of Indonesia and Peru, although, 
they present an additional layer of complexity.  In these case studies, I discussed how social 
movements and ICTs in Indonesia are creating more political opportunities than in Peru - 
despite Indonesia being the least wealthy and having the lowest human development, rate of 
education, and Internet usage of all the countries.  As a result, in terms of ICTs and political 
opportunities, Indonesia operated more like its wealthier, more educated, and higher Internet 
usage counterparts of Taiwan and Chile.  Therefore, what additional factors can help explain the 
divergence in this case?  Could Indonesia’s history of vibrant and successful student movements 
help to explain this?  I argue that Indonesia’s preexisting culture of activism and resistance 
could help explain why Indonesia has a more active culture of activism and use of ICTs, despite 
all odds.  However, two additional factors may warrant a closer review.  These are the role of 
social capital and political efficacy.  For example, in Indonesia, despite high level of corruption 
and weak democratic institutions, student movements had earlier demonstrated how to use 
ICTs to overthrow the Suharto dictatorship in 1998.  While in Peru, the dominance of elite 
politics in Peru and political apathy has weakened the sense of political efficacy which could 
contribute to a lack of social capital among citizens and civil society38 (Loulis, 2003; Schmitter, 
2003).  
 
The sense of political efficacy for both student movement protestors and political parties 
were themes explored in the surveys for Taiwan and Chile.  In both countries, the surveys 
showed that although students expressed a higher sense of political efficacy and interest in ICTs 
                                                 
38 This goes to Malcolm Gladwell’s argument that meaningful activism requires strong, offline ties to 
mobilize engagement (2016). 
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than did political parties, this didn’t suggest an interest in traditional politics.  For example, in 
Taiwan most students expressed a positive view towards the utility of social networking sites in 
politics, the political activities students were most likely to use ICTs to engage with were: (1) 
keep up with political news, (2) debate or discuss political issues with others, and (3) learn about 
what issues and policies political parties are advocating for, (4) read the blog of a politicians, (5) 
watch a video online of a politicians, and sign online petitions or comment on online news.  
However, students were less likely to use social networking sites for more traditional politicking 
tasks such as recruiting people to get involved in a political cause or finding other people who 
share their political views.  In Chile, students reported less political efficacy than Taiwanese 
students, but they still reported using ICTs in similar ways.  Finally, in Chile and Taiwan, 
students appear to utilize ICTs to be connected to specific issues and not necessarily politicians.  
Therefore, the trend in both countries highlight how students were not inclined to use social 
media to feel closer to their political party, but rather for other personal purposes and interests.  
Likewise, a further area for research in Taiwan is to survey and compare students from the 
mainland with islander to determine if students’ interest in technology for political activism is 
attributed to a generational gap or if also depends on the political opinions and sense of political 
efficacy that students’ have.  
 
In terms of political parties’ efficacy when thinking about ICTs, the surveys and analysis 
of political party websites found that most parties were not even in the beginning stages of 
evolving into more movement-as-party forms.  In Chile, the political parties which actively 
courted student-led movements, were more likely to express interest in exploring ways that ICTs 
could promote innovative forms of direct and participatory democracy.  Here the parties which 
appeared especially innovative and effective in facilitating new participatory strategies were: 
Party for Democracy (Partido Por la Democracia) and National Renewal (Renovación Nacional).  
These parties’standout above the rest because they employ multiple technology platforms and 
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strategies and have active online communities with engagement from the public.  Meanwhile, in 
Taiwan party use of the Internet and technologies is more a function of current party culture 
and desire to appeal to modern and young constituents, than an interest by parties to elevate 
their interactions with citizens.  Therefore, political parties in Taiwan are not necessarily 
interested in exploring ways to be more responsive to citizens and improve their transparency 
and internal party democracy, despite the existence of a highly educated and connected 
citizenry. Consequently, it remains to be seen whether political parties will either be reformed or 
entirely replaced under the weight of technological change (Anstead and Chadwick, 2009).  The 






Table 23: Summary of Chile and Taiwan Parties’ Surveys 
Issues Chile Taiwan 
Political leaders’ approval 
of ICT use 
Majority support Majority support 
ICTs are best for…. 1. Incorporate issues to the 
political agenda 
2. Motivate people to stay 
politically active 
3. Discussions with citizens 
1. Distributing information on 
policy proposals;  
2. Search for information on 
political or social issues 
3. Discussion with citizens 
Feel ICTs make party lose 
control of message ad 
narrative 
77% disagree 73% agree 
Feel ICTs have facilitated 
their communication of 
messages and goals of their 
party 
82% agree 98% agree 
ICTs help to increase 
affiliations 
53% agree 70% agree 
ICTs help to diversify 
affiliations 
54% 95% agree 
ICTs help to deepen 
participation 
76% agree 92% agree 
ICTs help party work more 
effectively and efficiently 
76% agree 91% agree 
Favorite online tools: Website, Facebook, Twitter Facebook, Website, SMS 
ICT tool with greatest 
impact 
Twitter Facebook 
Use ICTs primarily to…. 1. Distribute information over 
political objectives and 
other political messages 
2. Build consensus around 
political problems and 
solutions 
3. Mobilize members for 
specific objective 
1. Communicate about policy 
objectives 
2. Increase concern and 
interest in issues 
3. Communicate with other 






In Indonesia, the major political parties such as Democratic Party, Party of the 
Functional Groups, Indonesia Democratic-Party Struggle, Great Indonesia Movement Party, 
also had the most sophisticated uses of ICTs in their online politicking as well as the most 
vibrant online communities.  However, unlike any of the other countries, Indonesia political 
parties appear to have integrated mobile technologies into their political outreach and 
communications.  In Peru, there were only three major parties Left-wing-Partido Nacionalista 
Peruano, right-wing Fuerza Popular, and center-left Solidaridad Nacional, who had the most 
active online political communities and utilized the most professional and sophisticated uses of 
ICTs for engaging citizens.  The remainder of smaller parties in Peru employed ICTs in limited 
ways and therefore had either small or inactive online communities. Therefore, in Peru these 
technologies have become yet another communication and organizing tool for the more 
established and well-resourced political parties; rather than transforming traditional power 
bases and helping to overcome the political apathy that has become endemic to Peru’s political 




The table below summarizes the analysis of political parties use of ICTs in online spaces: 
Table 24: Summary of Political Party Use of ICTs in Taiwan, Chile, Indonesia and Peru 
 
Countries Active Political 
Parties 
Facebook Twitter Activity Level  
East Asia     
Taiwan 5 60%: 3(5) using 40%: 2(5) using Major parties 




Indonesia 12 67%: 8(12) using 83%: 10(12) using Most parties 
trying to actively 
use social media, 




Chile 12 92%: 11(12) 100%: 12(12) Most parties were 
active to varying 
degrees of 











Two parties are 
successful and 
one is innovative. 
 
Finally, the question as to whether political parties should resist or answer to populist 
demands for a more fluid party-as-a-movement form is debatable.  Studies have found that 
political parties may be reformed due to the tension between control and interactivity, as ICTs 
foster a culture of organizational experimentation and a party-as-movement mentality 
(Chadwick and Strommer-Galley, 2016).  But should they? For example, scholars such as 
Zeynep Tufekci(2016) and Clay Shirky (2010) suggests that although ICTs drive thousands into 
the streets, it doesn’t meaningfully threaten people in power (Tufekci, 2016). Instead, ICTs may 
make it easier to build large but fragile movements, but they lack the hard work of compromise 
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and coalition-building that is needed to organize and sustain efforts long enough to effect 
political change (Tufekci, 2016).  If this is the case for ICT-enabled movements, what if political 
parties go the same way as these movements?  What essential political party functions may be 
lost or diminished?  Thus, more research is needed to identify ways to help political parties use 
ICTs to deepen existing traditional functions and foster “authentic participation” (Picazo, 2005), 
rather than aspiring for newer party-as-movement forms that do not clearly define how, ICTs 
could complement and not necessarily replace certain traditional functions that political parties 
possess which are critical to democracies.  Whether and how ICT-enabled citizens should 
breathe new life into established political parties (Chadwick and Strommer-Galley, 2016) is still 
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